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INTRODUCTION. 
This study makes no attempt at a comprehensive history of 
ethics. It rather approaches some representative theories from 
the standpoint of the thesis that morality is the socialized 
behaviour of the integrated personality. The interest is pri- 
marily in what tendencies these various theories consider to be 
innate in man; in their treatment of the socialization of the 
individual; and of the integration of the personality; in their 
suggested solutions to the ego -alter conflict; and in their 
consideration of religion as an integrative force within the 
personality. 
The experimental section makes no attempt to measure 
morality or moral traits, for it is difficult, if indeed it be 
possible, for a laboratorial test situation, which would be a 
necessary prerequisite to such measurement, to elicit natural 
moral reactions from subjects. Furthermore, the objective 
measurement of morality would necessitate the establishment 
of a norm as a standard which, when it has been secured, is, 
after all, a somewhat arbitrary gauge for measuring what 
many think to be incommensurable. Henri Clavier (1) speaks to 
the point in these words: " There is no algebra or arithmetic 
of the soul, neither a physics, a chemistry, nor a physiol- 
ogy ". 
(1) " L'Idee de Dieu chez l'Enfant ", p.8. 
2. 
This study, rather, tries to discover what development of 
moral ideas takes place in the mind of the child in early ad- 
olescence, in that period of growth when self -consciousness 
and moral responsibility are thought to become manifest. 
The method used is the group questionnaire. Since words 
are but the symbols of ideas, it is assumed that ethical ideas 
and moral vocabulary develop together. It may be objected that 
words carry varying shades of meaning for various children; 
but this difficulty inheres in language itself. It may be 
further held that the questionnaire measures intelligence by 
means of a moral vocabulary; but even if this be the case, 
such measurement of intelligence does not exclude a simultaneous 
measurement of moral ideas. 
The questions of the test are based upon the theory that 
central to the development of moral behaviour is the develop- 
ment, within society, of the self -regarding sentiment. 
Some writers hold that morality is merely custom, a so- 
cial phenomenon. Others hold that ethics treats of what ought 
to be, that it is constituted of those principles which deter- 
mine the true worth of ultimate ends of conduct. The present 
essay presents the thesis that the criteria of morality are 
two: first, socialization of behaviour; second, integration 
of the personality around a worthy master sentiment. 
Although "meta- psychological" theories are not.legiti- 
mately a part of psychology, this essay, in one instance, 
dares to trespass slightly upon metaphysical territory, be- 
cause in this case that field is not wholly foreign to the 
3. 
present thesis. This transgression is noted where made. 
"Ideas" are considered to be simply the conditions of 
one's thinking upon any subject - the " enduring cognitive 
dispositions and systems of dispositions " 
"Concepts ", in addition, are thought of as partaking of 
the nature of the universal rather than of the particular. 
"Ideals" are those constructs of the imagination and re- 
flection which embody highest values; they serve as archetypes 
for the determination of the copy. ideals are mental constructs 
" in which needs find their fulfilment (1) 
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Socrates. 470 ( ?) - 399 B.C. 
The roots of our thesis are grounded in the systems of 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 
Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge and vice with 
ignorance, thus making ignorance of one's true good to be the 
source of all one's wrongdoing. Knowledge of the good involves 
good conduct: "just men are those who know what is just con- 
cerning men" (1}. On the other hand, "folly is most akin to 
depravity ". 
Virtue, that is, the knowing and the included doing of the 
good, means the doing well by each person whatever he under- 
takes. Morality is a personal efficiency, each in his own 
social station: for example, "Kings and rulers are not those 
holding the sceptres - -- but those knowing how to rule ".(2) 
Virtue is the quality which makes man perform his unique 
mission efficiently. 
Socrates shows a relationship to exist between the good 
of self and of society: the issues of good actions are bene- 
ficial to both the agent and others. All the members of soci- 
ety benefit from the virtues of each: "Try rather to take heed 
(1). Xenophon; " Memorabilia ", Book IV, Chap.VI, Sec. 6. 
(2).Xenophon, Up.Oit., Book III, Ohap.IX, Sec. ib. 
6. 
to yourself; and do not neglect the affairs of the city, if 
there is any power in you to make them better. r'or as these go 
well, not only the other citizens, but also your friends, and 
you yourself not least, will benefit ". (1). 
Virtue and justice are generally goods; but after all, 
"every one wishes for his own good, and would get it if he 
could ". 
Criticism. 
in demonstrating " the superiority of virtue to vice by 
an appeal to the standard of self- interest " (2), Socrates 
really bases virtue upon a prudential egoism. However, such 
can not, obviously, be a satisfactory solution of the ego -alter 
problem. 
.urthermore, in maintaining that virtue is knowledge, 
Socrates must admit either that vice is involuntary, or that 
ignorance is voluntary. Either horn of the dilemma is difficult 
to harmonize with a morality of a free human agent. 
section II. 
Plato. 427 - 347 B.C. 
Plato, as Socrates, identifies virtue and knowledge. The 
highest attribute of man is to know virtue. The good is that 
which any one or any thing is meant to be. The Idea of the 
Good is the source of all other ideas: "In the world of knowl- 
edge, the form of the good is received last and with difficulty, 
but when it is seen, it must be inferred that it is the cause 
(1). Xenophon, Op.Cit. Book III, Chap. VII, Sec. 9. 
(2). Sidgwick, " History of Ethics ", p. 31. 
7. 
of all that is right and beautiful in all things ". (1) 
"Reason grasps the power of dialectic, the hypotheses, 
making them, not ends, but, as it were, underpositions or step- 
ping stones and starting points, so that, coming to the un- 
assumed, to the source of all, finally arrives at the Idea ". 
(2). "Dialectic means to rlato the force which drives the mind 
toward knowledge, or union with the Real. 'he "Idea "is Reality; 
only Ideas truly exist. "Hypotheses "are assumptions obviously 
true. 
Integration. 
Plato divides the soul into the appetitive part ( 1-0 
Érrt. 9 ur v) the spirit part (r COvj ° E L ö E s ) , and the rational 
or philosophic part (moo ),°yccr-r&icov 1. (3). Reason is that in 
man which enables him to live for something, to have ideals. (4). 
Each of these three parts of the soul has its special virtue: 
temperance, courage, and wisdom, respectively. The correctly 
proportioned, and thus harmonious union of these three vir- 
tues, constitutes the fourth and supreme soul -virtue - justice 
(ôi-P <a4- 0e-úer 1 1. Until a complete personal integration is 
effected by means of the union of mind with Reality, " The 
Idea ", that is, until truth be attained and the " travailing 
of the soul " is thus allayed, man does not experience inner 
peace. It is such an integrated personality that has "set his 
(1). " Republic ", Book VII 
(2).Op.Cit. Book VI, Chap. IXI, Sec. 511, B, C. 
(3). R.L. Nettleshit, "The Theory of Education in Plato's Re- 
public", from "Hellenica ", Ed.. Abbott, p.72. 
(4). R.L. Nettleship, "Lectures on the Republic of Plato ", 
Chap. X. 
8. 
house in order and is master of himself and is his own best 
friend, harmonizing his three -fold being as three chords 
naturally harmonious ". (1). Thus integration of personality 
might be said to mean for .lato the supreme soul- virtue, 
justice, effected by the attainment of truth. This condition 
would be the highest good - that which is most worth having. 
Justice is self -regarding, in that the control of 
passions by Reason issues into happiness: orderliness of 
mind is the foundation of happiness. 
Internal disorder or lack of harmonious integration be- 
comes manifest in bad conduct. Ignorance is a cause of such 
unharmonious conduct: "the just man appears as being good and 
wise, and the unjust as ignorant and evil ".(2). 
Within the ordered hierarchy of the elements of the 
healthy mind, Reason sits supreme: "It is necessary for Reason 
to rule in the wise, who thus has control of his whole self, 
and has his spirit for his obedient ally ". (3). 
Socialization. 
Justice in the state, as the harmonious cooperation be- 
tween different persons, and justice in the individual, as 
harmonious cooperation between the different elements of the 
soul, are to Plato, in essence, identical, for in society 
we see but man " writ large ". Thus, " a man is just in the 
same way a city is ".( 4 ). (5). 
(1). " Republic ", Book IV, Chap. XVII, Sec. 443, C, D. 
(2). Op.Oit. Book I, Chap. XXI, Sec. 350, C. 
(3).Op.Cit. Book IV, Chap. XVI, Sec. 441, E. 
(4). Op.Cit. Book IV, Chap. XVI, Sec. 441, D. 
(5). Nettleship, " Lectures on the Republic of Plato ", Chap. IV. 
9. 
The disinterested sentiment as such is not directly and 
plainly recognized by Plato. In the state, which arises as 
the result of the need of adjustments between individuals, 
the various individuals exercise their respective specialized 
functions : rulers are to rule wisely, soldiers to fight 
bravely, and the industrial classes to work with energy and 
thrift. The individual's well -being is reached only when per- 
fect justice reigns in every soul. 
Religion. 
Plato recommends that in his state the gods should be 
set forth as the authors of good; thus morality may be support- 
ed by religion. He admits this procedure might involve a pi- 
ous fraud, but the end would justify the means. 
Criticism. 
Although Plato may be criticized for seeming to hold to 
a division of the " soul " into " faculties " - an anticipa- 
tion of an erroneous psychology of later times - still, his 
ethics contains some psychological beginnings which fore- 
shadow the need of socialization of personality, if that per- 
sonality is to be "good ". Furthermore, he notes that person- 
ality is complex, but capable of integration. Such a social- 
ized, integrated personality is Plato's just man - the embod- 
iment of virtue. 
Plato, however, does not satisfactorily show how social 
justice is identical with personal justice, how socialization 
of personality is identifiable with psychological integration 
of personality: he fails to note any other -regarding tendency, 
10. 
the recognition of which and the inclusion of which within the 
integration of the personality would make possible the in- 
clusion of socialization within integration; but there is more 
included in integration than socialization. ( See Part II ). 
Section III. 
Aristotle. 384 - 322 B.C. 
Innate. 
Aristotle is unique among ancient moralists in that, 
basing his ethics in a most modern way.upon psychology, he 
considers the "material of moral activity to be the whole gamut 
of the emotions or the emotional dispositions". Regarding 
man's innate passions he writes that "passions are any emo- 
tions on which pain and pleasure follow, because of which men 
differ in their decisions: such as anger, pity, fear, and any 
other such emotions, and also the emotions opposite to these ". 
With the exception of x a ( is , these passions which Aris- 
totle names exist in pairs or opposites. 
Loral virtues are neither inherent in man's nature, nor 
contrary to it: moral excellence is rather the result of hab- 
it. What is inherent is a potentiality, a disposition, or 
i 
"óova", 5" . "gú v ai,. i s" is the capability of feeling emotion 
or "7Ta & o 5' . Virtue ( ¿ 7---1 ") is a set of the mind (,, , (s" ) 
it is a " f ú v aj& is" which has been made the object of deliber- 
ative choice and reason. (1). 
(11. See also Brown: "TE-Iind and Personality" pp. 214 - 215. 
11. 
Socialization. 
Aristotle notes the importance for morality of the social- 
ization of man through experience, and by way of the social 
training of these innate human possibilities. Man's moral po- 
tentialities may be socialized into virtues: "Intellectual 
virtue for the most part has its genesis and growth in teach- 
ing, and therefore needs experience and time; but moral vir- 
tue ("ni a c i( -11 " ) develops from habit ( "É s e 4 oo s" ) , whence its 
name, with a slight change from habit r'd F4 oos" ): thus it 
is evident that none of the moral virtues (v'" ) 
comes to us by nature ". (1). 
Ego -Alter. 
Although it is natural, and a duty, for a good man to 
love himself, because his noble life is profitable both for 
himself and others, still, he needs friends who shall be the 
recipients of his overflow of kindness and shall complete his 
well- being. Mutual kindness completes the well -being of the 
good, between whom alone it can exist, by enlarging through 
sympathy that consciousness of life which is itself a good. 
A friend is the greatest of external goods, and is also an 
inner spiritual possession - he is a "second self" : " ;rraas 
yn r ú -To 5 0 t A d 5 r- t ", (2). 
The preeminent social virtue, uniquely involving one's 
behaviour to another, is justice. However, " if men are 
(1). "Nicomachean Ethics ", Book II,Chap.I,Secs. 1 -2. 
(2). Op.Cit. Book IX,Chap.IX, Sec. 10. 
12. 
friends, there is no need of justice; but even though they are 
just, they need friendship; and the principle of justice 
seems to be most especially of the nature of friendship ".(1). 
Integration. 
Well -being ( ú 6aL1 oar L a." ) involves the unimpeded ac- 
tivity of the soul. This unimpeded activity is attained through 
the moral virtues which become thus also the means adopted 
by Reason to acquire its freedom. They are the forms by which 
Reason as a powerful integrating force would regulate the in- 
dividual soul. When Reason is thus freed, and the soul regu- 
lated and integrated for unimpeded activity, man can perform 
his proper function well: he is virtuous, and without internal 
conflict: he wills actions that strike a happy mean in their 
effect. " There is excess and defect in evil, but there is 
a mean in virtue " " Virtue is purposeful habit, being in 
the mean relative to us, defined by reason as the wise man 
would define it ". This mean, defined as the wise man would 
define it, is, "from the point of view of the best and right, 
extreme ".(2). 
To Aristotle, "highmindedness ", loftiness of spirit, is 
the culmination of the virtues. " He seems to be great -souled 
who, being worthy, rates himself so ". (3). The man who is 
'( E y a,io y 0 X o s ' y evaluates himself neither more highly than 
he should which would be vanity, nor lower than he should, 
which would be littleness of mind. He possesses a healthy self- 
(1).Op.Cit. Book VIII,Chap. I, 3ec. 4. 
(2).Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. VI, Secs. 13,14,15,17. 
(3).Op.Cit. Book IV, Chap.I1I, bec. 3. 
13. 
respect: it might be said that the sentiment of self- regard 
is manifested within him : self- assertion and self -abasement 
are correctly proportioned. 
This highminded man attains the supreme end of conduct - 
"the good at which everything aims ". That is, " e v d- aLt ov t a..' 
well*0being, happiness, is the possession of the' o-> c' uX °S" 
or highminded man. This well -being is an end in itself, "for 
we always seek it for itself, and never for the sake of 
something else ".(l1. This happiness is obviously not a mere 
summation of pleasures, but a condition existing within a man 
whose will is "trained in the tradition of virtue, and acting 
in a duly ordered material environment ".(2). 
Criticism. 
In his politics, Aristotle deals with the well -being of 
the state, and in his ethics he concentrates upon the well- 
being of the individual; the result is, that he does not sat- 
isfactorily deal with the socialization of the individual: 
"the relations of man to man and citizen to citizen are in- 
sufficiently handled ".(3). he seems indeed, to over- emphasize 
the influence of society upon the individual (41, and in doing 
so, he has difficulty in finding place for free will, in ease 
a person deliberately chooses a recognized evil. Even though 
(11.0p.Cit. Book I,Chap.VII,Sec.3. 
(2).Wallas, " The Great Society ", p. 110. 
(31.Jackson, Article "Aristotle" in "Encyclopaedia of Religion 
and Ethics ". 
(41. See Bain, "Mental and Moral Science ", Vol.II,p. 513. 
14. 
he holds to personal responsibility, the voluntariness of 
which he conceives fails to exclude determinism: that is, present 
actions may still be considered as only the issue of character 
already formed. Responsibility is thus pushed ever further 
back, and becomes difficult to capture. 
This over- emphasis of the supremacy of society or the 
state is readily explicable when it is remembered that to the 
Greeks the state does not exist for the benefit of its cit- 
izens, but rather, the citizens derive from the state their 
being, welfare, and rights. It is only in the state that the 
citizens can realize their respective ends, that is, be moral.(1 }. 
Again: although Aristotle's conception of friendship 
appears to be a lofty one, it tends, after all, in its prac- 
tical disregard of an altruistic benevolence, to become only 





To the Stoics, all men are, through their reason, sons of 
Zeus, and therefore, brothers within the " City of Zeus ". 
This rational or moral life is identified both with the " life 
according to nature ", and " life according to law ". The 
Stoic Chrysippus is credited with saying that this " rational 
life " means "to live according to scientific knowledge of the 
phenomena of nature, doing nothing which the Universal Law 
forbids, which is the Right Reason which pervades all things, 
(l).A.C.Bradley, "Aristotle's Conception of the State ",p.174. 
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and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering of this 
world ". 
At the same time, the Stoic holds the first principle 
of nature to be self- preservation or self -love. But the 
foundation of all virtue is a life of subordination of self 
to the more general interests of the family, country, mankind, 
and the whole universe. Self- subordination and universal 
brotherhood are Stoic fundamentals. 
Ego -Alter. 
But this universal brotherhood does not mean to the aver- 
age Stoic that he should "erect the happiness of another into 
a direct object of his own positive pursuit ". It means only 
the discouraging of those self -regarding emotions which place 
one in hostility to others - one should respect the self of 
the other as well as his own self. 
Integration. 
The Stoic deals not only with this outer harmonization 
but also with inner integration of personality. His psychol- 
ogy stresses "the essential unity of a rational self that is 
the source of conscious human action ". (1). The true and proper 
object of desire is an inner unity which entails a tranquil 
inner freedom - a psychological integration - a self- sufficien- 
cy - a self -realization. Reason is supreme in this integrated 
self. An immoral life is a life uncontrolled by Reason. 
(1).Sidgwick, "outlines of the History of Ethics ", p.73. 
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Any passion is a morbid, disorderly condition of the soul, 
a soul- disease. Apathy, which is either the control of, or 
the absence of, emotions, is the chief quality of the good, 
that is the reasonable or wise, man. 
Religion. 
In Stoicism, religion is emphasized as being closely 
associated with morality. The Reason within man is a particle 
of the divine substance, and the pure life of that divine 
spark means the exercise of reason, or of wisdom. in propor- 
tion as man exercises Reason, he is a Son of Zeus, and is 
likewise, in that proportion, moral. 
Closely associated with the theory of human participation 
in the divine substance is the doctrine that, since God or 
Zeus is the author of all but evil, the highest good is to 
enter voluntarily into harmony with him and to submit to the 
inevitable laws of the universe. 
Criticism. 
Stoicism, particularity in its earlier days, is to be 
criticized for its negative attitude toward feeling. It tends 
to identify reason and will and to maintain that emotion is 
not a good. Although affect is not the total essence of the 
good life, it certainly, as Stoicism disregarded, enters into 
its constitution. Affect, indeed, is not isolable from cog- 
nition and conation: it is inherent as a constituent element 
in the "massive sensation complex ". (1). The affective ele- 
(1). Aveling, " Feeling and Emotion ". 
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ment is more than a mere disordered condition of reason, 
which should be suppressed; it is an essential, inescapable 
element of any personal reaction. 
An issue of the tenet that affect is something that should 
be suppressed, is the Stoic doctrine that pleasure is not 
good and should not be an end of conduct. It is true that all 
desire is not for pleasure, but it is also true that pleasure 
may be a good, a legitimate element in the end of conduct. 
A third criticism of Stoicism is its tendency to over- 
emphasize a submissive resignation on the part of the person- 
ality, at the expense of the free creativeness of the human 
mind. 
Zeno. 342- 270 B.C. 
As the founder of Stoicism,a brief mention of Zeno is 
in place. Zeno is Socratic in identifying virtue and knowledge. 
Innate. 
The highest good is a life conformable to nature. Notions 
of "the good and just come to the mind by nature ".(1). Thus 
Zeno seems to hold to some sort of an innate potentiality for 
morality. 
Integration. 
Touching upon an inner integration of personality, Zeno 
states that the "virtue of the happy man is the perfect happi- 
ness of life, when everything is done according to a harmony 
with the genius of each individual with reference to the will 
of the universal governor ".(2). Zeno here apparently in- 
(1).Diogenes Laertius, "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philoso- 
phers", Book VII,Sec.53.Huebner,Vol.II, p.121. 
(2).0p.Cit.,Bock VII,Sec.88. 
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timates the desirability of a kind of inner integration - a 
harmony between the natural endowment of a man and his ideals. 
Section V. 
Roman Stoicism . 
Epictetus. 60 - 140. A.D. 
Stoicism passed in due time to Rome, where it was, strange- 
ly and yet naturally enough, represepted by the social ex- 
tremes, the slave Epictetus and the Emperor Marcus Aureli- 
us. 
Innate. 
Epictetus makes Zeus say: "I have given you a part of 
myself - -- the ability for using appearances ".(1). 
Socialization. Ego -Alter. 
The nature of Zeus is "vows ". (2). If Zeus has thus 
shared his nature with man, all reasoning men are brothers. 
Integration. 
The man in whom Reason is active, who enters into his 
divine sonship, experiences an inner serenity, an integration 
following from his realized sonship. "The function of virtue" 
is "serenity ". (3). 
Epictetus holds that whatever there is instinctive in 
man as the son of Zeus, is therefore the source of right con- 
(1). Epictetus, "Discourses ", Book I, Chap.I, Sec. 12. 
(2). Op.Cit. Book II,Chap. VIII, Sec.2. 
(3). Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. IV, Sec. 5. 
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duct: "all done according to nature is done rightly ".(1). 
The highest of Stoic tenets, the universal citizenship 
of man in the city of Zeus, is expressed by Epictetus thus: 
" - - -- chiefly to rational creatures is it the natural gift 
to be the only things to commune with God, intertwined with 
him through the reason given him; why should not such a one 
say that he is a citizen of the universe ?" " And why not a 
son of God ? ". (2T. 
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. 121 - 180 A.D. 
Ego- Alter. 
Marcus Aurelius is unique as a Stoic, and as a Roman 
Emperor, in that he considers beneficence both a duty and a 
satisfaction. "A characteristic of the reasonable soul is to 
love those next to it ". (3). 
Religion. 
United with this tenet there is an intensified religious- 
ness: "Everything is harmonious to me that is harmonious to 
Thee, 0 Universe ". "Reverence the gods and help men" is the 
summary formula of a good life; and its two parts are insep- 
arable, for injustice - the refusal of the aid which nature 
fashioned us to give to other rational creatures - is itself 
impiety. "Love even those who do you wrong ", for they are 
kinsmen who err through ignorance. 
(1).Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. XI, Bec.5. 
(2).Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. IX, Secs. 4, 5. 
(3). Marcus Aurelius, "To Himself ", Book XI, Sec.l. 
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Integration. 
Such a life, lived in conformity with the divine Reason 
within, is a life of integrated harmony, for he who gives all 
his individual energy to the good of all "will make all his 
actions homogeneous and will therefore always be (consistent 
with himself ". (11. 
Even while loving and helping others, this man who is 
"consistent with himself" need not cease loving himself, "for 
it is pardonable for every one to seek his own good ". (2). 
Criticism. 
To Marcus Aurelius, morality involves a proper propor- 
tioning of self -love and altruism, but the method of the 
practical harmonization is left unexplained. The problem of 
Self versus other is only stated, it is not solved. His fail- 
ure to harmonize the two tendencies is flagrantly manifest in 
his inconsistent persecution of his Christian subjects. 
Section VI. 
Epicurus. 341 - 270 B.C. 
Stoicism is egoistic in emphasizing the desirability of 
the suppression of all passions, which suppression issues 
into an apathetic, unruffled tranquility of mind; the Epi- 
cureans are also egoistic, emphasizing as they do the de- 
sirability of an untroubled calm within the soul. 
Epicurus refers the standard of virtue and vice to 
(1). Op.Cit. Book XI, Sec. 20. 
(2). Op.Cit. Book XI, Sec. 16. 
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pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the only good and pain is the 
only evil. Moral virtues are not ends in themselves, but are 
indispensable means for getting the greatest possible enjoy- 
ment out of life. 
By happiness, however, is not meant "the pleasures of 
the debauchees --- but the absence of pain in the body and the 
freedom from confusion in the soul. And of all these, the be- 
ginning and the greatest good is prudence ". (1). Prudence is 
only a wise selection of pleasures. 
Integration. 
There are pleasures to be found in rest and freedom from 
disturbance. Pleasure inheres in inner serenity. "For this 
purpose we do everything - that we might neither suffer nor 
fear; and when all this happens for us, every storm of the 
soul is stilled ". (2). After the removal of pain or confusion, 
pleasure admits of variation only, not of increase. 
Ego -Alter. 
Epicurus considers the ego -alter relationship as a re- 
ciprocal agreement between men living in companionship with 
each other; both justice and friendship are based upon reci- 
procity. "The justice of nature is an expression of expedi- 
ency or agreement for refraining from harming and being 
harmed, each by the other ". (3). 
(1).Diogones Laertius, "Lives and Opinions ", Book X, Secs. 
131 -132. Huebner's Edition, Vol.II, p.583. 
(2). Op.Cit. Book X, Sec. 128. Huebner, Vol.II, p.580. 
(3). Op.Cit. Book X, Sec. 150. Huebner, Vol. II, p. 604. 
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Religion. 
Epicurus uses theology only as a means of dispelling 
man's fear for the gods which causes him unhappiness. He 
theorizes that the gods are not active in the world: "their 
condition is not one of agency, but of tranquil, self- sustain- 
ing fruition ". (1). 
Criticism. 
Epicurus is to be criticized in laying undue emphasis 
upon the enjoyment of feeling; he mistakenly identifies 
pleasure with the content of the good, whereas it dare be con- 
sidered only as an element within the good. 
Moreover, pleasure can not be considered as a sole mo- 
tive for action. All deliberated rational acts do not aim at 
pleasure. All men do not judge pleasure to be the highest 
good. Pleasure per se is not completely satisfying. Nor is 
pain per se unpleasant: it is not, psychologically,essentially 
an unpleasant experience always to be avoided. "Pain is a 
sensation and it is a sensation that at different intensities 
may be pleasant,indifferent,or unpleasant ".(2). 
Furthermore, Epicurus is unsatisfactory in basing friend - 
ship upon mutual utility. He tries to "free his egoistic 
hedonism from anti -social inferences" by praising devoted 
friendship, but a troublesome paradox appears when he bases 
(1).Bain, "Mental and Moral Science ", Part II, p.530. 
(2).Titchener, "A Textbook of Psychology ", p. 227. 
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that friendship upon pure self -interest. The ego -alter prob- 




CHRISTIANITY AND L1EDIAEVAL THEORIES. 
Section VII. 
Plotinus. 205 - 270 A.D. 
Neo- Platonism, a school of thought which developed in 
the early centuries of the Christian era, was an attempt to 
assimilate the doctrines of Plato with Christian mysticism. 
Of the Neo- Platonists, Plotinus is the most representa- 
tive. He holds that the soul fell from its original condition 
of holiness, and as a consequence and penalty, was united with 
a material body. The supreme goal of human action is to rise 
above this debasing corporeal incarnation, and to lead once 
again the former spiritual life. "Therefore it is essential 
for the soul to become intellect, likewise to commit the whole 
soul to the intellect, and to establish it in it, so that 
what the intellect itself sees, the soul may carefully re- 
ceive and through the intellect itself may contemplate even 
the One; and not using any sense - -- with the very first of 
intellect, contemplate the Most Pure ". (1). 
Socialization. Integration. 
The socialization of the individual and the harmoniza- 
tion of the ego -alter interests are quite secondary to the 
absorbing ecstasy of this contemplation of the eternal ver- 
ities. This union with the Good - becoming like Deity - is 
(1).Plotinus, "Opera Philosophica ", "Enneades ", Book VI, 
Chap. IX, Sec.III, p. 760 of edition of 1580. 
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Virtue. In this union, thought is transcended, and conscious- 
ness itself is superseded by pure ecstasy; and there results 
a "freedom from the other concerns of this life, a life 
unaccompanied by the affairs of the world, a flight of the 
alone to the Alone ". (1). 
Criticism. 
In Plotinus there is intimated an integration which is 
effected by way of the absorption of the individual into the 
Good, but this is accomplished at the cost of self- conscious- 
ness. Practical socialization of personality is not effected. 
St. Augustine. 353 - 430 A.D. 
The Church Fathers may be represented by St. Augustine, 
whose theories partake of both Christianity and Platonism. 
Augustine does not emphasize the solution of the ego - 
alter problem, but he hints at self- realization as being de- 
sirable good for man: defection from real existence to that 
which has less of life is to fail of one's highest goal. (2). 
An inner peace results from the rest which the soul has 
in God: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our soul is rest- 
less until it rest in Thee ". (3). In a dualistic fashion, 
Augustine maintains that the supreme good is this inner har- 
mony, effected when "the flesh no longer contends against the 
spirit ".(4). 
(1).Op.Cit., Book IX, Chap. XI, p.771. 
(2). Augustine, "De Civitate Dei ", Book XIII, Chap.VII. 
(3). Augustine, "Confessions ", Chap. I. 
(4). "DeCivitate Dei ", Book XIX, Chap. IV. 
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Innate. 
the germ of love is supernaturally implanted in man. 
Faith springs from this love. it is not "in our power to live 
rightly unless he helps us in our believing and praying - he 
who has given us even our faith ". (1). From love and faith, 
which are inseparable, springs hope, of which the supreme 
desire is the Highest Good - the pure love of God. 
Integration. 
Love of God is the integrating factor in which all of 
man's faculties reach perfection, and all his yearnings, 
which are essentially religious, are completely stilled and 
satisfied. Without love to God, human personality is incom- 
plete. 
Criticism. 
Approaching ethics with a churchman's theological bias, 
Augustine considers love to be a supernaturally implanted germ 
which is basic to the trinity of theological virtues faith, 
hope, and love. He presses the passivity of man's moral in- 
capacity and the aggressiveness of the Divine Agency to such 
a point, that with difficulty does he reconcile human freedom 
with his theory. 
Furthermore, the Augustinian approach to ethics by way of 
a God -given faculty of love, leaves the psychic constitution 
of man unanalyzed and therefore unexplained. 




St. Thomas Aquinas. 1226 - 1274. 
We take as our representative of the mediaeval scholas- 
tics St. Thomas Aquinas. 
St.Thomas is a disciple of Aristotle. At times, however, 
he deserts his master in favour of Plato or Plotinus whom he 
finds theologically more satisfactory. 
Socialization. 
He shows his Aristotelian discipleship by saying that 
"it is habits that are good or bad" (1). Both master and dis- 
ciple emphasize habit to be the result of training and ex- 
perience. 
Innate. 
Those virtues which, at a later time, are destined to be 
called the Cardinal 'virtues, Thomas holds to be potentially 
innate in man, though not in a perfected degree C "fecundum 
perfectionem" 1. (21. Human virtues are good habits, each vir- 
tue denoting "some perfection of a potentiality ". (31. 
Furthermore, God has given to man a knowledge of the 
immutable general principles of natural law as it relates to 
rational creatures; and also a conscience - a disposition 
(l). "Summa Theologica ", "Ethicus ", Question 55, Part II, First 
Part, Second )Aumber. 
(21. Op.Cit. Question 63, Art. I. 
(31. Op.Cit. Question 56, Art. I. 
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which prompts man to "a realization of these principles in 
his conduct" and "which protests against their violation ". 
That he may make a place for the virtues faith, hope, and 
love, Aquinas deserts the ancient philosophers. These three 
"are termed theological virtues; for they have God as their 
object in that through them we rightly relate ourselves to 
God; then because they are implanted in us by God alone; then 
because such virtues are given to us only by divine revela- 
tion in the Sacred Scriptures ". (1). 
There are intellectual virtues and actual virtues: vir- 
tues of mind and virtues of action. Actual virtues, virtues 
manifest in actions, are the result of putting a power or 
habit to actual good use. For morality, mere intellectual 
virtue is insufficient: "for well -doing it is required that not 
only reason be well -disposed through a habit of intellectual 
virtue, but also that the appetitive power be well -disposed 
through the habit of moral virtue. Then just as appetite is 
distinct from reason, so is moral virtue distinct from the in- 
tellectual". (2). Prudence is right reason thus applied to conduct. 
Religion. 
Aquinas holds that it is toward God that all things are 
really, though unconsciously, striving in their pursuit of 
Good. 
(1). Op.Cit. Question 62, Art. I. 
(2). Op.Cit. Question 58, Art. 2. 
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Ego- Alter. 
This love toward God expands into love toward God's crea- 
tures, and thus ultimately includes even self -love. In the re- 
ligious love to God, the human personality, with its divergent 
interests of Self and alter can be integrated and harmonized 
around the idea that both Self and other are God's creation. 
Criticism. 
As long as Aquinas follows Aristotle, his method is a 
scientific analysis of the human psychic endowment; but in con- 
sidering faith, hope, and love to be God -given faculties, he 
becomes guilty of a faculty psychology, with its lack of an- 
alysis and explanation. 
Aquinas, in the next place, does not account for an inte- 
gration of human personality in a satisfactory way. Ego inter- 
ests and alter interests, even though ego and alter are both 
God's creation, are not shown, for that reason, to be either 
harmonious or identical. 
Finally, Aquinas does not successfully harmonize the two 
tenets: first, man is free to choose good or evil; second, 
man is absolutely dependent upon divine grace for his goodness. 
30. 
Chapter III. 
MODERN THEORIES TO LOC_E. 
Section IX. 
Hugo Grotius. 1583 - 1645. 
Hugo Grotius occupies a position of transition between 
the ancient and modern theories. 
Innate. 
To him, natural law is part of divine law which follows 
from the essential nature of man, who is by nature social and 
reasoning. "Natural right is a dictate of right reason, show- 
ing that there is a moral turpitude or moral necessity in any 
act as a result of its agreement or disagreement with rational 
nature itself, and consequently that such an act is either for- 
bidden or commanded by God the Author of nature ". (1). 
Ego -Alter. 
Grotius posits a reciprocity or mutual compact entered 
into by men to refrain, each from harming his neighbour, and 
from interfering in his acquisition and enjoyment of earth's 
stores . "One is obliged to glace no hindrance in the way of 
another by whom the same permission is given him ". (2). Such 
a state - a state in which individuals and families lived, 
with no other laws than such "natural laws" as prohibit mu- 
tual injury and mutual interference - is the "state of nature ". 
Criticism. 
Although Grotius intimates a belief in a peculiarily hu- 
(1). "De Jure Belli ac Pacis ", Book I, Chap. I, Sec. 10. 
(2) Op.Cit. Book I, Chap. I, Sec. 9. 
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man "appetite" for peaceable association with one's fellows, 
which is fundamental to moral living, he says nothing about 
any innate tendency to regard others. 
Furthermore, his theory of non -interference in the re- 
lation between fellow -men, as each appropriates what he can of 
nature's common goods, is only a prudential egoism: it does 
not solve the ego -alter problem. 
Section X. 
Thomas Hobbes. 1588 - 1679. 
Hobbes's materialism states that everything real in the 
world is in space and time, and is, therefore, either matter 
or motion. Motion is the most universal cause in nature. 
This fundamental notion determines his psychology: passions 
are interior beginnings of voluntary motions; will is the last 
appetite of deliberation, the last motion in a delayed or sus- 
pended series of motions. 
Innate. 
For such a thorough -going materialism, all human desires 
are considered as reducible to the single desire for power. 
There exists in man "a perpetual and restless desire of power 
after power that ceaseth only in death ". There results, there- 
fore, between men who are thus constituted, a state of war 
unless there is found some power beyond to keep them in awe. 
"Covenants without a sword are but words ". 
On the other hand, Hobbes holds that there are innate in 
man some "passions" which make for peace, ameliorating the 
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otherwise wholly harsh universal state of war. Such are the 
tendencies toward "commodious living" and the fear of death. 
Socialization. 
Iv1an's desires are purely self -regarding, directed either 
to the preservation of his life or to the attainment of 
pleasure. in society, however, man consents, under mutual com- 
pact, to relinquish some of his rights: he is "willing, when 
others are so too,as far forth, as for peace,and defence of 
himself he shall think it necessary to lay down this right to 
all things, and be contented with so much liberty against 
other men as he would allow other men against himself ". (1). 
Hobbes conceives of the state as a supreme political author- 
ity enforcing this reciprocity and°'assuring to each individ- 
ual security in attaining his own desires. Self- interest is 
the inner criterion of morality; the state is the external 
criterion. 
Ego -Alter. 
The application of Hobbes's principle of exclusive ego- 
ism to the solution of the ego -alter problem develops a neg- 
ative golden rule which he puts forth as a summary of his 
nineteen laws of morality: "do not that to another which thou 
wouldst not have done to thyself ". (2). Friendship is desirable 
because it increases a man's feeling of power when he thinks 
he can not only accomplish his own desires, but also assist 
(1). "Leviathan", Chap. XIV, p.87. 
(21. Op.Cit. Chap.XV, p. 108. 
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a friend in accomplishing his. 
Integration. 
.I'or. Hobbes, however, this love of power is not an inte- 
grating force producing an inner harmony. Felicity for Hobbes 
means rather "continued success in obtaining those things 
which a man from time to time desires "; it is not a "repose 
of a mind satisfied.' (1). 
Religion. 
Religion as well as morals Hobbes makes a political 
matter, defining it as "a fear of power invisible, feigned by 
the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed ". 
Criticism. 
Hobbes errs when he considers man to be solely egoistic 
in pursuing the gratification of his own desires, and when he 
disregards any innate social affections in man. Any theory, 
as does that of Hobbes, which resolves into phases of self - 
regard the most apparently unselfish tendencies and emotions 
of man, even to the extent of considering friendship a mere 
boomerang contributing to the satisfaction of the individual's 
selfish will to power, is obviously an incomplete account of 
human nature. Men may, and do at times, desire the good of 
others, and do so in response to an innate urge which is as 
elemental as self -love. 
Hobbes's axiom that motion is the exclusive ultimate re- 
(1). Woodbridge, Article "Hobbes", "Encyclopaedia of Religion 
and Ethics ". 
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ality involves him in errors. He fails to bridge the gulf be- 
tween this mere moving matter and sensations. He fails to 
make the transition between mere sensations and ethical think- 
ing. Rational deliberation is mistakenly thought of as a 
mere "see -saw of conflicting animal impulses". Blind to se- 
lective attention on the part of man, Hobbes adopts a crude 
deterministic view on the question of free will. Yet he in- 
consistently holds to an ethical egoism which presupposes 
a permanent, self- conscious, self- asserting mind which is more 
than a mere collection of phantasmata possessing no causal 
efficiency. 
Hobbes by implication identifies good actions with those 
that prolong life, and with those that give pleasure, and with 
those that satisfy desire; but proof of this identity is 
lacking. 
Finally, Hobbes refutes himself. iie begins with an ex- 
clusive egoism, but concludes with the theory of an absolute 
social authority over the individual. 
Section XI. 
René Descartes. 1596 - 1650. 
Hobbes's sensationistic materialism is opposed by a 
Cartesian idealism. Descartes aims at reconciling the spirit- 
ual and physical, soul and body: the world and man, mind and 
matter, are really one. to seeking happiness within, where 
alone it is to be attained, one must begin with an attitude 
of universal doubt: "de omnibus dubitandum est ". But Car- 
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tesian doubt is not a stubborn skepticism, but is rather only 
the mental attitude which is necessarily precedent to a jus- 
tifiable belief. 
For Descartes, only one proposition is indisputable: 
because a man possesses consciousness, it must therefore be 
inferred that he exists - " cogito, ergo sum ". A man thinks 
even when he doubts, and man as a thinker must exist even 
when his senses deceive him. 
integration. 
Objects sensed "are not perceived because they are seen 
or touched, but only because they are understood ". Descartes 
thus makes understanding or Reason to be the basis of man's 
comprehension of objects. Reason may also give man a just 
appreciation of the value of good and evil, and his good 
judgment regarding them enables him to resist the influence 
of his passions. If one clearly saw that what he is doing is 
sarong, it would be impossible for him to sin, so long as he 
saw the thing in that light. 
Innate. 
The passions are "the perceptions or the sentiments or 
the emotions of the soul which are uniquely joined to it,and 
which are caused, supported, and strengthened by some move- 
ment of the spirits ". (1). A small gland in the brain is 
(1). "Oeuvres de Descartes ", Adam and Tannery, Vol.XI, 
"Passions de l'áme ", Art. 27. 
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"the chief seat of the soul" (1), whence it spreads through- 
out the body by means of "spirits ",nerves,and blood. The 
movement of these spirits causes passions (2), and passions 
are accompanied by movements of the body. (3). 
The passions depend absolutely upon the actions which 
bring them into function. In fact, the Cartesian system makes 
all the various psychological manifestations to be rationally 
explicable by purely mechanical means and causes. The will, 
on the other hand, is thought of as always free; the action 
or will of the soul can only be indirectly affected by the 
body. "There is no soul so feeble that it is unable, if well 
guided, to acquire an absolute power over the passions".(4. 
Religion. 
Descartes says man's consciousness of God is prior to 
his consciousness of self. For man could not doubt or desire, 
could not be conscious of any lack within himself, could not 
know himself to be imperfect, if he did not have within him- 
self the idea of a perfect Being, in comparison with whom 
he recognizes the defects of his own nature. 
Criticism. 
Descartes leaves unresolved the mind- matter antithesis 
with which he started and which he aimed to resolve: he does 
not explain how the movement of the passions can be altered 
(1). Op.Cit. Art. 32. 
(2). Op.Cit. Art. 51. 
(3). Op.Cit. Art. 38. 
(4). Op.Cit. Art. 50. 
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by Reason; he does not show how man's unifying Intelligence 
can endow inert matter with such relationships as to make them 
intelligible to man; and the theory that the human body is 
only a complicated machine, to know whose beginning and govern- 
ing laws is to know all, issues into materialism; but the 
theory that conscious thought is the philosophical fundamen- 
tum issues into a Kantian idealism. Free will and a mechan- 
ical psychology as a result are not harmonized. 
In holding that will and intellect are united in the 
moralized man, Descartes lacks psychological analysis: will 
and intellect are not isolable entities or faculties whose 
union results in moralization, but are rather only person- 
ality in several fune tional aspects. 
Section XII. 
Nicolas Lialebranche. 1638 - 1715. 
Innate. 
Malebranche says that Reason is the means of inter- 
course between reasoning men, and between men and God. "Thus 
by means of Reason, I have, or can have, some intercourse 
with God, and with all other intelligent beings, in that all 
have something in common with me, Reason ".(l). 
Just as God, a reasoning being, prefers some things to 
others, so man, a reasoning creature, can also discover that 
some things are more perfect than others. "It is certain 
(1). "Traite de Morale ", Chap.I, Sec. 3, p.2. 
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that God loves things in proportion as they are worthy of 
love, and I can discover that there are some things more per- 
fect, more valuable, and consequently more lovable than oth- 
ers". (l). 
Religion. 
Reason, which man shares with God, is the basis of moral 
discriminations and judgments. Because men are rational crea- 
tures, "their virtue and perfection is to love reason, or 
rather, to love order ". (2). That is, the love of order, 
submission to the immutable and necessary order, is Virtue. 
Integration. 
Thus, man's duty "consists in willing submission to 
God's law and to follow order. - -- we can know this divine 
order by union with the Word." (3) This "union with the 
Word" is effected by means of the "reason of man ". The "rea- 
son of man" is universal, being the "wisdom of God Himself ". 
Criticism. 
A universal Reason, the wisdom of God, can not well be 
invoked as the means of integration of such diverse elements 
as self- interests and other -interests. Such a blanket -theory 
does not explain the integration. Reason itself, as being 
personality functioning, needs explaining. 
(1). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. IV, pp. 2 - 3. 
(2). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. XIX, p.13. 
(3). Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. XXII, p. 17. 
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Section XIII. 
Benedict, Baruch de Spinoza. 1632 - 1677. 
Ego- Alter. 
Spinoza agrees with Hobbes that "the laws of social 
morality are originally determined by contracts between 
opposing interests "; but "it is only among men of undeveloped 
reason that these laws are to be regarded as merely external 
adjustments between opposing forces ". Spinoza differs from 
Hobbes in holding that among rational beings, self and alter 
are harmonized in their interests because inwardly the inter- 
ests of all rational beings are truly identical, in that 
"Reason is everywhere at harmony with itself ". (1). Increased 
knowledge abolishes any distinction between the interests 
of ego and of alter. 
Integration. 
"Beatitude ", Aristotle's "EÚdo_Lju0vL0. ", well- being, ie 
virtue itself rather than a mere reward for virtue. It is the 
experience of an integrated personality, and consists in the 
peace of mind arising from the recognition of and submission 
to the laws of nature which are unalterable and perfect. That 
is, "those things which do not follow from our nature we 
should bear; ever to await each issue of fortune with equa- 
nimity, and to bear it; seeing that all things follow with the 
same necessity from the eternal decree of God just as it 
follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles 
.(1). 6ee also Rogers, "Short History of Ethics ",pp. 143,ff. 
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equal two right angles ". (11. 
Reason is the integrating force; it is Reason that con- 
trols man's emotions, if they are controlled, and in this 
control consists man's freedom and happiness. Integration of 
personality, through the operation of the Reason, in con- 
trolling the emotions, constitutes happiness and freedom. 
Innate. 
Intuition, which is one kind of cognition, is the basis 
of man's ability to make moral judgments: "Besides these two 
kinds of knowledge, there is given - - -- a third, which we 
shall call intuition ". (2). Intuition "teaches us how to 
distinguish the true from the false ". (3). Here there is an 
innate basis for ethical discrimination. 
Religion. 
The relation of religion to ethics is well set forth 
by Spinoza in these words: "Blessedness is not the reward of 
virtue, but virtue itself: nor do we rejoice in it because we 
control our lusts, but on the other hand, because we re- 
joice in it therefore can we control our lusts. - -- Blessed- 
ness consists in love toward God, - -- which love springs 
from intuition - -- therefore it is virtue itself. Again, in 
proportion as Lind rejoices more in this divine love or 
blessedness, so does it the more understand; - -- therefore, 
in proportion as the Lind rejoices in this divine love or 
(1). "Opera Posthuma ", "Ethica ", Part II,Prop. 49, p.92. 
(21. Op.Cit. Part II, Prop. 40, Note 2, p. 78. 
(31. Op.Cit. Part II, Prop. 42, p. 79. 
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blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. - -- it 
follows that no one rejoices in blessedness because he has 
controlled his lusts, but on the contrary his power of con- 
trolling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself".(1). 
Criticism. 
Spinoza is to be criticized for ignoring the free crea- 
tive ability of the human mind. He says: "In the mind there is 
no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to the 
willing of this or that by a cause, which in turn is deter- 
mined by another cause, and this again by another, and so on 
to infinity ". (21. As we try to show in Part II of this essay, 
neither absolute determinism nor perfect freedom maintains 
in human personality; the only determinism which fulfills 
the requirements of both a psychology which is scientific and 
an ethics which allows for freedom, is self- determinism. 
Section XIV. 
The Cambridge Platonists. 
Ralph Cudworth. 1617 - 1688. 
Innate. 
Cudworth represents an English Platonic intuitionism. 
Opposing the sensationism of Hobbes, Cudworth holds that 
sensations, being subjective, passive, and transient, give 
no knowledge of ultimate reality even in the field where they 
function, namely, in the physical world. Ultimate reality 
(1). Op.Cit. Part V, Prop. 42, p. 263. 
(2). Op.Cit. Part II Prop. 48, p. 85. 
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is rather apprehended by Reason, intuitively: Reason is 
active, and not merely passive in its apprehension, as are 
sensations. Distinctions of good and evil are essential and 
eternal: it is the very nature of the good to be good; even 
God can not change this condition after he has created it. 
"No positive commands whatsoever do make anything morally 
good or evil, just and unjust, which nature had not made such 
before ". al. Thus, distinctions of good and evil, having 
objective reality, are intuitively known through an active 
Reason. 
Religion. 
This knowledge of good and evil is possible because man 
participates in the Divine Reason. All ideas are universal 
conceptions, Platonic "Ideas ". Such real, eternal Ideas, 
both scientific and ethical, all of which are intuitively 
knowable by man, can subsist only in an eternal mind; there- 
fore God exists. 
Criticism. 
Rational intuitionism tends mistakenly to disregard 
the affective elements involved in moral problems. 
Furthermore, it disregards objective elements in such 
a practical way. that, as a merely subjective theory, it has 
difficulty in grounding morality upon a universal authority. 
At the same time, however, it is to be remembered that 
(l). Cudworth; "A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable 
Morality ", Chap. V, Sec. 5. 
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there is an element of truth in intuitionism: that is, the 
highest general principles, qua highest, must be accepted 
intuitively, for they are not further reducible. 
In the next place, Cudworth gives no explicit reply to 
the question: "When private interests conflict with social 
interests, what motive has man for preferring the latter ? ". 
Henry More. 1614 - 1687. 
More's Platonism is hedonistic: true happiness is said 
to consist in pleasure which the soul derives from a sense 
of virtue. This pleasure, apprehended not by the intellect, 
but by a "boniform faculty; is the motive to virtuous con- 
duct. 
Innate. 
On the other hand, More says that virtue is an intellec- 
tual force of the soul. He apparently considers it to be 
something innate in man. It "rules over animal suggestions 
or bodily passions in such a way that in separate actions it 
easily attains that which is absolutely and simply the best ".(1). 
This intellectual force of the soul, Right Reason, may 
be ultimately resolved into "noemata" or moral axioms.(2). 
These noemata are principles which are in themselves immedia- 
tely seen to be true - clear and manifest. More's noemata 
number twenty- three. 
(1). More, "Opera Omnia ", "Enchiridion Ethicum ", Chap.III 
(2). Op.Cit. 'Chap. IV. 
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Religion. 
Noema XXI states that it is better to obey God than man 
and our own desires. 
Criticism. 
More's hedonism holds that every man should have, to 
enjoy, that which is his own, and this too, without interfer- 
ence; but to the problem arising when social interest con- 
flicts with private interest, i\ior.e offers no solution. 
The individualized form of the problem, the ever- present 
self -other problem, is noted by More in Noema XIV: "Whatever 
good you wish bestowed upon you in given circumstances, you 
ought yourself to bestow upon another in the same circum- 
stances, so far as can be done without injury to a third 
party ". But this only states the problem: it does not solve 
any conflict arising between interests of self and of other. 
Section XV. 
Richard Cumberland. 1632 - 1718. 
Cumberland bases morality upon the one supreme law of 
rational regard for the common good of all: "The greatest 
benevolence of every rational agent towards all constitutes 
the happiest state of each and of all, in so far as it can be 
made the happiest by them, and is necessarily required for the 
state which they can attain; and then the common good will be 
the supreme law ".(1). "Moreover the sum of these laws is 
(1 ). Cumberland; "De Legibus Naturae ", Chap. I, Sec. 4. 
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called benevolence or universal love ".(l). 
Socialization. 
Cumberland is thus a precursor of utilitarianism. In- 
dividual happiness is best secured through the promotion of 
the general good. "There is no greater power in men by which 
they may procure for themselves and others a collection of 
all goods than the desire of pursuing, each his own happiness, 
and at the same time, the happiness of others ". (2). 
Innate. 
Reason is the faculty which determines the best means 
or actions of promoting happiness. Conscience is Reason, or 
the knowing faculty in general. 
Cumberland says he has not discovered that there are 
innate ideas of the "laws of nature ", whereby conduct is to 
be guided. 
Criticism. 
Although Cumberland does make a statement which is con- 
sistent with the golden rule - "It is inconsistent that one 
decide to act one way regarding himself and another way re- 
garding others who participate in the same nature" (3), - 
still he does not offer a clear solution to a possible con- 
flict between the individual's good and the universal good. 
His utilitarianism seems rather to be only a socialized ego- 
(11. Op.Cit. Chap. I, Sec. 9. 
(2). Op. Cit. Chap. I, Sec. 6. 
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ism. The "happiest state of each" seems to be considered the 
ultimate goal of the conduct of each. 
47. 
Chapter 1V. 
LOCKE TO KLNT. 
Section AVI. 
John Locke. 1632 - 1704. 
innate. 
John Locke may be considered the founder of English em- 
piricism. He holds that knowledge of general principles is 
indirectly, inductively, derived from various experiences of 
sense and emotion. io ideas are innate, not even an idea of 
God - an idea which would be innate if any were; therefore, there 
are no innate ideas at all: "though the knowledge of God be 
the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of 
Him is not innate - -- 1 imagine there will be scarce any other 
idea found that can pretend to it ". (1). It follows that nei- 
ther are moral principles innate; although they may be intu- 
itively learned. 
Socialization. 
man's ideas of morality are the generalizations made up- 
on moral actions. These ideas result from: first, discern- 
ment of the pleasure and pain of mankind; second, comprehen- 
sion and interpretation of the laws of God, nation, and pub- 
lic opinion; third, education and custom. Of these three 
sources, education and custom add most to man's moral ideas. 
"If we therefore examine it aright, we shall find that the 
(1). Locke; "AnJssay Concerning Human Understanding ", Book I, 
Chap. III, Sec. 18. 
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measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and 
vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame - -- where- 
by several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst 
them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that 
place ". (1). 
Integration. 
Locke is silent on the nature of disinterested action, 
considering the summum bonum for the individual to be the pro- 
curing of pleasure and the avoiding of pain: "That we call 
good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish 
pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession 
of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the con- 
trary, we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase 
any pain or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure 
us any evil or deprive us of any good ". (2). The pursuit of 
happiness tends to become Locke's integrating motive for the 
personality. 
Religion. 
Locke returns to Deity as the final authority in moral- 
ity: "The divine law - -- is the only true touchstone of moral 
rectitude, and by comparing (their actions) to this law, it 
is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil 
of their actions, that is, whether as duties or sins, they are 
like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of 
(1). Op.Cit. Book iI, Chap. XXVIII, Sec. 10. 
(2). Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. XX, Sec. 2. 
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the Almighty ". (1). By the exercise of Beason, man may dis- 
cover not only his moral duties to God, which become his 
highest moral rule, but also the very existence and attributes 
of God. 
Criticism. 
Locke's hedonism erroneously disregards man's innate 
other -regarding tendencies in favour of a single exclusive 
self -regarding tendency. 
Section XVII. 
Samuel Clarke. 1675 - 1729. 
To Clarke, morality can be "placed among the sciences 
capable of demonstration, from self -evident propositions as 
incontestible as those in mathematics".(2). 
The duties of man may be divided into three branches: 
first, duties toward God; second, duties to others, which in- 
clude justice or doing as one would be done by, and universal 
love of benevolence which is the promoting of the welfare 
or happiness of all; and third, duties to one's self, such as 
self- preservation, temperance, and contentment. 
Clarke is a rational intuitionist. The discernment of 
duties is by the Reason - mere intellectual apprehension. 
The cognition of them is a sufficient motive to a rational 
being for performing them, irrespective of any pleasure or 
pain which might be involved. 
Íl1. Op.Cit. Book II, Chap. XXVIII, Sec. 8. 
(2 ). Marke: "Sermons at Boyle's Lectures ", Vol. II, p. 84. 
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These particular duties are based upon certain funda- 
mental "rules of righteousness" which are known intuitively 
as eternally right, fit, and natural, and which require no 
support outside themselves. "Virtue and goodness are truly 
amiable, and to be chosen for their own sake and intrinsic 
worth ". (1). 
Religion. 
In Clarke's system, morality is supported by religion. 
The more cheerfully and steadily are men's wills determined 
by the revealed will of God, by that much are they the more 
excellent and the more in harmony with the eternal, immutable 
obligations to morality which are incumbent upon them. These 
obligations are made thus incumbent upon men by the very 
nature and reason of things. 
Ethical obligations are thought of as enforced also by 
a belief in immortality and future rewards and punishments. 
Criticism. 
Clarke may be criticized, first, on his disregard of the 
affective element in the moral judgment. A disregard of this 
element does not answer such psychological egoism as that of 
Hobbes; and a refutation of Hobbes must precede any safely 
grounded ethics. Until this refutation is accomplished, "the 
utmost demonstration of the abstract reasonableness of social 
duty only leaves us with an irreconcilable antagonism between 
the view of abstract reason and the self -love which is 
(1). Op.Cit. Vol.II, Sec. Vii, p. 97. 
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allowed to be normal in man's appetitive nature ". (1). 
A second criticism is, that Clarke leaves egoism and al- 
truism unharmonized. He recognizes the just demands of the 
interests of others upon the individual, but to a conflict 
between interests of Self and of others, he offers no solution. 
Section XVIII. 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. 
1671 - 1713. 
Shaftesbury is the first moralist to emphasize as central 
the line of thought that there is a normal harmony between 
man's social affections and his reflective self -love, and to 
stress the importance of the emotional impulses which prompt 
to social duty. 
Innate. 
The affections or passions natural to an animal are either 
those "which lead to the good of the public "; or. those "which 
lead to private good "; or those which "are neither of these, 
nor tending either to any good of public or private, but con- 
trariwise, those which may be therefore justly styled unnat- 
ural affections ". (2). 
Shaftesbury has been styled an aesthetic intuitionist, 
because he holds that moral distinctions arise from a "moral 
(l). Sidgwick; "Outline of the History of Ethics ", p.183. 
(2). Shaftesbury; "Characteristics of Ien,Manners,Opinions, 
Times °, Vo1.II, "" .n Inquiry concerning Virtue or %lerit ", 
Book II, cart I, Chap. 1, sec. III, pp.86 -87. 
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sense ", which is affected by the moral qualities of actions 
just as the sense of beauty is affected by the beauty of ob- 
jects, and as man's body is affected by the physical quali- 
ties of objects. 
integration. 
tiioral goodness is beauty in the sphere of the affections, 
for it implies a harmony or fitness of parts within a whole, 
to which "the heart can not possibly remain neutral ".(lÌ. 
if some affections are "in unequal proportion to the others, 
and causing an ill balance in the affection at large, they 
must of course be the occasion of inequality in the conduct, 
and incline the party to a wrong moral practice ". (2). sen- 
tient happiness results from the affective harmony which is 
the essence of virtue. The criterion of the correctness of 
this proportion between parts is the tendency to promote the 
good of all men. 
Ego -Alter. 
Goodness depends upon the coexistence of innate impulses 
of two kinds: social affections and self -love. "To be well - 
affected towards the public interest and one's own is not only 
consistent but inseparable. - -- in order that virtue be the 
result, - -- there must be maintained a just proportion, bal- 
ance, and harmony of these different elements ". (3). 
Furthermore, " - -- moral rectitude or virtue must - -- be 
(1). Op.Cit., Book I, Part II, Sec.3, p. 30. 
(2). Op.Cit., Book II, Part II, Sec. I, p. 92. 
(3). Op.Cit., Book II, Part I, Sec. I, p. 81. 
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the advantage, and vice the injury and disadvantage of every 
creature ". 
Criticism. 
Shaftesbury is to be criticized on his failure to achieve 
any real harmonization or identity between public and private 
good: that is, "to prove the exact coincidence of the two 
points by any close or cogent reasoning ". Although claiming 
a normal harmony exists between the two, he does not show 
how this harmony is possible. Conflict, in fact, may actually 
exist; and although Shaftesbury speaks of a balancing of the 
two coexistent impulses, he does not offer any method of 
harmonization in case of a conflict. 
in the next place, the gratification of the social feel- 
ing within man may be, in his theory, purely egoistic: the 
possibility remains that altruism may be based only upon 
egoism. Shaftesbury really maintains an hedonistic attitude. 
in the third place, Shaftesbury inconsistently derives 
a knowledge of an objective good from a subjective moral sense. 
Finally, Shaftesbury, holding that no speculative o- 
pinion can "exclude or destroy the moral sense ", gives the 
appearance of substituting "taste" in contradistinction to 
Reason and Conscience as the ultimate standard of right and 
wrong. But "taste" is not fundamental in moral evaluation: 
it is resolvable into a sense of the beautiful. Furthermore, 
it requires much exercise for its development and culture 
before it becomes functionally efficient. 
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Section XIX. 
Bernard de Mandeville. 1670 - 1733. 
Innate. 
The "Fable of the Bees" is a satire upon artificial so- 
ciety, which aims at exposing the "hollowness of the so- called 
dignity of human nature ". Mandeville, considering that the 
passions are evil, and that the spring of human conduct is 
almost wholly these passions, holds that the real basis of 
society is the evil of human nature. By the substitution of 
reason, passions are to be eliminated. 
Ego- Alter. 
On the problem of the relationship existing between "self - 
interest" and "other- interest ", Mandeville holds that man 
"centres everything in himself, and neither loves nor hates 
but for his own sake ": that is, one's concern for others is 
HIS concern, after all. We not only have no innate love for 
others, but we are also even regardless of the effect of our 
conduct upon them. Pity seeks only its own relief from the ex- 
perience which evokes it, and not any benefit for the object 
of pity; it should therefore be curbed if any benefit to so- 
ciety is to be produced. 
Socialization. 
iAandeville claims that morality, being unnatural to man, 
results from the "skillful management of wary politicians}' (1) 
(1). "The Fable of the Bees ", "An Enquiry into the Origin of 
Moral Virtue ", p. 37. 
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who have succeeded in persuading men that it is best for every- 
one to prefer the public interest to his own. This "socializa- 
tion", if it can be called stich, is effected by the contri- 
vance "honour ", which is only an imaginary recompense for the 
thwarting of the self -interest in the interest of society. Thus 
virtue becomes purely artificial - a device of scheming men 
"who played on the pride and vanity of the 'silly creature 
man' ". 
Criticism. 
landeville furnishes an incomplete and a very unflatter- 
ing picture of human nature. He is to be criticized for his 
disregard of practically all man's innate social tendencies. 
In the second place, he confuses virtue with ascetic 
suppression. native impulses are not to be annihilated, as 
though they were evils; rather are they to be organized and 
controlled, as being potentially good. 
In the third place, although a person's impulse is his 
omn impulse, still, it can not, for that reason, be called an 
evil self -love. "If it aims at one's own aggrandizement, it 
may be called self -love; if it aims at others' welfare, it is 
hardly such ".(1). 
Section XX. 
William Wollaston. 1659 - 1724. 
Integration. 
For Wollaston, morality is based "in the nature of 
(1).Lamprecht,Article, "TheFab1e of the Bees ", "Journal of hil- 
osophy", Vol. 23, 1926, p. 561. 
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things "; if things but "speak for themselves ", they "proclaim 
their own rectitude or obliquity ": that is, the nature and re- 
lation of things determine their moral character. Bad action 
contains the denial of the truth: "Immorality implies the 
truth of the proposition, and then acts as is it were not 
true; 'or practically' denies the admittedly true proposition ". 
Wollaston's theory is really an approach to the recon- 
ciliation of rationalism and hedonism : "happiness is signif- 
icant for morals only in so far as it is reducible to truth ". 
"The way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one 
into the other. - -- Nothing can produce the ultimate happiness 
of any being which interfere with truth ". (1). Harmony of the 
two is a matter of religion; but this is not a revealed re- 
ligion. By religion Wollaston means nothing else but "an ob- 
ligation to do what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear 
what ought not to be done ".(2). "The great law of the religion 
of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, is - that every 
intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, 
as by no act to contradict truth; or that he should treat 
everything as being what it is ".(3). 
Ego -Alter. 
In estimating things truly, the Self must not disregard 
other; the individual must be socialized if he is to be con- 
(1). Wollaston; "The Religion of Nature Deliniated ", "Of Loral 
Good and Evil ", Sec. II, par. 14, p. 40. 
(2). Op.Cit., Sec. II, par. 14, p.25. 
(3). Op.Cit., p.26. 
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sidered moral. "When things are truly estimated, persons 
concerned, times, places, ends intended, and effects that nat- 
urally follow, must be added to them ". (1). 
Criticism. 
In spite of the consideration given to these conditions 
by a person, Wollaston fails to show how the interests of the 
considering person and the interests of the person considered 
are identical: that is, the ego -alter problem remains un- 
solved. 
Section XXI. 
Joseph Butler. m1692 - 1752. 
Joseph Butler has been styled an autonomic intuitionist 
because he held that man is morally a law unto himself - 
autonomous. 
innate. 
There are three innate emotional principles of the human 
mind: impulses, some of which are altruistic; a calculated 
self -concern; and the deliberative and regulative principle of 
reflection, namely, conscience. The social affections, which 
work toward social harmony, and benevolence, which seeks di- 
rectly the good of others, are as natural to man as the ego- 
istic tendencies. "There are as real and the same kind of 
indications in human nature that we were made for society, 
and to do good to our fellow creatures, as that we were in- 
(1). Op. Cit., Sec. I, par. 6. 
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tended to take care of our own life and health and private 
good ". (1). 
As a guide of man's higher nature, conscience is supreme 
over the natural passions and instincts; "follow nature" is 
a reasonable rule, only if it be recognized that man's nature 
is constituted for virtue as truly as for vice. Regarding 
conscience, Butler says it "is a superior principle of reflec- 
tion - -- which distinguishes between the internal principles 
of one's heart, as well as his external actions: which passes 
judgment upon himself and them; - -- which, without being con- 
sulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts it- 
self, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accord- 
ingly. - -- It carries its own authority with it; -- it is our 
natural guide; the guide assigned us by the Author of our 
nature". (2) . 
Socialization. 
Butler holds that the two authorities within, "Conscience 
and self -love, if we understand our true happiness, always 
lead us the same way" (3), that is, to the goal, happiness. 
"The nature of man considered in his public or social capacity 
leads him to a right behaviour in society, to that course of 
life which we call virtue. - -- But men are as often unjust 
to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally 
(1). Butler; "Fifteen Sermons ", Bernard. Sermon I, p.27. 
(2). Op.Oit. Sermon II, pp. 45, 54. 
(3). Op.Oit. Sermon III, p. 57. 
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so to both by the same actions ". (1). Man's unhappiness re- 
sults either from a lack of a cool and reasonable concern for 
himself; or, if he does so consider wherein lies his chief 
happiness, he does not act accordingly. If men did so act, 
all society would become an harmonious whole. 
Although happiness is a goal for man, his desire is not 
aroused by the anticipation of its own satisfaction, but rather 
seeks its appropriate object directly. Butler thus escapes 
a psychological hedonism. it follows, that love of neighbour 
may be considered to be disinterested, even though it directly 
ministers to personal happiness. And furthermore, man's happi- 
ness depends as surely upon his permitting the functioning 
of this benevolent impulse as upon the functioning of any other 
of his innate impulses. 
Integration. 
The inward law of conscience is obligatory, and under 
its authority man's nature would be a system, with all his 
active principles functioning in such a way that they would 
promote and not oppose the end for which they were given him. 
Conscience and self -love are coordinate: neither needs to be 
subordinated to the other. Social and private happiness are 
not mutually exclusive and antagonistic. Conscience is a 
guide to general happiness in which one's own is included by 
a beneficent Creator. 
(1U. Op. Cit. Sermon I, p. 37. 
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Criticism. 
Butler does not give satisfactory grounds for the har- 
monization of the interests of self and the obligatoriness 
of conscience. This harmony can not be satisfactorily accounted 
for on the assumption that the beneficence of the Creator 
precludes any inherent antagonism between them. If conscience 
is considered to be supreme, no other criterion can be con- 
sistently considered as sharing that finality: in Butler's 
case, his hedonism, manifested in his theory that the end of 
self -love is personal well -being or pleasure, and his purism 
which considers conscience final, are harmonized, but on the 
basis of an inconsistent assumption. 
Section XXII. 
Francis Hutcheson. 1694 - 1747. 
Innate. 
Hutcheson believes in "the inherent beauty of goodness ", 
intuitively appreciable by a "moral sense ". "This perception 
of moral good is not derived from custom, education, example, 
or study ". (1). lather, "we have a distinct perception of 
beauty or excellence in the kind affections of rational 
agents, whence we are determined to receive any idea from the 
presence of an object which occurs to us, independent of our 
will ". (2). 
(1). Hutcheson; ".n Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil ", 
from "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue ", Sec. I, par. VII, pp. 133 -134. 
(2). Op.Cit. Sec. I, par. I, pp. 118 -119. 
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This moral sense does not suppose any "innate ideas, 
knowledge, or practical proposition ". Hutcheson means by it 
"only a determination of our minds to receive amiable or dis- 
agreeable ideas of actions when they occur to our observation, 
antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound 
to ourselves from them ". (1). 
The moral faculty is, for Hutcheson, the moral standard, 
but it does not give unconditional knowledge of its objects, 
for it improves with experience. This possibility of im- 
provement explains any differences in the moral standards of 
different men, ages, and nations. 
Ego -Alter. 
Besides this moral sense or conscience, which is a first 
"calm determination" of action, there are within man a second 
and third, namely, self -love and love of others or benevo- 
lence. 
Hutcheson seems to identify benevolence with virtue, con- 
sidering the true spring of virtuous action to be "some de- 
termination of our nature to study the good of others; or 
some instinct, antecedent to all reason from interest, which 
influences us to the love of others; even as the moral sense 
above explained determines us to approve the actions which 
flow from this love in ourselves or others ".(2). 
(1). Op.Cit., Sec. I, par. VII, p. 135. 
(2). Op.Cit., Sec. II, par. IX, p. 155. 
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This benevolence is disinterested: although its practice 
gives pleasure to the benevolent one, that pleasure can not be 
directly obtained by practicing benevolence for the purpose 
of obtaining that pleasure. "All the passions and affections 
justify themselves ". ''ihey are neither chosen for their con- 
comitant pleasure, nor voluntarily brought upon ourselves with 
a view to private good - - -", but are evoked by the "uneasiness'/ 
inherent in them : "in the pleasant passions, we do not love 
because it is pleasant to love; we do not choose this state 
because it is an advantageous or pleasant state: this passion 
necessarily arises from seeing its proper object, a morally 
good character ". (1). 
integration, Religion. 
Personal integration is for Hutcheson a proportionate 
balancing of innate tendencies. Benevolence and the moral 
sense are by nature harmonious; religion is the efficient means 
of integrating all three elements, self -love, benevolence, and 
the moral sense. integration of these, through acknowledgment 
of God, issues in the highest personal happiness. 
in his attitude toward happiness, Hutcheson approaches 
the utilitarian criterion: "the virtue is in a compound ratio 
of the quantity of good and the number of enjoyers ". (2). 
Criticism. 
Even though a moral sense theory were acceptable, 
(1). Up.Uit., Sec. iI, par. VIII, p. 154. 
(2). Op.Cit., Sec. III, par. VIII, p. 177. 
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hutcheson's concept of such a sense or innate conscience is 
vague. he is not clear whether it is a mere passive faculty 
or "taste ", or whether it is also an active, rational, cog- 
nitive, judicial faculty which passes judgments, as well as 
feels and acts instinctively as the feeling prompts. 
he furthermore seems ready to admit that the moral sense 
varies from man to man. But by admitting its variability, 
Hutcheson precludes the possibility of securing, by means of 
the moral sense theory, an acceptable ultimate authority for 
morality. 
A final criticism of Hutcheson is, that he fails to give 
an explanation as to the method of harmonizing self -love and 
other -love: he does not make clear how the three "calm de- 
terminations", moral sense, self -love, and benevolence, can 
coincide. 
Section XXIII. 
David Hartley. 1705 - 1757. 
Hartley applies associationism to ethics, holding "the 
deduction of all our moral judgments, approbations, and dis- 
approbations from association alone ". (1). Virtues are asso- 
ciated in experience with rewards; vices are associated in 
experience with punishments; and "this association in ex- 
perience, repeated, will at last beget in us a general, 
mixed, pleasing idea and consciousness when we reflect upon 
(1). Hartley: "Observations on Man ", chap. I, Sec. II, rop.12, 
p. 499. 
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our own virtuous affections or actions; a sense of guilt and 
anxiety when we reflect on the contrary; and also raise in 
us the love and esteem of virtue and the hatred of vice in 
others ". (1). 
Benevolence is not an innate feeling: it is developed by 
a detailed process: "the benefits we receive from the virtues 
of others, and contrary mischiefs from their vices, lead us 
first to love and hatred of the persons themselves by asso- 
ciation". (2). The love for the people exhibiting the virtues, 
and the hatred for those showing the vices, are then trans- 
ferred, by association, to the virtues and vices themselves. 
iti'ioreover, man is expected to assume at least, the appear- 
ance of benevolence; and the pretense begets the real feeling. 
Again, praise, blame, and mutual exchange of benefits become 
associated with the feeling of benevolence, so that there de- 
velops a tendency to be benevolent apart from any expectation 
of reward. 
Ego -Alter. Religion. 
The ideal aim of man, though probably not attainable in 
this life, is to continue his development toward benevolence 
until self -interest is completely subordinated to it. But 
"benevolence can never be free from partiality and selfish- 
ness until we take our station in the Divine Nature and view 
everything from thence ". Until this ideal be attained, Hart- 
(1). Op.Cit., p. 495. 
(21. Op.Cit., p. 496. 
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ley admits the necessity of substituting for the general rule 
of universal benevolence several other rules less general and 
more immediately practicable: among which are obedience to 
Scripture; preference of closely related persons to strangers 
and of benevolent, religious persons to others; and regard to 
the moral sense of ourselves and others. 
Another religious tenet of Hartley's is that the feelings 
connected with virtue are strengthened by meditation on God, 
prayer, and by the hopes and fears regarding a future life: 
"All meditations upon God, who is the inexhaustible fountain 
- -- of all perfection - -- and also all kinds of prayer-- - 
transfer by association, all the perfection, greatness, and 
gloriousness of his natural attributes upon his moral ones, 
that is, upon moral rectitude ". (11. 
Innate. 
Hartley holds that an authoritative moral sense is not 
innate. gather, " - -- all the pleasures and pains of sensa- 
tion, imagination, ambition, self -interest, sympathy, and the -. 
pathy, as far as they are consistent with one another, with 
the frame of our natures, and with the course of the world, 
beget in us a moral sense, and lead us to the love and appro- 
bation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of 
vice ". (21. Hartley says that it "will be necessary in order 
to support the opinion of a moral instinct, to produce in- 
stances where moral judgments arise in us, independently of 
(1). Op.Oit. p. 497. 
(21. Op.c;it. p. 497. 
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prior associations determining thereto ". (1). 
Criticism. 
;ze criticize Hartley for his sweeping associationism 
which is made to explain the derivation of all the more com- 
plex mental phenomena, including those involved in volitional 
morality, from simpler physiological sensations; mental devel- 
opment is thought of as consisting of an "aggregation of el- 
ements at first independent and distinct ". But the process 
is rather, we think, a segmentation of what is originally 
continuous. In other words, the unity of the moral agent is, 
for an ethical psychology, the point of departure. Psychology 
begins with the reacting individual, an individual which is a 
unit. Association itself needs explanation as well as the 
unity for which it is offered as an explanation. The acceptable 
explanation lies probably in an affective continuity of in- 
terest of the individual. 
In the next place, Hartley offers no solution to any 
chance conflict ( which is left possible ) between his several 
less general maxims, as one might attempt to apply these to 
any specific deliberate acts. And as an ultimate guide, Hart - 
ley's moral sense, based as it is upon the pleasures and 
pains of sensations, is hardly trustworthy. 
Section XXIV. 
Adam Smith. 1723 - 1790. 
Innate. 
For Adam Smith, the ethical standard is the judgment of 
(1). Op.Cit. p. 498. 
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a supposed well- informed impartial spectator or critic who is 
one of two persons into which a man divides himself. This 
spectator in his approval and disapproval of one's actions, 
represents the rest of society and is at the same time to be 
identified with conscience, a "sense of propriety" which 
seems to be a demigod within the breast to whom God delegates 
authority. The general rules of morality "are ultimately 
founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our 
moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety 
approve or disapprove of ". (1). 
Ego -Alter. 
The moral faculty is not an innate "moral sense ", but is 
rather a general "fellow -feeling with any passion whatever "(2): 
that is, it is reducible to sympathy. "How selfish soever man 
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature which interest him in the future of others, and render 
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing 
from it except the pleasure of seeing it ". (3). Sympathy is 
the ultimate element into which moral sentiments can be an- 
alyzed. 
Smith does not analyze the motives leading to self -sac- 
rifice for others, but he does recognize its existence. 
(1). Smith; "The Theory of the _oral Sentiments ", Part III, 
Chap. IV, p. 224. 
(2). Op. Cit., p. 5. 
(3). Op. Cit., Part I, Sec. I, Chap. I. 
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Religion. 
Smith ignores the existence of a revelation of moral and 
religious truths, and grounds for himself a natural religion 
upon an accepted benevolent and just administration of the 
universe. 
Criticism. 
By means of sympathy, Smith accomplishes a psychological 
explanation for the force which "conscience" can exert. 'de 
agree that sympathy is basic in the moralizing of the non - 
moral individual, but would hold in addition, as we attempt 
to show in Fart II, that the moral sentiments are different 
from and more complex than mere sympathy. 
.'urthermore, Smith's conception of sympathy is at times 
confused. he fails to distinguish clearly between primitive 
passive sympathy and active benevolent sympathy, and to show 
the relation between the two. 
ieither does he solve the ego -alter problem. he notes the 
existence of innate other- regarding tendencies, and says that 
the happiness of alter is necessary to the happiness of self; 
but on the one hand conflict between the two remains possible 
and to a possible conflict smith offers no solution; and on 
the other hand there is here a tendency to make happiness of 
self the criterion of the good - to base altruism on egoism. 
In maintaining the inerrancy of the guidance of the 
"impartial spectator ", Smith fails to explain the variation 
in moral standards of individuals, and in moral customs of 
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various ages and communities. A subjective moral sense does 
not, alone, furnish a satisfactory basis for an objective 
morality. Neither does it account for the great influence 
which social usages exert upon the individual consciences. 
r`inally, Smith does not successfully harmonize the two 
tenets: first, the "impartial spectator" is a product of 
society; second, this spectator is a demigod within the breast 
to whom God delegates authority. In other words, Smith fails 
to keep separate the naturalistic method and the intuitional 
method in ethics. 
Section XXV. 
William Paley. 1743 - 1805. 
Paley says that "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in 
obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting 
happiness ". (1). The standard here is two -fold: the will of 
Deity and utility or human happiness. 
Moral obligation depends upon the command of God: "the 
will of God is our rule ", and is to be learned "by His ex- 
press declarations, when they are to be had; and which must 
be sought for in Scripture ". (2). 
One decides moral questions by estimating the tendency 
of the various possible actions to promote or diminish his 
happiness, considering also his eternal happiness: I am 
(1). Paley; "The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy ", 
Book I, Chap. VII. 
(2). Op.Cit., Book II, Chap. IV. 
70. 
urged to keep my word "by a violent motive ( namely, the 
expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, or 
punished for it if I do not 1, resulting from the command of 
another ( namely Cod ) ". (1). 
Paley implies the absence of any disinterested senti- 
ment and of any innate moral distinctions. 
Criticism. 
Paley, urging as he does, morality "for the sake of ever- 
lasting happiness ", is to be criticized for basing morality 
upon a mere prudential egoism. 
Section XXVI. 
Jeremy Bentham. 1748 - 1832. 
Jeremy Bentham is utilitarian. The supreme end of conduct 
is "the greatest happiness to the greatest number ": "nature 
has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. - -- The principle of utility 
( of greatest happiness or greatest felicity 1 recognises 
this subjection -- -. By the principle of utility is meant 
that principle which approves or disapproves of every action 
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to 
have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
interest is in question: --- if that party be the community 
in general, then the happiness of the community; if a par- 
(1). Op.Cit., Book II, Chap. III. 
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ticular individual, then the happiness of that individual".(1 ). 
Innate. 
men are induced to obey useful rules by one of "four 
sanctions or sources of pain and pleasure ": physical, polit- 
ical, moral or popular, and religious. "Of these four, the 
physical is altogether, we may observe, the groundwork of the 
political and moral: so it is also of the religious in so far 
as the latter bears relation to the present life". (2). 
Although Bentham gives the intellect or Reason a large 
place in making up the moral faculty of man, he conceives of 
it as merely cooperating with man's sensibilities to pleasure 
and pain. Other constituents of the moral faculty are : good 
will or benevolence, love of amity, and the dictates of religion 
with a view to the happiness of others; and Frudence with a 
view to the individual's own happiness. happiness is the mere 
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. 
Religion. 
Religion is one of the moral sanctions, but men often 
pervert it into an enemy of utility. Bentham distrusts scrip- 
tural interpretations as being only the distorting amplifi- 
cations made by individuals, who thereby reveal their own 
"presumptive 
will". But if man could obtain a clear statement 
of the divine will, Bentham holds that revelation would be the 
revelation of a will desirous of securing happiness for man. 
(1}. "Works", (Bowring), Vol. I, Chap. I, p.l. 
(2). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. II, p. 14. 
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Ego- Alter. 
Bentham notes the claim of socius upon self when he 
speaks of considering motives "according to the influence 
which they appear to have on the interests of the other mem- 
bers of the community, laying the interests of the party him- 
self out of the question ". (1). He further states that "the 
dictates of utility are neither more nor less than the dic- 
tates of the most extensive and enlightened ( that is, well 
advised ) benevolence ". (2). 
Bentham mentions an entity to which some ascribe the 
unifying of personality, namely, "disposition "; but Bentham 
says it is fictitious, and that "it is with disposition as 
with everything else - it will be good or bad, according to 
its effects; according to the effects it has in augmenting 
or diminishing the happiness of the community ". (3). 
Criticism. 
In ascribing to pleasure and pain, man's "two sovereign 
masters" the function "to point out what We ought to do as 
well as to determine what we shall do ", Bentham becomes guilty 
of psychological hedonism. 
Furthermore, in his later works, Bentham assumes that the 
conduct conducive to general happiness always coincides with 
that which conduces most to the happiness of the agent. But 
by Bentham's method of hedonistic calculation, it is difficult, 
(1). Op.Cit,, Chap. X, Sec. XXXIV, p. 56. 
(2). Op.Cit., Chap. X, Sec. XXXVI. 
(3). Op.Cit., Chap. XI, Sec. II. 
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in complex social conditions, to prove this universal harmony 
of interests. 
In his earlier writings, however, Bentham plainly says 
that the only interests which a man at all times can find 
adequate motives for consulting are his own. This earlier 
attitude classifies Bentham as an egoistic utilitarian. 
The ego -alter problem is thus left really unsolved by 
Bentham: for if, in the calculation, "every one is to count 
for one, and no one for more than one ", what motive would 
induce an individual to prefer such an equitable distribution 
of pleasures to an increase in his own`? 
Section XXVII. 
Richard Price. 1723 - 1791. 
innate. 
"Morality is eternal and immutable ", says Price.(l). 
The conceptions "right" and "wrong" are "single ideas ", unan- 
alyzable ultimates. All rational beings immediately and 
necessarily approve of moral actions when they see them: 
"To behold virtue is to admire her - -- to perceive vice is 
the very same as to blame and condemn - - -". (21. That is, 
moral ideas are derived from "the intuition of truth or imme- 
diate discernment of the nature of things by the understand- 
ing". But "in men it is necessary that the rational principle, 
(1J. Price; "A. Review of the 2rinciple Questions and Diffi- 
culties in Morals", p.77. 
(2). Op.Cit., Chap. II, p. 95. 
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or the intellectual discernment of right and wrong, should 
be aided by somewhat instinctive - -- our íviaker has wisely 
provided supplies for the imperfections ( of Reason ); and 
established a due balance in our frame by annexing to our 
intellectual perceptions sensations and instincts which give 
them greater weight and force ".(1). "In short, the truth 
seems to be that, in contemplating the actions and affections 
of moral agents, we have both a perception of the understand- 
ing, and a feeling of the heart ".(2). In these statements, 
Price maintains the existence of an affective element accom- 
panying intellectual intuition of right and wrong, but sub- 
ordinates the former to the latter. 
Ego -Alter. 
Although Price holds that "it is absurd to deny disinter- 
ested benevolence ", he does not consider it to be the whole 
of virtue. 
Criticism. 
Price does not show how to resolve the difficulty which 
arises when this benevolent tendency conflicts with egoistic 
tendencies. 
Section XXVIII. 
Claude Adrien Helvétius. 1715 - 1771. 
helvétius seriously tries to reduce all morality to di- 
(1). Op.Cit., Chap. II, p. 99. 
(2). Op. Cit., Chap. II, p. 100. 
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rect self -interest. In this consistent attempt, he becomes 
purely materialistic, reducing all man's faculties to sensa- 
tions, and differentiating man from beast only by an increased 
intricacy of organization. 
Innate. 
The only spring of human action is self- interest - pleas- 
ure and pain. Virtue coincides with private happiness, based 
upon self -love. "The most numerous class of men are entirely 
devoted to their own interests, never considering the general 
interest ". (11. "Personal interest is the only and universal 
estimator of the merit of men's actions ". (2i. 
Self -interest is, even to society, the sole motive for 
action and the only criterion of virtue: " - -- the public, 
like particular societies, is, in its judgments, only de- 
termined by the motive of its own interest ".(31. Virtue, for 
society, is only a desire of the general happiness: "Le 
mot de vertu, le desir du bonheur public`. (41 
Criticism. 
helvetius, emphasizing only one aspect of the moral prob- 
lem, mistakenly disregards, as other egoists have done, the 
social and altruistic elements innate in man. neither does he 
offer any harmonization between self and socius: each person 
is, for himself, the end of all conduct. 
(1). Helvétius; "De l'Esprit ", Discours II, "De la .Probité ", 
Chap. II, p. 56. 
(21. Op.Cit., p. 60. 
(3). Op. Cit., Chap. XI, p. 133. 
(41. Op. Cit., Chap. XIII, p. 155. 
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r'ur.ther, man's faculties are not all reducible to sen- 
sation. An exclusive sensationism overlooks man's original 
psychic endowment, and disregards the presence of an initial 
unity or entity or self to be the receiver and organizer of 
sensations. 
Helvétius is mistaken also in holding to a psychological 





David Hume. 1711 - 1776. 
innate. 
David Hume is an empiricist, holding that knowledge of 
general principles is not reached directly or intuitively, 
but is derived rather by way of induction from particular sen- 
sory and emotional experiences; in this process of attaining 
ideas, the function of Reason is not to make discoveries, but 
rather to retain and coordinate what the senses offer. Hume 
consequently opposes the rationalism of Clarke and Cudworth: 
"Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of 
so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals ". 
hume thus gives the account of his application of this 
inductive empirical method to ethics: "In order to attain 
this purpose ( to discover the true origin of morals z, we 
shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: we shall 
analyse the complication of mental ualities which form what, 
in common life, we call personal merit: we shall consider 
every attribute of the mind which renders a man an object 
either of esteem or affection, or of hatred and contempt; 
every habit, or sentiment, or faculty, which if ascribed to 
any person, implies either praise or blame; - -- the very 
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nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a 
judgment of this nature; and as every tongue possesses one 
set of words which are taken in a good sense, and another in 
the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices, 
without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arrang- 
ing the estimable or blamable qualities of men. The only ob- 
ject of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both 
sides which are common to these qualities; to observe that 
particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one 
hand, and the blamable on the other; and thence to reach the 
foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles 
from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived ".(1). 
For Hume, morality is "more properly felt than judged 
of ". Feelings rather than Reason are the motives of all our 
voluntary actions. Hume practically holds to a psychological 
hedonism, and identifies the good with pleasure and the evil 
with pain. Upon his psychological hedonism he bases his 
arguments for utilitarianism; "Sympathy, becoming general- 
ized by thought, yields public utility as the first universal 
standard of morality ". "And as every quality which is useful 
or agreeable to ourselves or others is, in common life, 
allowed to be a part of personal merit, so no other will be 
received, where men judge of things by their natural, un- 
prejudiced reason - - -". (2). 
(1). Hume; "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals ", 
Sec. I, par. 138, p. 173. 
(2). Op. Cit., "On Personal Merit ", Sec. IX, par. 219, p.270. 
79. 
But the "natural unprejudiced reason" is not an Hutnhe- 
sonian "moral sense ", an. ultimate, unanalyzable instinct. 
Such a sense is, for Hume, derived; derived not only from 
self -interest and custom, but from sympathy - a fellow- feeling 
with the happiness and misery of others which is "a principle 
in human nature, beyond which we can not hope to find any 
principle more general ". Sympathy becomes then "the chief 
source of moral distinctions ". "The pleasure which arises 
from views of utility may be resolved into the sentiments of 
humanity and sympathy ". (1). 
But love of mankind as such, independent of personal 
qualities or services, or of relation to one's self, does not 
exist in man's mind. A general indefinite sympathy arises from 
frequently sympathizing with different persons. 
Socialization. 
As to the socialization of the elements in man, Hume 
says that associations of custom and tradition originate 
with education, and continue to operate in society partly be- 
cause it is generally felt that virtues are of advantage to 
every person in the community, and partly because they nat- 
urally possess influence. Sympathy is the main root of moral 
obligation, but the latter is strengthened by the cooperation 
of public praise, education, and custom. Hume writes: "We 
may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane, 
(1) Op.Cit., Sec. IX, par. 221, p. 272. 
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beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails 
to be amply insisted on, namely, the happiness and satisfac- 
tion derived to society from his intercourse and good offices ".(1). 
For example, " - -- the necessity of justice to the support 
of society is the sole foundation of that virtue ".(2). 
Ego -Alter. 
in the self -other relationship, hume states in one place 
that justice in society rests finally on self- interest. now - 
ever, a sympathy with others, it must be remembered, exists, 
according to other statements of Hume's, and although it is 
not considered as leading to unrecompensed self- sacrifice, 
it is taken to be one inducement to virtue. Hume notes the 
other -regarding tendencies in these words: " - -- no qualities 
are more entitled to the general good will and approbation 
of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and grat- 
itude, natural affection, and public spirit, or whatever pro- 
ceeds from a tender sympathy with others and a generous con- 
cern for our kind and species ". (3). 
The other inducement to virtue is self -love or prudence; 
these two together tend to promote the good both of self and 
of others. 
Criticism. 
Hume leaves the personality of man unintegrated, and 
ego and alter unharmonized. in his earlier writings, sympathy 
(1). Op.Cit., Sec. II, Part II, par. 141, p. 178. 
(2). Op.Cit., Sec. III, Part I, par. 163. 
(3). Op. Cit.,Sec. II, Part I, par. 140, p. 178. 
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means really only an altruistic hedonism. interests of others 
are, in such a theory, only submerged into interests of self - 
there is no real harmonization. in his later writings, Hume's 
thought develops from this earlier egoism to a principle of 
benevolence, but he wavers between the two, and leaves the 
problem in an unsatisfactory state, 
In the second place, we criticize Hume for his psycho- 
logical hedonism. e believe, on the other hand, that actions 
are evoked by their appropriate stimuli or objects, and some- 
times, irrespective of contingent satisfaction. As men eat, 
urged to do so by hunger, and not merely by the anticipation 
of the pleasure derived from eating, so a consciousness of 
duty may become a practical incentive to action, quite apart 
from any anticipation of pain or pleasure attached to that 
action. 
A third criticism of Hume touches his theory that the 
self is a "bundle" of impressions, ideas, and feelings. The 
ethical Self, however, is, we think, more than such a "bundle ": 
it is rather a reacting unity. flume, moreover, in a way which 
is inconsistent with his "bundle" theory, seems to assume a 
continuing unity or self which is of such a nature that it 
can regard a remote good. (1). 
Finally, to the hedonistic theory, particularly prominent 
in Hume's earlier writings, moral obligation means very 
little. There is little morality in an act which is performed 
(1) See also Rogers; "A Short History of Ethics ", pp.187 ff. 
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by a person who is so constituted that he must perform that act 
merely because he foresees the pleasure resulting from its 
performance. 
Section XXX. 
Thomas Reid. 1710 - 1796. 
To Reid is likely due the characteristic later form of 
Scottish philosophy - a philosophy of "common sense ". 
Reid says that "morals like all other sciences, must have 
first principles ", and he points out the following. 
" A. Relating to Virtue in General. 
1. There are some things in human conduct that merit appro- 
bation and praise, others that merit blame and punish- 
ment; and different degrees either of approbation or 
of blame are due to different actions. 
2. What is in no degree voluntary, can neither deserve mo- 
ral approbation nor blame. 
3. What is done from unavoidable necessity may be agree- 
able or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, but can not be 
the object either of blame or of moral approbation. 
4. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought 
to have done, as well as in doing what they ought not. 
5. We ought to use the best means we can to be well -in- 
formed of our duty - - -. 
6. It ought to be our most serious concern to do our duty 
as far as we know it, and to fortify our minds a- 
gainst every temptation to deviate from it - --. 
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B. Relating to Particular Branches of Virtue. 
1. We ought to prefer a greater good, though more dis- 
tant, to a less; and a less evil to a greater. 
2. As far as the intention of nature appears in the 
constitution of man, we ought to comply with that in- 
tention, and to act agreeably to it. 
3. 1 o man is born for himself only - - -. 
4. - -- What we approve in others, that we ought to 
practice in like circumstances, and what we condemn in 
others, we ought not to do. 
5. To every man who believes the existence, the per- 
fections, and the providence of God, the veneration 
and submission we owe to him is self -evident." (1). 
Ego -Alter. 
As the third axiom above states, Reid acknowledges the 
obligations resting on man to consider the interests of others. 
Indeed, he considers our own "good on the whole" to include 
"that of others indirectly, through the 'Benevolent affec- 
tions planted in our constitution', the exercise of which 
makes a 'capital part of our happiness' ". (2). 
Integration. 
Reid intimates that integration may possibly be achieved 
within a personality if the non -rational impulses are under 
(1). Reid; "Essays on the Active Powers of Man ", Essay V, 
Chap. I, pp. 370 - 377. 
(2). James Seth; "The Scottish Contribution to Moral 2hil- 
osophy", p. 36. 
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the control of the rational. The non -rational springs of ac- 
tion which per se are legitimate and yet are to be controlled 
by Reason are: first, mechanical instincts and habits; and 
second, the three animal principles which he terms appetites, 
desires, and affections. 
All original and natural impulses are legitimate in their 
proper places, but the "regard for one's good on the whole" 
( the sphere of prudence ), and a sense of duty ( the sphere 
of virtue ), are two coordinate Rational principles by the ex- 
ercise of which these natural tendencies are to be governed. 
Innate. 
Reid favours an original internal power or moral sense 
by the free use of which moral judgments are made: "By an o- 
riginal power of the mind, which we call conscience, or the 
moral faculty, we have the conception of right and wrong in 
human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral ob- 
ligation and our other moral conceptions; and by the same 
faculty we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, 
and others to be wrong; and the first principles of morals 
are the dictates of this faculty; and we have the same reason 
to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our 
senses, or of our other natural faculties ". (1). 
This conscience, a faculty unique to man, comes to ma- 
turity by insensible degrees, through education, training, 
(l). Op.Cit., Essay III, Part III, Chap. `JI, p. 243. 
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exercise, and habit. "There is a strong analogy between the 
progress of the body from infancy to maturity, and the progress 
of all the powers of the mind. The progression in both is the 
work of nature, and in both may be greatly aided or hurt by 
proper education." (1). Conscience is innate only in germ, 
but when matured, it can attain moral truth. 
Religion. 
Religion furnishes, in a due reverence to God, one of the 
fundamental moral axioms. For Reid, "Virtue without piety is 
incomplete ". Natural theology also furnishes him a final 
reconciliation between virtue and prudence. "While the world 
is under a wise and benevolent administration, it is impossible 
that any man should, in the issue, be a loser by doing his 
duty ". (2). 
Criticism. 
Reid fails to account for an integration of personality 
in a clear way, around any inclusive motive or ideal. he 
holds that all natural impulses are legitimate, but to any 
conflict between the functioning of these developing innate 
elements, Reid offers no satisfactory solution. In case of 
conflict between ego and alter, the interests of both of 
which are legitimate, Reid can only suggest as a solution 
(1). Op.Cit., Essay V, Chap. I, p. 379. 
(2). James Seth, "The Scottish Contribution to coral Phil- 
osophy", p. 36, quoting Reid, Op.Cit., Essay III, 
Part III, Chap. VIII. 
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that the exercise of benevolence furnishes happiness to the 
individual. The issue of this solution is that altruism has 
an egoistic basis. 
Section XXXI. 
Dugald Stewart. 1753 - 1828. 
Innate. 
Stewart says that "The primary sources of our activity 
are the circumstances that influence the will. These are 
I. Appetites, such as hunger, thirst, sex. 
II. Desires for knowledge, which is curiosity; society; es- 
teem; power, which is ambition; superiority, which is em- 
ulation. 
III. Affections, including Benevolent and iâalevolent. 
IV. Self -love. 
V. Moral faculty ". (1).. In addition to these sources of ac- 
tivity operative in man, there are the four secondary coop- 
erating principles which Stewart calls decency, sympathy, a 
sense of the ridiculous, and taste. 
When these principles "are suffered to pass the bounds 
of moderation ", the word "passion" is applicable to them. 
All these active principles, whether ultimate facts of 
man's mental constitution or resolvable into other more gen- 
eral facts, are "to be regarded as constituent parts of hu- 
(1). Stewart; "Outlines of Moral Philosophy ", Part II, Chap. I, 
Sec. I, pars. 112 - 119. 
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man nature ". (1). 
Stewart does not reduce benevolence to egoism: "Notwith- 
standing the pleasure arising from the indulgence of the ben- 
evolent affections, these have nothing selfish in their or- 
igin". (2). But he does hold that "it is implied in the very 
idea of happiness that it is a desirable object; and there- 
fore self -love is an active principle very different from 
those previously considered ". (3). 
Ego -Alter. 
In motivating his attitude to others, man has inherent 
within him the two secondary principles of sympathy and a 
sense of the ridiculous. The latter renders trifling imper- 
fections a source of amusement, thus arousing exertion to 
correct them. 
In treating definitely of one's attitude to others, 
Stewart says: "Our duties to our fellows are benevolence, 
justice, veracity ". (4). "Benevolence which is an object 
of moral approbation is a fixed and settled disposition to 
promote the happiness of our fellow- creatures ". (5). 
"Justice is that disposition which leads us, in cases where 
our own temper, passions, or interests are concerned, to de- 
termine and to act without being biased by partial consid- 
(1). Op. Cit., par. 139. 
(2). Op. Cit., par. 146. 
(3). Op. Cit., par. 161. 
(r). Op. Cit., Part II, Chap. II, Sec. II, par. 351. 
(5) Op.Cit., par. 329. 
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orations'. (1). Veracity, he says, is instinctive: "There 
is in the hhman mind a natural or instinctive principle of 
veracity. - -- Truth is always the spontaneous and native 
expression of the mind ". (2) . 
Stewart also allows for duties to one's self. Self -love, 
or the desire for happiness, is morally as legitimate as ben- 
evolence. Prudence, temperance, and fortitude are the three 
duties to one's self. (3). 
Integration. 
Jor the harmonious integration of these elements of per- 
sonality, Stewart might be said to offer the regulative 
functioning of Reason. "The constitution of man, if it were 
composed merely of the active principles ( of appetites, 
desires, affections ) would be analogous to that of the brutes. 
His reason, however, renders his nature and condition, on the 
whole, essentially different from theirs ". (4). Beasts "are 
incapable of looking forward to consequences "(5); but "man 
is able to avail himself of past experience, in avoiding 
those enjoyments which he knows will be succeeded by suffer- 
ing; - -- he is able to form a general notion of Happiness 
and to deliberate about the most effectual means of attain- 
ing it ". (6). 
(1). Op.Cit., par. 332. 
(2). Op.Cit., par. 357. 
(3). Up. cit., Bart II, chap. II, sec. III, par. 388. 
(4). Up. Cit., Bart iI, Chap. i, Sec. V, par. 154. 
(5). Op. Cit., par. 155. 
(6). Up.Cit., par. 160. 
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Stewart approaches the thesis of this essay when he says 
that cooperating with our moral powers in their influence on 
conduct is a "decency or regard to Character ", which sense of 
decency exerts an influence of self- command and self- denial. 
This sense of decency is closely akin to the sentiment of 
self -regard, or self -respect. 
Stewart speaks clearly to our thesis when he says: "It 
is necessary for us to form to ourselves some plan or system 
of conduct, in subordination to which all other objects are to 
be pursued ".(1ì. In this way there is attained a happiness 
which arises "chiefly from the mind ". (21. It seems that 
Stewart would but say that a peace of mind, or happiness, re- 
sults from the integration of a personality, which integra- 
tion has been effected by the acceptance, on the part of the 
person, of a sufficiently comprehensive ideal of conduct. 
Stewart speaks of the authority exercised by an innate 
moral faculty or "moral taste" (31, which he calls conscience: 
"The various duties all agree with each other in one quality, 
that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents; 
and they are all enjoined by the same authority - the authori- 
ty of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different 
articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word 
virtue ". (4). 
(1). Op.Cit., ±art II, Chap. II, Sec. III, Art. 3, par.375. 
(2). Op. oit., par. 387. 
(31. Op.Cit., par. 198. 
(4). Op.Cit., Part II, Chap. II, Art. IV, par. 422. 
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This sense of duty "is not resolvable into a regard to our 
happiness ".(1). It judges right and wrong. The words right 
and wrong express simple ideas, or ideas "incapable of an- 
alysis". (2). 
So, it "is absurd to ask why we are bound to practice 
virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of ob- 
ligation". (3). 
Religion. 
Stewart supports the immutability and eternalness of mo- 
ral distinctions by summoning a belief in the goodness of God. 
" --- if moral distinctions be not immutable and eternal, it 
is absurd to speak of the goodness or of the justice of 
God: (4). 
By an appeal to the same belief, he speaks of a future 
balancing of accounts between virtue and happiness: "That 
virtue is, even in this world, the most direct road to happi- 
ness, is a fact, but man knows that Deity governs by gener- 
al laws, and when he feels himself disappointed in the attain- 
ment of his wishes, he acquiesces in his lot, and consoles 
himself with the prospect of futurity ". 
Piety is a necessary complement to real virtue, leading 
man to consider conscience as God's vice -regent for his gui- 
dance, and conspiring with his desire for future happiness to 
(1). Op.Cit., Part II, Chap. I, Sec. VI, par. 188. 
(2). op. Cit., par. 188. 
(3).. Op.Cit., Art. 3, par. 213. 
(4). Op. Cit., par. 196. 
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stimulate him to virtuous actions, and issuing in his volun- 
tary submission to God's will which he believes to be benef- 
icently inclined toward him. 
Stewart is open to criticism on several counts. In treat- 
ing of man's duties to his fellows, he speaks of justice as 
"That disposition which leads us, in cases where our own temper, 
passions, or interests are concerned, to determine and to 
act without being biased by partial considerations ". It seems 
that this relationship between individuals should be broad- 
ened to cover every condition, not only those conditions 
where our own temper, passions, and interests are concerned. 
As McCosh shows in his edition of Stewart, Justinian, in his 
Institutes, gives a broader and more satisfactory definition: 
"Justice is the constant, persisting purpose to give to each 
the rights which are his ". 
Furthermore, Stewart's tenet that conscience, as God's 
vice - regent in man, is an innate faculty, a "moral taste ", 
is open to criticism. There does develop in man a unique el- 
ement, a socially developed self- consciousness which is basic 
to morality; but this "Anlage ", or whatever name be applied 
to it, is not a specific instinct or faculty - it is rather 
a possibility, a germ, a seed, which, only through develop- 
ment in society, becomes a self -conscious power of evalua- 
tion which can properly be called conscience. 
Finally, Stewart leaves unsolved the problem of self 
versus other. Although he admits the claims of both self -love 
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and other -love, he gives no fundamental solution to the con- 





Immanuel Kant. 1724 - 1804. 
Innate. 
Kant's "Practical Reason ", moral consciousness, enables 
man to apprehend the unconditionally obligatory principles 
of actions: "Pure Reason is in itself practical, and furnish- 
es man a common law which we call the moral law ".(1 }. This 
practical reason is common to all men: "No one is wholly 
without moral sense; for in case of complete lack of this 
sensibility, he would be morally dead, and if ( to speak in 
the language of the doctors ) the moral power could not note 
any stimulus to this feeling, manhood would be degraded to 
bestiality - -- and would become mingled with the mass of nat- 
ural things in an irremediable way". (2). 
tian is free to exercise this practical reason, and "Nothing 
in the whole world, or even outside the world, can possibly 
be regarded as unconditionally good, except a good will ".(3). 
A will is good, not because of any effects it might produce, 
but in itself. A will is thus good for its own sake when its 
(1). Kant; "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft ", Theil I, Buch 
I, Hauptstueck I, Sec. 7. 
(2). "Metaphysik Anfangsgruende der Tugendlehre ", Einleitung, 
XII, a. "Werke ", (1838), Vol. V, p. 226. 
(3). "Metaphysic of Morality, Sec. I. 
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motive is a consciousness of duty. "Duty consists in the ob- 
ligation to act from pure reverence for the moral law ".(1). 
All other motives except duty are morally worthless, for they 
are all mere forms of inclination. The highest good is a free 
will which has as its object a purpose which comes as an in- 
dependent, categorical imperative by way of the practical 
reason. (2). 
The general form of this categorical imperative is: 
"Handle so, dasz die 1,iaxim deines Willens jederzeit zugleich 
als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten koenne ": 
"Act only on that maxim whereby you could, at the same time, 
will that it should become a universal law ". (3). 
The first special form which the categorical imperative 
takes is: "Ask yourself whether you could possibly, through 
your Will, consider to be a law of Nature of which you your- 
self are a part, the action which you contemplate ". (4). 
A second form runs thus: "So act as to treat humanity, 
whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every 
case as an end, and never as a means only ". Kant holds to the 
intrinsic worth and dignity of one and of only one reality - 
rational nature. Every man, qua rational, has certain abso- 
lute rights which should never be violated. IVian is an end in 
(l). Op.Cit., Sec. I. 
(2). See "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft ", Theil I, Buch II, 
Hauptstueck II, Sec. VII, p. 134. 
(3). Op. Cit., Theil I, Buch II, Hauptstueck I, Sec. VII. 
(4). Op.Cit., Theil I, Buch I, Hauptstueck II. 
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himself: " - -- nur der Mensch, and mit ihm jedes vernuenftige 
Geschoepf ist Zweck an sich selbst". (U). 
A third form of the imperative is stated: "Act as if the 
will of any other rational being, qua rational, were the legis- 
lator of thine actions ". 
Socialization. 
It is assumed that the reason of one individual gives 
the same laws as the reason of any other, for these laws are 
universally and unconditionally binding, and do not derive 
their authority from the special characteristics of any one 
individual; each person may be considered an end in himself, 
determining the actions of all the others. 
The community of such rational beings, each being thus 
subject to laws of his own making, which are universally 
binding, constitutes the Kingdom of Ends. By Kingdom Kant 
means "the systematic combination of different rational be- 
ings through the medium of common laws ". Thus morality leads 
to a harmony between all rational beings, for reason can not 
be self- contradictory. 
Happiness should be justly proportionate to a man's vir- 
tue. Therefore there are necessary three postulates of mor- 
ality: first, God must exist as the necessary condition for 
realizing the just proportion between virtue and happiness, 
which happiness is the summum bonum; second, the will of 
(1). Op. Cit., Hauptstueck lII, p. 87. 
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rational man must be free; and third, the soul of rational 
man must be immortal in order to give man a sufficient oppor- 
tunity in which to realize perfection. 
Criticism. 
Kant is open to criticism in assuming that self -love may 
be a morally right motive if one seeks happiness under the re- 
straints which are imposed by every one else seeking his, 
and by the obligations one is under to help others in their 
pursuit of happiness. This assumption does not solve the ego - 
alter conflict - it merely states it. The question is un- 
answered: "How can the unselfish furthering of another's 
happiness be carried out, if that should conflict with one's 
own ? ". What Kant really does, is to "universalize egoistic 
actions, leaving the ego's as impervious spiritual monads''. (1). 
Kant is also vulnerable in considering feelings as 
"transitory accidents in self -consciousness" rather. than 
'essential constituents of it. Te hold that the moral life as 
such implies affect. "If we dismiss feeling, we lose the en- 
tire content of morality, and what is left is only its empty 
form ". (2). As Sir '.'William Hamilton says: "Without the in- 
tervention of feeling, the cognition stands divorced from the 
conation, and apart from feeling, all conscious endeavour 
after anything would be altogether incomprehensible ". (3 }. 
ill. See Hirst; "Self and neighbour ". 
(2). Seth: "Ethical :&rinciples ", p. 165. 
(3). Hamilton; "Metaphysics ", p. 426, Vol. H. 
97. 
Kant is also open to attack on his happiness principle: 
his moral law gives no reason why happiness should be pro- 
portionate to virtue, but so Kant holds. Furthermore, there is 
an inconsistency in first holding that action is essentially 
good if the motive of the agent is good, let consequences be 
what they may; and then maintaining that happiness must he 
an element in the summum bonum. 
Finally, Kant is wrong in saying that "'Wohlthun ist 
Pflicht" irrespective of the issues consequent upon any 
action in question. :Ian can foresee at least some of the con- 
sequences of his actions, and he is bound by this ability of 
foresight, as well as by the lams of morality, to consider 
those consequences, and to allow them to influence his ac- 
tions. In fact, "the consequences, so far as they can be 
foreseen, are included in the act ". (1). 
Section .X.XXIII. 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte. 1762 - 1814. 
Fichte follows Kant in rational idealism. Reason and 
Self- consciousness are the ultimate explanations of morality. 
Lorality is action; duty is self -consciousness realizing it- 
self in the world of deeds. 
The Infinite Ego, or Self -Consciousness, or Pure In- 
telligence, is Ultimate Reality; it is essentially free and 
self -determining. Individuality gives rise to a plurality of 
finite ego's which are the necessary manifestations of this 
(1). Rashdall; "Conscience and Christ" p. 11. 
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Infinite Self- Consciousness, which is basic to all conscious- 
ness, and which alone makes consciousness possible. A finite 
ego, then, is something, "only in so far as it posits itself, 
or contemplates and thinks itself as such ". (1). A finite 
ego, a person, only knows what he really is, when he has rec- 
ognized his identity with the Infinite Ego. This infinite 
Ego is the "one primary and indubitable fact ": the "eternal 
act or energizing ", through which man lives, and "within 
which all existence is contained ". 
The finite ego becomes free, that is, is no longer 
externally controlled, when, by the action of the rational 
will, it assimilates to itself the non -ego. This freedom is, 
for richte, the summum bonum: the free self- conscious assim- 
by the ego of objective nature. Thus knowledge alone 
accomplishes, for the ego, freedom. This knowledge is iden- 
tified with right action. Every man knows his position, so 




since all individual ego's are equally manifestations 
of the infinite Ego, exclusive egoism is unthinkable. This 
is so, for if each finite ego attended exclusively to his 
own good, disregarding and possibly antagonizing a fellow ego, 
(l ). Fichte; "Deduction des Yrincips der Sittlichkeit ~, 
Sec. II, p. 29, "Werke ", (1845), vol. 1V, Erstes 
hauptstueck. 
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he would be revealing, by his egoism, something akin to an- 
archy within the essence of the infinite Ego. ten must be 
more than egoists, for God is an harmonious unity. 
Criticism. 
Fichte's philosophical rational idealism as applied to 
ethical theory, leaves much to be desired from a psychological 
standpoint. Fichte does not develop a method of integrating 
an individual personality into an harmonious whole. Indeed, 
it seems as though he intimates that the individual is in no 
need of such a process, being, as he is, only a necessary 
manifestation of the Ultimate Self- consciousness. There is 
shown here a lack of psychological analysis of the individual. 
.r'ichte, in theory, accomplishes the solution of the ego - 
alter problem by attacking it from above; but the real prob- 
lems which a personality, with his various and often con- 
flicting instincts and tendencies, meets, are not practically 
met by this rationalism and idealism. By saying that the 
interests of A can not conflict with those of B because A 
and B are both the manifestations of G, leaves too much un- 
explained; the approach must be made to the problem from the 
under side - the side of the analysis of the personalities 
of A and B; and if this approach leads to the same conclusion, 
namely, that A and B may be united in their interests with G, 
well and good - but in this latter case, the psychological 
conditions actually inhering in the personalities of A and 3 
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will have been dealt with. 
in the next place, Fichte's rational idealism, ignoring 
as it does, the affective fundamentum in morality, does not 
furnish a complete explanation of morality. All reactions 
involve affect, and affect is, for morality, quite fundamen- 
tal and essential. 
Fichte is further open to criticism in his ultimate i- 
dentification of the finite and the Infinite Ego's, of the hu- 
man and divine self- consciousness, the unification of con- 
sciousness in a single Self. We believe, rather, that each 
human being is a Self, self- conscious; being both subject 
and object to himself. Each Self is "impenetrable to other 
Selves ", resisting successfully, as an including entity, any 
other Self, even God. As man is of an identical type with 
God, Fichte mistakenly holds to a unity of existence of man 
and God. (1). 
Section XXXIV. 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 1770 - 1831. 
Hegel holds that "the essence of the universe is a 
Process of thought from the abstract to the concrete ". (2). 
When "I think an object, I make it a thought, and take from 
it what is sensible ". In this way I make it something which 
is in fact and directly my own ". (3). Only in thought am I 
(1). See Seth; "Hegelianism and Personality", p. 226. 
(2). Sidgwick; "History of Ethics ", p. 279. 
(3). Hegel; "Philosophie des Rechts ", Einleitung, Sec. 4, 




The individual can identify himself with the mind of 
society, which is objective reality, and which is the ethical 
substance. To the extent that he effects this identification, 
does the performance of his duty express what he is, and the 
performance of duty is not a mere obligation: it is then that 
"the various social forces are not something foreign to the 
subject, but there is a witness of the spirit to them as to 
his own being. In them he feels he has a consciousness of 
his own self, and in them he lives as in his own element which 
is indistinguishable from himself - a relation which is more 
direct and intuitive than even faith and trust ".(l). In iden- 
tifying his will with the universal will as objectified in 
the state, the individual attains freedom and morality. "A 
consistent and logical theory of duties can be nothing else 
than the development of those relations, which, necessary 
through the idea of freedom, and therefore actual in their 
whole context, are found in the State ". (2). 
In the State, there is, theoretically, an inward unity 
between the interests of one and all, for the State is con- 
sidered to be literally, one living mind. The constitution 
of the State is the expression of the mind of a nation - 
the embodiment of a mind immanent in nature and developing 
(1) Op.Cit., Sec. 147, p. 212. 
(2). Op. Cit., Sec. 148, note. 
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in time as a "plan of Providence ". 
The practical issue of He;;el's ethics is that the in- 
dividual should submit his will to the existing order of 
things; the positive morality of the society in which he 
lives is to be the guide of an individual's conduct. (1). 
Ego -Alter. 
In a person's immediate relation with his neighbour, 
Hegel says the maxim is: "Personality involves above every- 
thing the capacity to have rights - -- the mandate of moral- 
ity is therefore, Be a person and respect others as persons ". 
If the individual, qua free, sets up his own particular 
will against the Universal 'gill, that is, if he is anti- 
social, an exclusive egoist, asserting his own Self irrespec- 
tive of others, he manifests evil in its pure form. Immoral- 
ity is an irrational inconsistency. 
The will is free to do this, for it is man's citadel. 
"Into this inner conviction of man no one can break; no 
force can reach it, and so is the moral will inaccessible ".(2 ). 
Integration. 
Hegel touches on the subject of an integration of the 
personality around a purpose which is recognized by the moral 
will as its realization. "Each act, to be moral, must first 
of all agree with my purpose, since the right of the moral 
will is, that in the realization of the same, there is recog- 
(1). See Rogers; "Short History of Ethics ", p. 228. 
(2). Hegel; Op. Cit., Part II, Sec. 106, p.149. 
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nized only what is found within as a purpose ". (1). He fur- 
ther says that right and duty coincide in the identity of 
the universal and particular wills. (2). 
Religion. 
Man's individual Self is rooted in the larger Self of 
the absolute personality. Morality becomes the gradual un- 
folding of an eternal purpose whose whole is the perfection 
of humanity. Personality attains its complete self- realiza- 
tion through a growing consciousness of the world and of 
God. Hegel thus unites morality with religion. 
Criticism. 
Hegel, in his emphasis of reason and will, mistakenly 
disregards affect as a constituent element of the moral in- 
dividual. 
In the second place, when he says that "whether the in- 
dividual exists, makes no difference to the objective order, 
The moral order therefore has been represented to peoples 
as the eternal justice, as Gods existing in and for them- 
selves, in comparison with whom the noble striving of individ- 
uals remains only an empty game" ( "ein anwogendes Spiel" ) 
(3), Hegel tends to annihilate the individual, or to lose 
individuality in God, or in the State which is the embodi- 
ment of the Immanent Lind in history. 
A Psychological Theory of the State. 
We believe, rather, that the moral function of the State 
(Z). Op. Cit., Sec. 114, p. 156. 
(2). Op. Cit., Sec. 155, p. 220. 
(3). 
Op. Git., Sec. 145, p. 211. 
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is not thus to engulf personalities and individualities, 
but to be the vehicle for the personal life of its citizens, 
guaranteeing to each person connected with it a permanent 
medium for making permanent the fruits of his personal la- 
bours, as these fruits are manifested in his own personality 
and property, also in those of his descendants. An organ- 
ized State is psychologically necessary to personality, be- 
cause, for the development of personality, it is necessary 
that the fruits of the labours of personality, which are a 
part of personality, should be safe -guarded. The State has 
a right to coerce an individual into acting in any certain 
way only because, and when, (existing as it does, for the 
interests of personality) it represents the citizens' own 
better Selves, assuring the protection of such interests 
as it has found, through long experience, to be the real best 
interests of its citizens. Rebellion thus becomes advanta- 
geous, and necessary, to a person, only when the external, 
organized manifestation of the State contradicts the inner 
ideal of the State. 
Section XXXV. 
Arthur Schopenhauer. 1788 - 1860. 
Schopenhauer says the state of desire is painful, but 
is essential to life; pain is more intense than pleasure 
and the labour of securing a merely imperfect degree of 
perfection is irksome. "The life of most is only a constant 
fight for existence itself, with the certainty of losing it 
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at last. - -- But when existence is assured to men, they do 
not know what to do with it: then there follows the second 
thing that sets them in motion, the striving to be freed 
from the burden of existence, that is, to escape Ennui ". (1). 
The result of this pessimistic evaluation of facts is the 
conclusion that self -conscious life itself is a curse, and 
the will to live is the chief moral blunder of man. 
Schopenhauer makes loving -kindness the essential basis 
of all altruism and of all true morality. On the other hand, 
asceticism naturally results from the belief that the will 
to live is evil. "That is, it no longer suffices him to love 
others as himself and to do as much for them as for himself; 
but there arises within him a horror of the existence, the 
the expression of which is his own being, the will to live. 
- -- He therefore disowns this existence which appears in 
him, and is already expressed through his body ". (2). Here 
is a dilemma: on the one side, loving -kindness; and on the 
other, a horror of that nature of which one's very existence 
is an expression, the will to live. 
Integration. 
The renunciation of the will to live is the only es- 
cape from the blind, relentless drive involved in the will 
to live. Whatever integration is conceivable for such human 
(11. Schopenhauer; "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung ", 
Buch IV, Sec. 57, pp. 368 - 369, Deusen's Edition. 
(21. Op.Cit., Buch IV, Sec. 68, p. 449. 
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personality as Schopenhauer conceives, is to be found in 
this renunciation of the will to live; and the consequent 
condition for the individual is a quiet freedom from all vo- 
lition. This is pleasure: pleasure is nothing positive, 
but rather only the removal of pain and want. This ethical 
theory is an hedonistic pessimism. 
Religion. 
As a philosophical or religious basis for this pessi- 
mism, Schopenhauer posits an Irrational Will as the source 
of all reality. in man, will becomes self -conscious; and as 
man's ego is not conscious of the creation of nature by it- 
self, therefore the Creative Ego can not always be conscious 
of its own actions - it is blind will. This blind will is 
irrational, showing signs of its unreasonableness, for ex- 
ample, in war between living things. 
Criticism. 
Schopenhauer is to be criticized for an inadequate 
treatment of personality. Tian is more than the incarnation 
of a blind will. And it is not easy to ascribe even a neg- 
ative pleasure to an incarnate blind will, as Schopenhauer 
does. 
A further inconsistency in Schopenhauer's voluntaristic 
pessimism is, that renunciation of the will to live implies 
a rational choice; but blind will can not well make deliber- 
ate, rational choices. 
Furthermore, Schopenhauer de- moralizes man by consider- 
ing will to be blind. Blind, unreasoning will is not capa- 
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ble of morality. 
i'inell_y, Schopenhauer's blind will is not will at all, 
but only brute force. Will separated from intelligence is 
not will. Cognition, conation, and affection are what they 
are, and exist at all, only as an indivisible psychological 
trinity inhering within personality. 
Section XXXVI. 
Friedrich Eduard Beneke. 1798 - 1854. 
Beneke holds that morality involves "the pursuit of the 
universal good, as measured quite impartially in accordance 
with a true assesEment of values, and controlled by funda- 
mental motives ". (1). 
Socialization. 
In this pursuit of the good, the interests of individ- 
uals, when conflicting with those of groups of individuals, 
are subordinated to the latter: "for the interest of a larger 
body of men is nothing but a multiplication of the interest 
of the individual ". (2). Thus the problem of the conflict 
between society and the individual is "solved" by making 
society's interests paramount to those of the individual. 
Ego -Alter. 
Beneke meets the question of the self -other relation- 
ship by saying that the welfare of each is to be considered 
(1). Beneke; "Grundlinien des ìdaturlichen Systems der Prak- 
tischen Philosophie ", Translated by Benjamin Rand, 
Chap. III. 
(2). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. III. 
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as on an equal footing with that of every other, for "in 
actuality, or according to its nature, it is on the same 
footing with ours ". (1). 
Innate. 
Beneke seems to hold to the innateness of the basis of 
the capability of moral evaluations, although he rejects the 
idea of a moral instinct as such. "For the true estimate of 
values lying at the foundation of the moral demands, is 
given to us a natural product of the human soul. It must 
therefore somehow coincide with the deepest constitution of 
our being, or indeed, if not innate or preformed (which we 
have deemed inadmissible) be at least predetermined ". (2). 
This capability is supplemented, in the individual's 
experience as morality develops within him, by the exper- 
iencing of objective relations. " --- morality is by no means 
a thing foreign to human nature, entering into it only after- 
wards, or even as in opposition to it. On the contrary, the 
moral and natural coincide throughout, and the moral law is 
in fact none other than the pure and flawless development 
of the deepest fundamental relations of human experience ".(3). 
Beneke considers the realization of elementary facul- 
ties to be good things: "The unfulfilled elementary facul- 
ties strive for realization. - -- only the fulfilment, and 
(1). Op.Cit., Chap. III. 
(2). Op. Cit. Chap. III. 
(3). Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. V. 
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the development conditioned by it, give to them the full 
reality of which they are capable, and these we must cer- 
tainly regard as good things. - -- The satisfaction of the 
stimulus or gratification is a good, so much the greater as 
the need was greater or more pressing ". (1). 
Criticism. 
-Ne hold that the fulfilment and development of man's 
elementary tendencies are not per se good. "Good" can not 
be predicated of all organic completions of instinctive 
urges. instincts, in themselves, are neither good nor bad. 
Their functioning must be socialized and integrated before 
it is good. Tendencies are good or bad, not in and of them- 
selves, but only in their relation to other tendencies; 
the satisfaction resulting from organic completion of in- 
stinctive urges, although probably an element in the good, 
is not the whole of the good. 
Neither does Beneke resolve the apparent ego -alter an- 
tithesis. There is no solution for this problem in the con- 
tention that the interests of all are on an equal footing: 
this claim only states the problem. Unless the interests 
of A are such that they can not and therefore do not con- 
flict with those of B, the self -other problem is unsolved. 
Beneke is also to a degree guilty of Hegelian subor- 
(11. Op. Cit., Chap. III, Sec. H. 
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dination of the individual to society. individual and so- 
ciety are to be harmonized, not by the loss of either in the 
other, but through the realization that their interests, be- 
cause of the psychological constitution of the individual, 
are identical. "There is a higher egoism which contains 
altruism within itself, and makes 'transition' unnecessary ".(1). 
(l1. Seth; 'ethical Principles ", p. 135. 
Chapter VII. 
MORE RECENT ENGLISH THEORIES. 
Section XXXVII. 
John Stuart Mill. 1806 - 1873. 
mill says: "The creed which accepts as the foundation 
of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, 
holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the re- 
verse of happiness ". (11. 
Happiness is to be interpreted as including for man, 
especially those pleasures which are qualitatively superior 
to the sensuous pleasures of a beast. "Few human creatures 
would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, 
for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's plea- 
sures - -- We may give what explanation we please to this 
unwillingness - -- but its most appropriate appellation is a 
sense of dignity which all human beings possess in one form 
or another ". (2). 
Which pleasures are to be valued "higher ", and which 
"lower ", must be decided by "the general suffrage of those 
who are familiar with both ". (31. Such alone can decide. 
Furthermore, the "utilitarian standard is not the a- 
gent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of 
(11. "Utilitarianism ", Chap. II. 
(2). Op. Oit., Chap. II. 
(3). Op. Cit., Chap. II. 
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happiness altogether ". (l). Ivor is the happiness which is 
meant "a life of rapture, but moments of such, in an ex- 
istence made up of few and transitory pains, many and 
various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the ac- 
tive over the passive, and having as the foundation of the 
whole not to expect more from life than it is capable of 
bestowing ". (2). 
self- sacrifice is given a place in Lill's system, but 
not as an end in itself: "A sacrifice which does not in- 
crease the sum total of happiness, it (utilitarianism) 
considers as wasted ". (3). 
The best assurance of attaining happiness is the con- 
scious ability to do without it, "for nothing except that 
consciousness can raise a person above the chances of 
life ". (4 ). 
Lill holds that the golden rule is the ideal perfec- 
tion of utilitarian morality: do as you mould be done by. 
r'urther, the system of ïiill says that if trod is both 
perfectly good and wise, it is also necessary to believe 
that the moral rules which he reveals to men will in some 
way coincide with the requirements of utility. 
innate. 
Utilitarianism offers two moral sanctions: an external 
(1). Up. vit., chap. II. 
(2i. Up. vit., chap. II. 
(3). Up. cit., Chap. II. 
(4). Up. Cit., Chap. II. 
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and an internal. "Of the external sanctions: these are the 
hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from our fellow 
creatures or from the -ìuler of the Universe. 
"On the other hand, if, as is my oven belief, the moral 
feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that 
reason the less natural. it is a natural outgrowth of our 
nature. 
"There is a basis of powerful natural sentiment for this 
moral feeling, which is this: that of the social feelings 
of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow crea- 
tures - - -". (1) . 
socialization. 
All the strengthening of social ties, and all healthy 
growth of society, give to each individual a stronger per- 
sonal interest in consulting the welfare of others. Each 
comes as though instinctively to be conscious of himself 
as a being that of course pays regards to others. Virtue, 
to be sure, is a thing to be desired, and that, too, for it- 
self; but virtue is not originally an end: although through 
association it is capable of becoming so. "Virtue, according 
to the utilitarian conception is: there was an original 
desire of it, save its conduciveness to pleasure and es- 
pecially to protection from pain. But through the associa- 
tion thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and de- 
sired as such with as great intensity as any other good. 
(1). Op. Cit., Chap. III. 
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"Will is the child of desire and passes out of the do- 
minion of its parent only to come under that of habit ".(1). 
Ego -Alter. 
Mill discovers in man the presence of natural disinter- 
ested impulses, but he traces them to a purely self- regarding 
origin. "All the grand sources of human suffering are in a 
great degree, many of them entirely, conquerable by human 
care and effort - -- yet every mind sufficiently intelligent 
and generous to bear a part, however small and inconspicu- 
ous, in the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment from the 
contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form 
of selfish indulgence consent to be without ". (2). 
Whatever amount of the feeling of regard for others 
a person has, "he is urged by the strongest motives both of 
interest and sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost 
of his power encourage it in others. 
"The deeply rooted conception that every individual 
even now has of himself as a social being, tends to make him 
feel it one of his natural wants that there should be har- 
mony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow 
creatures ". (3). 
Criticism. 
Mill is to be criticized first, on holding that a Stoic 
indifference to the pleasurable result of a morally good ac- 
(1). Op. Cit., Chap. IV. 
(2). Op. Cit., Chap. II. 
(3). Op. Cit., Chap. III. 
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tion is the best way to assure that Epicurean end. 1i11 says 
all men desire pleasure. But to desire pleasure involves a 
prospect of that pleasure. But this pleasant prospect is not 
a Stoic indifference. A Stoic indifference can not be con- 
sidered as a means in accomplishing an Epicurean end. 
A second criticism is, that if "the greatest good to 
the greatest number" is to be the standard, it is necessary 
that an "intuitive impartiality" shall be the fundamental 
principle of evaluating actions. But this is not the prin- 
ciple Lill invokes; rather, he again makes the pleasure 
principle the standard. If the motive of As action is the 
attaining of his personal pleasure, then "the greatest good 
to the greatest number" as a standard of action is thereby 
excluded. The result is, that psychological hedonism can 
not be the basis for utilitarianism. 
If Mill intends to prove, however, that the collective 
happiness is the object of the collective desire, rather 
than of the individual's desire, it is still to be said that 
Mill assumes that the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number has a greater value for the individual than his own 
happiness. This assumption, however, remains unproved. 
finally, Mill claims to recognize a qualitative as well 
as a merely quantitative difference between feelings - 
pleasures are higher or lower; the pleasures of mind are 
higher than those of the body. But quality is an extra- hedon- 
istic criterion. The only hedonistic criterion is quantity; 
lower pleasures will be more intense and more desirable to 
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lower natures; and higher pleasures likewise to higher na- 
tures. The difference of quality will resolve itself into a 
difference of quantity. 
Section XXXVIII. 
Herbert Spencer. 1820 - 1903. 
Spencer, working toward psychology from the sociological 
point of view, holds the tenet, based upon the evolutionary 
hypothesis, that the ethical ideal is utilitarian. 
The evolutionary principle of the survival of the fit- 
test applies to the process of moral growth as well as of 
the organic: "A mode of action entirely alien to the pre- 
vailing modes of action, can not be successfully persisted 
in - must eventuate in death to self, or posterity, or both ".(1). 
During evolution, mere activity becomes conduct by becom- 
ing purposeful toward the preservation of the various forms. 
The natural objective end of the evolutionary process 
is life - life of the organism and of the race. Life means 
continuous adjustment of inner relations to environment. Con- 
duct is this purposeful adaptive adjustment, and is good if 
it furthers life in the individual, in the offspring, or in 
fellow -men. 
Ethical principles in the race have been inductively 
reached: "By early and rude experiences there were induc- 
tively reached vague but partially true notions respecting 
(1). Spencer; "Principles of Ethics ", Part I, Vol. I, 
Chap. XV, p.280. 
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the effects of men's behaviour on themselves, on one another, 
and on society; to a certain extent serving for the guidance 
of conduct" . (1) . 
When sentiency appears in the evolutionary process, 
only those living creatures survive who, on the whole, take 
pleasure in life- preserving acts. Pleasure is both biologic- 
ally and ethically good. Good conduct produces a surplus 
of pleasure somewhere; bad, always inflicts somewhere a 
surplus of either positive or negative pain. (2). Absolutely 
right conduct would be that which produces pure pleasure, 
pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere. In conduct at large, 
however, it usually happens that whatever course is taken, 
entails some pain somewhere. Pain-producing or bad actions 
tend more and more to disappear, and there will be an ultim- 
ate coincidence of acts which are at the same time pleasure - 
giving, self -preserving, and race- preserving. 
Socialization. 
nature aims at the preservation of the species rather 
than of the individual, so the "life of the social organism 
ranks above the lives of its units ". The interests of so- 
ciety and of individuals conflict: "The multitudinous crea- 
tures of all kinds which fill the earth - -- are interferred 
with by one another ". (3). The two ends, however, the end of 
(1). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. XV, p. 270. 
(2). Op. Cit., Vol. 1, Chap. XV, p. 261. 
(3). Op. Cit., Vol. 1, Chap. II, p. 17. 
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nature, life, and the end of man, pleasure, must move 
toward harmony if the race is to survive. 
Ego -Alter. 
Beyond so behaving that each achieves his ends without 
preventing others from achieving their ends, the members of 
a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends - 
and "whatever facilitates the making of adjustments by each, 
increases the totality of the adjustments made, and serves 
to render the lives of all more complete ". (1). 
These last stages in evolution of conduct are those 
displayed by the highest type of being, when he is forced, 
by the presence of increased numbers, to live more and more 
in the presence of his fellows. (2 }. 
"And conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion as 
the activities, becoming less and less militant, and more 
and more industrial, are such as do not necessitate mutual 
injury or hindrance, but consist with, and are furthered 
by, cooperation and mutual aid ". (3). 
The source of the cooperative adjustments between in- 
dividual and society is sympathy, which becomes thus the 
origin of disinterested benevolence. But egoism is prior, 
both biologically and ethically, to altruism. A parent 
must first have life for himself before he can give fuller 
life to the offspring. 
(1). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 19. 
(2). Op. Cit. Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 20. 
(3). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. II, p. 20. 
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Altruism, however, is just as essential as egoism to 
the preservation of any species; and "is present from the 
spontaneous fission of the elementary forms to the higher 
types of self -sacrifice" which are manifestad in man's ac- 
tions. Since "unduly egoistic as well as unduly altruistic 
individuals alike tend to disappear from the race ", only 
socialization and harmonization can assure preservation. 
Egoism and altruism are destined to be reconciled naturally 
by the process of evolution. As a basis for this reconcil- 
iation, this socialization, Spencer's theory is that a 
universal recognition of justice is advantageous to each in- 
dividual. Justice is abstinence from mutual aggression. 
Thus Spencer's harmonization of the conflict between the 
interests of the individual and those of society is based 
upon utility. Altruism is made to have an immediate egoistic 
value, which arises from the joys of sympathy and kindly 
actions. 
Criticism. 
Spencer is to be criticized for thus making altruism 
only a duly qualified egoism. The happiness of the individ- 
ual does indeed follow his seeking the happiness of others, 
because the other -regarding urge, as well as the self- regard- 
ing urge, is innate, and its exercise gives satisfaction; 
but this satisfaction is contingent to the real goal, the 
completion of the reaction. This completion entails the sat- 
isfaction, but does not aim directly at it. The problem of 
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self -other is to be satisfactorily solved by way of an in- 
tegration of the elements of personality: harmony between 
self -interest and other -interest can be maintained or re- 
stored only by recognizing them to be mutually involved, 
each with the other. 
Furthermore, Spencer, in making ultimate harmony to 
follow upon the objective, mechanical process of evolution, 
and natural selection - a pragmatic trial and error process 
on a large scale - rather than to depend upon an inner har- 
monization of innate tendencies, attained through an active 
self -organization of those tendencies, must admit that 
"throughout a considerable part of conduct, no guiding prin- 
ciple, no method of estimation enables us to say whether a 
proposed course is even relatively right" (1): only the 
issues and consequences of an act can reveal its rightness or 
wrongness. In the case of an ad interim conflict between 
interests of self and of other, Spencer has no reply to the 
question, "'Mich shall I satisfy ? ". Ego and Alter are left 
unharmonized. 
Again, natural selection is really only a physical, 
external, objective process. Nature does not actively, criti- 
cally, volitionally, purposively select; she only passes by. 
A satisfactory ethics implies a self -conscious evaluation, 
judgment, and choice by man, between several possible al- 
ternatives to action. In this process of moral choice, man 
(1). Op. Cit., Vol. I, Chap. XV, p. 268. 
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takes into account not only his material environment, but 
such elements as society, ideas, spirit. Such choice, taking 
account of such elements, "has no direct effect on man's 
continuance on earth as a physical organism". Mere biologi- 
cal life is not identical with a good life. Furthermore, 
Spencer does not prove that "actions biologically good and 
actions ethically good coincide in the limit of evolution ". 
For men, it is the kind of life, not life itself, that 
counts. Spencer fails to see that pleasure can be properly 
evaluated only when character is taken into account. 
Section XXXIX. 
Henry Sidgwick. 1838 - 1900. 
Sidgwick has been called a philosophical or rational 
intuitionist, an intuitional utilitarian, and a universal- 
istic hedonist. He can be called an intuitionist because, 
although he criticizes the intuitions of the "common sense" 
philosophy, he still has left upon his hands a "residuum 
of intuitional thought which he finds it impossible to re- 
ject". This residuum is manifest in his three regulative 
principles of reason - prudence, benevolence, and justice - 
which are in turn reducible to the single imperative: "Act 
impartially or rationally ". His rationalism consists in the 
fact that he appeals to reason for the organizing principle 
of the ethical life. He is hedonistic in affirming that 
pleasure, although not the actual object of choice, is the 
only reasonable ground of choice, the only ultimate Good. 
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Personal pleasure can not be made the continuous end 
of conduct, for its very acceptance "as the ultimate end of 
conduct involves the practical rule that it is not always 
to be made the conscious end ". (1). 
Socialization. 
Rather, "Universal happiness, desirable consciousness, 
or feeling for the innumerable multitude of sentient be- 
ings, present and to come, seems an end that satisfies our 
imagination by its vastness, and sustains our resolution by 
its comparative security ". (21. 
Ego- Alter. 
Regarding the ego -alter conflict, Sidgwick says: "Dis- 
interested benevolence is not only thus generally in har- 
mony with rational self -love, but also in another sense, 
and independently, rational: that is, Reason shows me that 
if my happiness is desirable and good, the equal happiness 
of any other person must be equally desirable ". "I find that 
I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly 
as I see any axiom in arithmetic and geometry, that it is 
right and reasonable for me to treat others as I should 
think that I myself ought to be treated under similar con- 
ditions, and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive 
to universal good or happiness. This is the clearest and most 
certain of our moral intuitions ". (3). 
(1k. Sidgwick; "The Methods of Ethics ", Book III, chap.XIV. 
(21 Op. Oit., Book III, chap. XIV. 
(31. Up. cit., Book III, Uhap. XIV. 
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Religion. 
Sidgwick assumes a moral order in the universe maintained 
by a moral governor, "a hypothesis logically necessary to 
avoid a fundamental contradiction ". One must believe that what 
is good for the individual and for the universe are ultimately 
identified. 
Criticism. 
Sidgwick is to be criticized on his hedonistic stand. 
Hedonism is commendable in that it holds pleasure to be 
essential to the good, but is wrong in inferring that there- 
fore the good and pleasure are identical. 
Sidgwick is universalistic, his principle being "the 
greatest good to the greatest number ". But there is present 
in all utilitarianism a failure to furnish any satisfactory 
quantitative measure for happiness. ± leasure is quantita- 
tively incommensurable. 
'urthermore, if the good and pleasure are identified, 
egoism and altruism, self -love and benevolence, are incom- 
patable: for this identification leaves the good still self - 
contradictory - the pleasure of Self is not the pleasure 
of Alter. interests of Self and interests of others are har- 
monized, we believe, only in Aristotle's " E 3 óa v, o V z O r 
or Spinoza's "beatitudo": that is, in the well -being which 
inheres in the integration of personality, where the two in- 
terests are recognized as mutually involved, each with the 
other. 
`inally, Sidgwick leaves personality unintegrated. he 
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dethrones Reason as the integrator of personality, consider- 
ing it merely regulative, "the slave of passion ": it only 
"discovers the path to the goal of sentient satisfaction 
and only plans the execution of an end which is already 
determined by sensibility ". But he places no sovereign upon 
the vacated throne. 
Section XL. 
r'rancis H. Bradley. 1846 - 1924. 
Bradley holds that the ethical end is self- realization: 
"What we do do, perfectly or imperfectly, is to realise 
ourselves, and we cannot possibly do anything else; all we 
can realise is (accident apart) our ends, or the objects we 
desire; and all we can desire is, in a word, self ". (1). 
This individualism and the Hegelian ethics are to him, not 
inconsistent. 
Bradley says "The self we try to realise is for us a 
whole, it is not a more collection of states. The whole self 
is present in its states, and therefore the whole self is 
the object aimed at; this is what we mean by self- realisa- 
tion. - -- the question in morals is to find the true whole, 
realising which will practically realise the true self" (2/. 
Integration. 
Speaking of the unity of the self, Bradley says: "What 
we mean to distinguish is the self as will in general, from 
(1). Bradley; "Ethical studies ", Essay II, "Why J. Should Be 
moral". 
(2). Up. cit. 
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this or that object of desire; and at the same time to iden- 
tify the two - -- were are two factors in will: the unity 
subjective, and the something willed, the objective. That is, 
in order to will, we must will something. - -- A third factor 
in will is the volition as a whole - this is the identity 
of both these factors, and the projection or the carrying 
of it out into external existence. This unity of the two 
factors we may call the individual whole, or again the con- 
crete universal. This means self- realisation. Thus 1 possess 
my world only when I find my will in it; and'I do not find 
that until what I have is a harmony or a whole in system ".(l). 
Furthermore, "realise yourself" means not merely "Be 
a whole ", but "Be an infinite whole ". "The mind is not fi- 
nite, just because it knows it is finite. The self knows 
itself to be limited, to be finite. Well, if it does, it is 
infinite. .ior limitation comes from the outside by the out- 
side, and to know itself to be limited thus, means it 
knows the outside - therefore, to feel finiteness, means to 
be infinite ". "The finite is relative to something else; 
the infinite is self - related ". 
Religion. 
Bradley's Hegelianism is manifest in his tenet that God 
is neither personal nor impersonal, but "super- personal ". 
Bradley finds such a concept necessary because he says he 
(1). Op. Cit., Essay II. 
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can conceive of personality only as finite - an infinite 
personality is a contradiction: "A person is finite or is 
meaningless ". 
Nevertheless, he says, and seemingly inconsistently: 
"Realise yourself as an infinite whole ", which means "Real- 
ise yourself as the self- conscious member of an infinite 
whole by realising the whole in yourself ". 
Criticism. 
Not only does Bradley seem inconsistent here, but he 
also confuses human individuality and personality. The former 
may be only finite, but the latter is essentially infinite. 
"Only the infinite is completely personal ". (1). (2). 
Bradley leaves personality unintegrated. He says: "Two 
great divergent forms of moral goodness exist. In order to 
realise the idea of a perfect self, a man may have to choose 
between two partially conflicting methods. i;iorality, in short, 
may dictate either self- sacrifice or self- assertion ". (3). 
Now, if self- sacrifice and self- assertion are mutually ex- 
clusive, the moralization of a complete personality is im- 
possible; but if integration involves self -sacrifice, then 
moralization is thereby effected. Vie hold that the "Ideal- 
ization of a cause" manifests a personal loyalty which express- 
es a union of self- sacrifice and self -assertion. (4). (5). 
(1). Seth; "Ethical Principles ", p. 451. 
(2). See Part II. 
(3). Bradley; "Appearance and Reality ", p. 415. 
(4). See Part II. 
(5). See Royce; "The Philosophy of Loyalty ", pp. 173,ff, 311. 
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Section XLI. 
Thomas Hill Green. 1836 - 1882. 
Thomas Hill Green represents an attempted individual- 
ization of German rational idealism; he tries to emphasize 
more strongly than that idealism does the satisfaction of 
each individual. The rational idealists may be described as 
holding to the doctrine that the higher social customs and 
institutions are the "creations of the self- unfolding mind 
of society ". 
Ego- Alter. 
Green asserts that man's aims and activities are not 
explicable by natural laws, and that his good can not be 
found in the satisfaction of the desires of the animal or- 
ganism. What this good is, can not as yet be exactly de- 
fined, for it is not yet realized in man; but within this 
good there can be no distinction between the good for the 
Self and the good for others. 
Green gives as his reason for this impossibility of 
distinguishing these two goods, that all persons are the re- 
productions of the same Eternal Spirit, who is a Being in 
whom we exist, with whom we are in principle one; with 
whom the human spirit is identical, in the sense that He is 
all which the human spirit is capable of becoming. Only be- 
cause men are such reproductions of the One, can each see 
that the good of others is objectively good, while it remains 
a good for himself as well. Green says: " - -- with the con- 
stant characteristic of self- consciousness and self -object- 
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ification, the one divine mind gradually reproduces itself 
in the human soul. In virtue of this principle in him, man 
has definite capabilities, the realisation of which, since 
in it alone he can satisfy himself, forms his true good ".(1 ). 
This reproduction of the "One Divine Spirit ", or of the 
"Spiritual Principle ", or the "Eternally Complete Conscious- 
ness" in persons, is Reason. 
Integration. 
Reason makes it possible for one to hold before himself 
an ideal - a future Self who is better than the actual pres- 
ent Self. Will is the present Self, as a self -determining 
agent and a unity, in the process of realizing this ideal. 
When the ideal shall have been attained, Will and Reason 
will coincide. 
The motive which determines will is always such an ideal- 
ization of the future state of the Self, and the gradual 
realization of the ideal gives satisfaction to the person. 
" - -- the development of morality is founded on the action 
in man of an idea of true or absolute good, consisting in the 
full realisation of the capabilities of the human soul ".(2). 
Meanwhile, until the ideal shall be fully realized, man is 
able to conceive the truth of it but dimly, but this par- 
tial conception of it operates as a motive within man for 
(1). Green; "Prolegomena to Ethics ",Book III, Chap. II, Sec.A, 
p. 189. 
(2 }. Op.Cit., p. 308. 
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for its complete realization. 
Socialization. 
This moral good can be realized in beings who are self - 
conscious persons. But man becomes a self- conscious person 
only in society, and human society presupposes persons in 
capacity - subjects capable, each of conceiving himself and 
the bettering of his life, as an end to himself; only in the 
intercourse of men is this capacity for personality actual- 
ized. The ideal can be realized only in society. This ideal 
is "a society of persons, in which each has reached his own 
highest satisfaction, and each identifies another's good 
with his own ". (U). 
Criticism. 
Green, in his Hegelianism, is to be criticized in that, 
in holding to the idea of one self -conscious mind in soci- 
ety, it is with difficulty that he secures individuality. 
Man tends to become "only 'a fact' for an Eternal Conscious- 
ness and an Absolute knower ". 
Furthermore, Green's Hegelianism makes the good of self 
and of other to be indistinguishable because all persons 
are reproductions of the One Eternal Spirit. Rather, we 
would maintain that the two goods are identical because 
they are psychologically only the reverse sides of the same 
bi- polarity or ambivalence. (2 ). 
(1). Rogers; "A Short History of Ethics ". 
(21. See Part II. 
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Section XLII. 
James tartineau. 1805 - 1900. 
Martineau says that "the sentiments of right and wrong 
are characteristics of human nature ", and therefore "the 
system of action which they call up receives the name of 
Mores or established ways ". (1). 
Ian measures the goodness, and graduates his approval, 
of actions "by the purity of the source, not by the magnitude 
of the result ". "What we judge is always the inner Spring of 
an action, as distinguished from its outward operation ".(2). 
In this graduation of approval, "every action is right 
which, in the presence of a lower principle, follows a 
higher; every action is wrong which, in the presence of a 
higher, follows a lower ". (3). To draw an absolute dividing 
line between good and bad is "mere casuistry ". 
Innate. 
Martineau quotes Heraclitus who said that "strife is the 
father of all things ". When there is a simultaneous appear- 
ance of colliding forces which check and exclude each other, 
the "breach of the peace" which ensues results in an intui- 
tive moral valuation of the conflicting forces. The conflict 
and resulting valuation is "the one great condition which 
raises the spontaneous into the self- conscious life ". 
(i). Martineau; "Types of Ethical Theory ", Vol.II, Book I, 
Chap. I, p. 19. 
(2). Op. Cit. p. 24. 
(3). Op. Cit. p. 270. 
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Dealing with the intuitive, instinctive aspect of this 
process of evaluation, í.artineau says: "Suppose the case of 
one lone man in an atheistic world; could there really exist 
any 'authority' of higher over lower within the enclosure 
of his detached personality? I cannot conceive it. - -- The 
predicate 'higher than IT takes me yet a step beyond; for 
what am I? A person: 'higher' than whom no 'thing' assuredly - 
no mere phenomenon - can be; but only another Person, greater 
and higher and of deeper insight. In the absence of society 
or human companionship, we are thus still held in the presence 
of the One having moral affinity with us, yet solemn rights 
over us: by retiring into ourselves, we find that we are 
transported out of ourselves, and placed beneath the light 
of a diviner countenance. If it be true that over a free and 
living person nothing short of a living person can have 
higher authority, then is it certain that a 'subjective' con- 
science is impossible. The faculty is more than part and 
parcel of myself; it is the communion of God's life and 
guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive cap- 
acity in myself. Here we encounter an 'objective' authority, 
without quitting our own centre of consciousness. - -- If 
this pathway is correctly traced, from the moral consciousness 
to religious apprehension, all possible excuse is taken away 
for treating the authority of Conscience as merely personal 
and subjective, or even as that of Reason 'impersonally 
conceived', for that which is real in the universal Arche- 
type of all mind cannot be either an abstraction or an acci- 
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dental phenomenon of human individuality ". (1). 
Religion. 
A man's very selfhood is dependent upon this One Other: 
"That he has a self at all, and knows it, is possible simply 
because the universe has an Absolute Self - -- which communi- 
cates itself to the human being - the infinite to the finite 
spirit - and constitutes thereby the knowledge of moral law 
as the expression, under temporal conditions, of an eternal 
perfection ". (2). 
Criticism. 
In considering conscience as he does, .Martineau is 
open to criticism. Communion between God and man may, we 
believe, be considered as a consummation of the process of 
individual moralization; and religion may properly be held 
to be the efficient power working toward a personal integra- 
tion; but a God -given moral sense, or faculty, or a con- 
science, as such, innate to the individual at the beginning 
of the process of moralization, is a theory which needs re- 
stating. In Part II, we try to show that there is present 
in' man only a unique something which makes morality possible; 
it is an undeveloped potentiality rather than a power or 
faculty. Along with a developing self- consciousness, it de- 
velops in society, and becomes socialized; the beginning of 
it is something more like an " Anlage" than like a definite 
instinct or faculty. 
(l) Op. Cit., Chap. IV, pp. 104 ff. 
(2). Op. Cit., p. 106. 
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PART TWO. 





INNATE BASES OF MORAL BEHAVIOUR. 
I.Theories of Springs of Action. 
1.Life Impulse. 
A living organism is said to behave when it acts with a 
degree of self- determination, toward an end, and does so as a 
unity or whole. Behaviour is a criterion of animal life. Life 
itself is initiative: the drive or urge inherent in life is 
the ultimate mover to action. Dreyer calls this original ener- 
gy or spring of action "life impulse": "In a great part of 
our experience, possibly in all, we experience ourselves as 
active. - -- this activity which we experience, but which also 
determines experience, is the 'life impulse' become conscious 
in us ". (1). 
2.Freudian "Viish". 
Freud holds that the structures which are the springs 
of action are constituted of living cells which are the par- 
takers of this life impulse. in this view, instincts are made 
up of these synthesized elementary "cell wishes ". A cell 
wish includes a push toward activity, in virtue of the life 
which inheres in the cell. Each living unit of a living organ - 
isn partakes of the general incentive to activity. Freud pur- 
sues this theory to the point of making the thus constituted 
(1). Dreyer; "Instinct in Man", p. 84. 
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"Unconscious" to be, in a mechanistic way, the ultimate 
spring of human conduct. 
3. Ideo -motor Theory. 
It is held by some that ideas are springs of action. 
This, the ideo -motor theory, is tenable, we think, only if 
ideas are shown to embody life impulse. "An idea which is 
only an idea, a simple fact of knowledge, produces nothing 
and does nothing ".(1). Ideas, however, themselves depend up- 
on life, being the results of experiences - the residual de- 
posits as it were of reactions. Reactions, activities, 
experiences, must precede ideas, for ideas are not innate. 
These experiences, in turn, presuppose life. 
Simply because experience presupposes life, therefore 
an idea as mere cognition is only an abstraction, for life - 
experience, organic reaction, involves meaning, and affect, 
and often emotion. Ideas are movers to action only insofar 
as there inheres in them vital impulse, with the accompanying 
element of meaning, or affect, which is involved in reactions. 
4. Intelligence. 
Graham Wallas makes intelligence "as truly a part of our 
inherited nature, as independent a cause of human action, as 
any of the traditional instincts ".(2). But intelligence, 
rather than being considered as an isolable element, a mover, 
is better regarded, we think, as a method of movement man- 
(1). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions ", p. 19. 
(2). Wallas; "The Great Society ", p.48. 
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ifested by an organism which is otherwise moved to action. 
Intelligence is the ease and efficiency with which the organ- 
ism's reactions are, from the inside, adjusted to the outer 
evokers of action, particularly when the outer conditions are 
new ones. It is a "mental trait ", a "capacity for abstraction" 
rather than a spring of action. (1). 
5. Habit. 
Dewey (2) and Woodworth (3) consider habit to be a 
spring of action. Dewey says: "All habits are demands for 
certain kinds of activity ". "They form our effective desires 
and furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our 
thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong, and 
which shall pass from light into obscurity ". "They are ac- 
tive means, means that project themselves, energetic and 
dominating ways of acting ". "Eye, arm, hand - -- are means 
only when they enter into organization with things which in- 
dependently accomplish definite results. These organizations 
are habits ". Habits are "positive agencies ", (4); they are 
energy "organized in certain channels" (5). 
Habits, we think, are springs of action only in the 
sense that in their formation the vital impulse functions: 
they are formal sets, which probably have a physiological 
correlative concomitant: they are the resultants of reactions, 
(1). Thurstone; "The Nature of Intelligence ", p. 159. 
(2). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct ", p. 25. 
(3). Woodworth; "Dynamic Psychology ". 
(4% Dewey: Op.Cit., p. 175. 
(5) Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 76. 
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making easier the repetitions of those reactions, rather than 
the movers to those reactions. (1). 
6. Instinct -emotion Theory. 
McDougall (2) makes instincts and their respective emo- 
tions to be the ultimate springs of human action. "The human 
mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are 
the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and ac- 
tion - -- and are bases from which the character and will of 
individuals and nations are gradually developed under the 
guidance of intellectual faculties ". Furthermore, "each of the 
principal instincts conditions some one kind of emotional 
excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it ". (3). 
Godfrey Thomson (4) agrees with McDougall that "instincts 
are the great sources of energy ". 
Instincts are, we believe, movers to activity only be- 
cause they are the manifestations of "vital energy" or "life 
impulse ". This self -starting vital energy, differentiated, 
works itself out into specific conscious activities which are 
commonly called "instincts ". Each instinct is then evoked 
by its appropriate object, always in a definite, constant 
way. 
Morton Prince (5) singles out emotion and considers this 
affective element to be the ultimate spring of action: he 
(1). See Chap. XI. 
(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology ",' p. 20. 
(31. McDougall; Op.Cit., p. 49. 
(4). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character ", p. 156. 
(5). Prince; "Can Emotion be Regarded as Energy ? ". 
138. 
says that "emotion is energy ", "emotion moves us ". 
We think, however, that the Instinct -affect ultimate, 
whatever it is called, moves to action because it is the 
vehicle or instrument of the fundamentum, the vital impulse, 
and that emotions "are to be regarded as accompaniments and 
not causes of instinctive reactions of all kinds ". (1). 
The consummation of any primary reaction or specific 
response through which the life impulse works itself out and 
becomes differentiated, causes organic satisfaction; and in 
this sense, "life with its changes and movements originally 
means pleasure ".(2). That is, "primary reactions are di- 
rectly conditioned by the constitution of man's nature; are 
not determined by pleasure -pain; and are themselves the 
sources of hedonic results ".(3). The satisfaction resulting 
to the agent from the completion of these instinctive re- 
sponses, shows that a goal has been attained. It seems to us, 
therefore, that McDougall is correct in claiming that pur- 
pose is present in "instincts ": there is a "persistence 
until ": instinct -reactions tend to persist until a satisfy- 
ing completion is effected, or a goal is attained. 
H. Instincts and Reflexes. 
Instincts are to be distinguished from reflexes. The 
latter lack (4) spontaneity, persistence, variability, pur- 
pose, preparation, and improvability. Furthermore, reflex 
(1). Pillsbury; "The Utility of Emotions ". 
(2). Buehler; "Displeasure and Pleasure in Relation to Ac- 
tivity". 
(3). Irons; "A Study in the Psychology of Ethics ", p. 171. 
(4). See McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", pp. 53,ff. 
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action is a response to a stimulus, while "instinctive ac- 
tion is in many cases a response to an object" (1), which 
action involves, in some sense, a perceptive process on the 
part of the reacting organism. A reflex involves no psychical 
process. Again, each instinct -reaction is the response of the 
whole organism or person, who acts through the respective 
organs involved; reflexes, on the other hand, are the move- 
ments of separate organs which can be elicited even when 
neural connection with the brain of the organism is severed. 
They are not the reactions of the total organism or person. 
Thus, for example, the knee might respond to a stimulation 
with a knee -jerk reflex, even if nerve connection with the 
brain were cut, but the person would not, in similar condi- 
tions, show acquisitiveness. 
On any first reaction, habit begins to be formed. A 
predisposition to any response results from the repetition 
of that response. In the physiological aspect, these habits 
correlate with those latent modifications in the irritable 
tissue of the reacting organism which result from the repe- 
tition of the response. These modifications are analogous 
to the neurograms of Prince or the engrams of Semon.(2). 
They are "arrangements of neurones, conditioned in such a 
way that their subsequent activation produces a pattern of 
behaviour which resembles, but is not identical with, the 
(1). LcDougall,Op.Cit. 
, p.75. 
(2). Semon; "The Mneme", p.12. 
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previous resultant behaviour". W. 
III. Innate Elements are Non- moral. 
Gordon holds that these engrams, "representing primitive 
patters of thought and feeling, acquired during the life- 
time of various individuals, may be transmitted in their 
modified form to future generations ". (2). This is doubtful, 
but whether it be true or not, definite character traits, 
character itself, are not transmissible. Character must be 
won by each personality for himself. Essentially, man's 
innate endowment is non -moral; the raw material of virtue 
and vice is the same; original desires are in themselves 
non -moral. Neither good nor bad inheres in instincts them - 
selves.(31. (41. 
Psycho- therapy agrees in considering these elements 
of man's innate endowment to be, per se, un- moral. " - -- there 
are no vices in their own right; there are only perverted 
impulses, which, when wrested from their morbid attachments, 
may be turned into positive virtues ". (5). To be sure, these 
native impulses are at first non -socialized, but in and of 
themselves they are not bad. 
Neither are they good. "So far as any excellence is 
merely a natural or inherited tendency, it may be the basis 
(1). Gordon; "Personality ", p. 180. 
(2). Gordon, Op.Cit., p. 181. 
(3). See Rashdall; "The Theory of Good and Evil ", Vol.II,p.73. 
(4). See Thouless; "An Introduction to the Psychology of 
Religion ", p. 129. 
(51. Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals ", p.117. 
- 
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of virtue, but is not itself virtues ".(l. 
Although this innate dispositional endowment of man is 
neither good nor bad, it is the basis for "both moral and 
immoral tendencies in later years ".(2). 
Goodness and badness, morality, inheres in the conscious 
approval or disapproval by a self -conscious individual, of 
the actions upon which a weighed judgment has been pronounced 
by himself, as he is influenced by his socially- formed ideals. 
A child of two years, for example, would not be considered 
culpable if he appropriated a diamond ring whose brilliance 
attracted him. The "acquisitive instinct" would not, as a 
result of such action, be condemned as bad because this mani- 
festation of its operation did not conform to social custom. 
The act was not the consciously approved act of a self -con- 
scious, responsible individual. Instincts must be trained in 
and by society, and self -consciousness must first develop 
in the child, before the functioning of instincts takes on 
an ethical aspect. 
IV. There is i4o Loral Instinct. 
From the earliest times, some moralists have held that, 
as self -consciousness develops in the child, he can become 
morally responsible only as a result of his possessing an 
innate moral instinct. 
Thus Kirkpatrick (3) says that "such an instinct prob- 
(1). Sorley; "The Moral Life ", p. 15. 
(21. Waddle; "gin Introduction to Child Psychology ", p.213. 
(3). Kirkpatrick; "wundamentals of Child Study ", p. 61. 
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ably exists, in man at least, in the moral tendency to con- 
form to law, and to act for the good of others as well as 
self, and in the religious tendency to regard a Higher Pow- 
er". He continues: "Since every race and tribe has some form 
of morality and worship, there is good reason for saying 
that the tendencies to conform to law and to worship unknown 
sources of power is instinctive ". 
SO also Clavier (1), says that a moral sentiment ex- 
ists in the form of an innate tenderness. 
Professor Paterson (2) holds that "Whatever may have 
been the precise factors and stages of his development as 
a moral being, man is now endowed with a moral instinct ". 
A German theory, that of Ebbinghaus- Duerr, is quoted 
by Froebes(3): "Normal men today possess an innate faculty 
which reacts to specialized stimuli just as fundamentally 
with praise or blame as the eye does to light -stimuli with 
colour sensations". 
The various statements of the moral -instinct theory are 
to be variously criticized. Kirkpatrick speaks of a tendency 
to conform to law: but the fact seems to be that whatever 
conformity to law does exist in an unexperienced child, is 
either chance, or a result of external enforcement, or the 
mark of self -submission. If it is the result of chance, there 
is obviously no morality involved. If conformity is enforced, 
(l). Clavier; "L'Idee de Dieu chez l'Enfant ", p. 89. 
(2). Paterson; "The Nature of Religion ", p. 99. 
(3). Froebes; "Lehrbuch der Experimentellen Psychologie ", 
Vol. II, p. 470. 
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it is not a voluntary obedience, so is not moral. If it is a 
mark of an attitude of self- submission, it is not a moral 
instinct, but rather only the instinct of self -submission 
that is operating. 
Kirkpatrick further speaks of the tendency to act for 
the good of others. avow the roots of altruism are indeed, 
just as innate as those of egoism, but there is to morality 
more than a developed altruism; the two are not identical. 
Morality is bigger than any single moral trait; it includes 
more than a tendency to act for the good of others. 
Kirkpatrick also mentions the tendency to regard a 
Higher Power. But this tendency is religious rather than 
ethical. Confusion in terms is here avoided only if man's 
personal regard for, and relation to, his accepted God or 
Gods, be considered the unique criterion of religion, rather 
than a characteristic of morality. 
As to Kirkpatrick's statement, then, it can be said that 
obedience to law, altruistic regard for others, and reverence 
for God, are not the result of a moral instinct, neither is 
their sum identifiable with morality: all three result par- 
tially from a developing socialization; and some elements, 
such as duties to one's self, are omitted. Furthermore, 
religion is not to be wholly included within morality. (1). 
or can it be said that a moral instinct exists because 
every race and tribe has some form of morality; for universal- 
(ll. See Chap. XIV. 
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ity of practice does not alone make an instinct. Men may 
act alike just because they are physically of similar con - 
struction, and live in a similar environment; such condi- 
tions would account for tropisms and reflexes as well as for 
instincts. Rather, it can be said that the fact that every 
race and tribe has some form of morality is a social phenom- 
enon, not that similarity of action is the mark of an in- 
stinct of morality. 
Clavier's statement is acceptable, if innate tenderness 
is not construed to be the whole of the moral sentiment. 
Innate tenderness may be the basis for a worthy character - 
trait, but morality includes more than the one element of a 
developed tenderness. 
Professor Paterson seems to hold definitely to a moral 
as well as religious instinct. But definition is needed here. 
It appears that Professor Paterson holds, after all, that 
what is innate is an "Anlage", a disposition, a potentiality 
for moralization, rather than anything so definite as a 
specific moral instinct. Such an Anlage or potentiality, we 
agree, is innate to man when he begins his development toward 
moralization, but this potentiality is nothing so specific 
as an instinct. L.L. Bernard (1) emphasizes the specificity 
for which we contend when he defines instinct as "a specific 
response to a specific stimulus or set of stimuli ". 
(1). Bernard; "Instinct; A Study in Social Psychology ". 
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Ward (1) agrees that what the child inherits is only a 
"tendency to develop certain ancestral characteristics, in 
award, a particular Anlage". Waddle (2) calls this inheri- 
tance the inborn capacity to attain morality "in a social 
order permeated with social standards ". Burt (3) speaks of 
"certain inborn dispositions" and "a heterogeneous collection 
of mental tendencies ". Ribot (4) says the moral sentiment is 
instinctive, innate, "a set of tendencies ". 
As the vital impulse is the spring of action in "In- 
stinct", so the differentiations of this impulse into the 
various instincts become, in turn, the conscious impulses 
or driving forces to the various human capacities; but as 
to the existence of a specific "moral instinct ", it is to be 
concluded that, since there is revealed no consistent, spe- 
cific response to stimulation which is the same for all in- 
dividuals on all similar occasions, (5), a moral instinct 
as such can not well be considered as existing in man. 
"A moral instinct does not teach a man what is right and what 
is wrong - for there is no such instinct" (6) . There is lack- 
ing that specificity in an evoking object and in reaction 
which is an essential characteristic of instinct responses. 
(1). Ward; "Psychological Principles ", pp. 427 - 428. 
(2 ). Waddle; "An Introduction to Child Psychology", p. 210. 
(3). Burt; "Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility ". 
(4). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions ", p. 299. 
(5). See I'IcDougall; "Social Psychology", p. 26. 
(6). Sutherland; "The Origin and Growth of the Moral In- 
stinct", Chap. XXIV. 
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Thus although morality and religion have instinctive bases, 
there are no instincts of morality and religion. (1). 
Innate potentiality for morality develops into moral- 
ity within society. Potential morality becomes actual moral- 
ity only under social influences. It does not develop "in- 
dependently of the moral control, training, and education 
which is supplied by the community ". (21. McDougall thus em- 
phasizes the social element in the moralizing process of 
the child: "The tendency to do what one believes to be right 
- -- has an innate basis which may probably be called the so- 
cial or moral disposition. - -- The morality of a people ob- 
jectively considered is the outcome of the interaction between 
their moral disposition on the one hand, and the moral en- 
vironment on the other; and the latter consists of two parts: 
the traditional system of precepts, customs, laws, in short, 
the code; and the traditional system of sanctions by which 
the code is enforced." (3). 
V. Moralization is Unique to lÁan. 
Our position is, that, although there is in man, as a 
basis for morality, nothing so specific as a moral instinct, 
still, there are instinctive bases for morality; there is 
an innate Anlage, tendency, capacity, or potentiality for 
morality, which, in a social environment, and as self -con- 
(11. See Tracy; "The Psychology of Childhood ", p. 181. 
(21. Sully; "The Human Mind", Vol. II, p . 163. 
(3) . McDougall; "The Group Mind", p. 263. 
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sciousness thus develops in the child, develops into morality. 
Furthermore, if this Anlage be resolvable into simpler con- 
stituents such as self- submission, curiosity and the like, 
there still is, in the total organization, something unique 
to man. This moral tendency may extend radically to non- 
human forms, but even if it does, there is manifested in this 
moral potentiality of man, to use Morgan's term, a distinctly 
human "emergent ". 
1. Neural Intricacy and Plasticity. 
On the physiological side, this emergent is marked by a 
greater intricacy in nervous organization. MTan's neural organ- 
ization attains to a greater complexity than that of any non- 
human individual. With the increased complexity of the nervous 
system there goes an increased ability to "think" on any 
subject, non -moral or moral. An increase in psychic intrica- 
cy parallels the increase in intricacy of nervous organiza- 
tion. Moreover, the neural patterns with which non -human 
individuals are endowed, are not only less complex than those 
with which a human being begins life, but those of the form- 
er are less amenable to development - less plastic than those 
of man. Horton (lk says along this line: "As we come nearer 
to human goals in the problems of comparative psychology, 1 
we experience a paradoxical slowing up in the yield of in- 
formation from animal experiments. - -- Knowledge derived 
from chimpanzees can rise no higher than chimpanzees. The 
(1). Horton; "Prince's íeurogram Concept ", in "Problems of 
Personality ", p. 409. 
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proper unit of investigation of humanity is man. - -- When 
the experiments with chimpanzees are as finished as a 
squeezed orange, there will still be left out of account the 
especially human potentialities of nerve impulses in combin- 
ation". The highest non -human individual can hardly be 
said to possess the ability of CONCEPTUAL THINKING, EVALU- 
ATING AND COMPARISON OF CONCEPTS, and FREELY CHOOSING one 
of several possible modes of action which may appear, at 
first glance, to be of equal desirability. 
Z.Conceptualization. 
It is just this conceptualization, however, the highest 
kind of thinking, which is necessary if any individual is 
to form comparative, qualitative, moral evaluations of ac- 
tions and motives; if he is to make judgments upon actions 
and ideals of others, and upon his own; and if he is to 
have, as a necessary basis for these processes of evalua- 
tion and judging, concepts of the things judged. 
3. Self -consciousness. 
Another element in man's moral uniqueness is his self - 
consciousness. Man can know himself, and can also know him- 
self as the knower. As a person, he is not only a subject, 
but can make himself his own object as well. Hegel speaks 
to this point in the words: "The self- existing or abstract 
will is the person. The highest goal of man is to be a per- 
son - -- as every living thing is above all a subject. The 
Person is thus the subject for which this subjectivity ex- 
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ists, for in the person am I self -contained ". (1) . 
Mead writes as follows; " - -- the self that is central 
to all so- called mental experience has appeared only in the 
social conduct of human vertebrates. It is just because the 
individual finds himself taking the attitudes of the others 
who are involved in his conduct that he becomes an object 
for himself. - -- the self can exist for the individual only 
if he assumes the roles of the others. - -- This is what we 
imply in 'self -consciousness'. We appear as selves in our 
conduct insofar as we ourselves take the attitude that others 
take toward us, in their correlative activities. - -- We take 
the role of what may be called the 'generalized other'. - -- 
It is this generalized other in his experience which pro- 
vides him with a self ". (2). 
Seth speaks of man's uniqueness in these words: "In 
his critical and judicial 'view' of the impulsive and sen- 
tient life, consists that 'conscience' which distinguishes 
man from the animal creation, and opens to him the gates 
of the moral life which are forever closed to it ".(3). 
McDougall says that "The child has to pass gradually 
in the course of its development from the lowest to the 
highest stage of behaviour. - -- The passage is effected by 
the development of self- consciousness, of the sentiments, 
and of character. human behaviour on a low level, attended 
(1). Hegel; "Philosophie des Rechts", Part I, Sec. 35, Addition. 
(2). Mead; "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control ", in 
"International Journal of Ethics ", Vol. XXXV, pp.251 ff., 
1924 - 1925. 
(3). Seth; "Ethical Principles ", p. 193. 
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by a meagre amount of conceptualization, but rather evoked 
by primary instinctive impulses, approaches the non -moral ".(1). 
We may conclude: 
1. The human nervous equipment is more intricate and 
more highly organized and organizable than that of any other 
animal, and his psychic capacity is at least proportionately 
greater. 
2. In society, man becomes uniquely self -conscious. 
3. Because of his resulting conceptual, critical, and 
judicial ability, his conduct "is distinguished from the be- 
haviour of animals by the presence of moral ideas ". (2). 
L.A. Reid well says: "It is the existence of value 
self- consciously realized which constitutes the novelty of 
the moral life; reference to instincts is insufficient ". (3). 
(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 185. 
(21. Sorley; "The Moral Life and Moral Worth ", p. 1. 
(3). Reid; in "British Journal of Psychology ", Vol. XIV. 
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Chapter IX. 
MORAL BEHAVIOUR AND THE ORGANIZATION 
OF MAN'S AFFECTIVE ENDOWMENT. 
I. Moralization Involves JLore than Socialization of 
Innate Elements. 
Man's character is based upon his inherited powers and 
tendencies. The roots of character tap pre -natal life, but 
character itself is developed by the individual's experiences, 
under which are included both the systematic training which 
is called education, and the countless influences which the 
mature as well as the growing mind receives from the physical, 
social, and mental surroundings. "Heredity provides the basis 
of character. The environment gives the external conditions 
in which it must live and grow by the assimilation of ex- 
perience and adaptation to the circumstances of life" (11. 
So important, however, is the social element, and so 
great is the influence and pressure which society exerts 
upon the growing child, that some have claimed that the so- 
cialization of man's innate endowment is the whole of moral- 
ity. Trotter (21 seems to consider the "herd instinct" to be 
the total basis for morality: but the term "herd instinct" 
is used "too indiscriminatingly as a mere descriptive term 
to blanket over behaviour otherwise unexplained" (31. Such 
(11. Sorley; "The Moral Life and Moral Worth ", p. 11. 
(21. Trotter; "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War ". 
(31. McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", p. 154. 
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a term is reminiscent of the abandoned faculty psychology. 
McDougall says that the only reason for not considering 
socialization to be identical with moralization is the re- 
sulting confusion in terms. We do not wholly agree with his 
statement that "there would be no serious objection to the 
use of the two expressions (moral conduct and social con- 
duct) as synonymous" (1), unless there is included in the 
term "social conduct" the idea of integrated conduct. (2). 
Even then, it would be more exact to include socialization 
in integration than integration in socialization. 
The mere tendency of individuals to associate together 
with others of their own kind does not prompt them to a be- 
haviour which can be called either altruistic, or moral in 
any other sense. The gregarious instinct only "creates the 
situation in which the profoundly important general tenden- 
cies sympathy, imitation, and suggestibility can become 
effective in the development of the human being" (3). It is 
true that the complete satisfaction of their impulses is 
"impossible until each animal is surrounded by others of the 
same species in a similar state of excitement" (4), but 
gregarious instinct simply draws men together in society; 
it furnishes no incentive to proper social behaviour. 
It is with ALL forms of individual experience, and not 
only with the instinctive associating together on the part 
(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 179. 
(2). See Chap. XIII. 
(3). Dreyer; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education ".p.83, 
(4). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 175. 
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of members of the same species, that morality is concerned. (1}. 
Our problem is the VALUE of associations; the KIND of be- 
haviour manifested by individuals in groups. 
We conclude that society is the necessary field for the 
moralization of an individual, furnishing him with socially 
approved and socially enforced customs as a partial curb and 
guide to his innate tendencies. However, real "progress of 
morality involves its gradual emancipation from the external 
rule of custom, and, at the same time, an increase and deep- 
ening of the reflective factor" (2) in the individual. The 
possibility of the development of morality resides primarily 
not in the gregarious instinct, but rather in the affective 
endowment of man. Morality involves both the socialization 
of the human innate tendencies, and also the development and 
integration of the inner elemental factors, including es- 
pecially the affective ones. 
H. Affective Endowment is Basic to Man's Moralization. 
1. "Instinct- interest" and Emotions. 
The most fundamental element in man's affective endowment 
is the "instinct- interest" of Drever's theory. It is here that 
emotion is related to instinct. Instinct- interest is the affec- 
tive element in the instinct experience; if this affective 
ultimate be disturbed in its normal functioning, there results 
conscious emotion: if temporarily thwarted, the intensity of 
(1). See Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 222. 
(2). Sorley; "The moral Life and moral Worth", p. 8. 
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the desire for the end grows until at some undefined point 
in the process it becomes conscious - emotional - negative, 
or a "sadness" emotion; if temporarily and unexpectedly facil- 
itated, it gives rise to a positive or "joy" emotion. Thus, 
any particular instinct may take on either of two opposite 
characters or polarities, according as the instinct finds or 
is denied satisfaction ". 
We accept this theory as against Dewey who says that 
"emotion is a perturbation from the clash or failure of 
habit" (1). Clash and failure of a tendency to action would 
arouse the unpleasant or negative emotions, but the pleasant 
or positive ones, which arise from any unexpected facilita- 
tion to response, are left, in Dewey's theory, unexplained. 
A group of psychologists define and explain emotion 
wholly in physiological terms. rieron says it consists "essen- 
tially in an abnormal discharge of nervous energy, an amount 
too great to result in normal reactions" (2); this "reserve 
nervous energy" is discharged throughout the body, and the 
resulting "widespread reaction is the emotion ". Weiss con- 
siders feeling and emotion as "categories of behaviour re- 
sulting from the interaction between physical stimulating con- 
ditions and the censori -motor system" - -- "To regard feelings 
and emotions as non -physical forces which modify behaviour 
leads to a type of experimentation the result of which can not 
(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct ", p. 76. 
(2), Pieron; "The Nature of Emotion in Animal and klan ". 
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be incorporated into the rapidly developing system of bio- 
logical and social laws ". (1). Cannon considers emotions to 
be "under the control of the lower centres of the nervous 
system, to a considerable extent of the spinal cord ", and 
have their "sources outside the field of consciousness ". (2). 
Dunlap says that in his vocabulary, "emotion means visceral 
occurrences ", and "in normal life are the general back -ground 
against which external objects appear ". (3). Bechterew says 
that the nature of emotions is best expressed in the "ex- 
ternal mimetic movements and the somatic or bodily changes ", 
and hence emotions may best be considered as "somato- mimetic 
reflexes ". (4). 
Such theories, we think, are satisfactory as far as they 
go, but they mistakenly make the mechanical element the whole 
of the affect experience. Organic activities, somatic and 
overt, do accompany emotion; but to make these bodily mani- 
festations of emotion the total experience is to exclude from 
that experience those qualitative elements which are observable 
only to introspection, but which are just as real as those 
which are quantitatively, behaviouristically, commensurable. 
It seems to us that such exclusive theories mistakenly identi- 
fy emotions with the observable expressions of emotions, the 
(1). Weiss; "Feeling and Emotions as forms of Behaviour ". 
(2). Cannon; "Neural Organization for Emotional Expression ". 
(3). Dunlap; "Emotion as a Dynamic Back -ground ". 
(4). Bechterew; "Concerning Emotions as Somato -mimetic Reflexes ". 
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"concomitants of the life process" (1) with the self- starting 
urge inherent in the life process itself. 
McDougall has most recently stated his emotion theory 
as follows: "There are good reasons to believe that the human 
organism is innately endowed with a number of distinct con - 
ative tendencies, each subserving some great biological end. - -- 
The best general name for them is, I suggest, 'primary ten- 
dency'. - -- Each primary tendency, when brought into action, 
manifests itself in a felt impulse or desire; and each such 
primary impulse is accompanied by and, as a mode of experience, 
is qualified by, a specific quality which reflects in con- 
sciousness the general setting of the organism. When any pri- 
mary impulse is excited in great strength, the corresponding 
specific quality is easily recognized as one of the primary 
emotion -qualities. The conjoint operation of two or more pri- 
mary impulses is accompanied by a complex quality in which, 
in many cases, we can detect affinity with the corresponding 
primary emotion -qualities; such complex may be called the 
secondary or blended emotion -qualities. The complex feelings 
(otherwise known as the 'derived emotions') have no such one - 
to -one relation to the primary tendencies. Their relation to 
them is, rather, highly general ". (2). 
McDougall's theory is inferior to Dreyer's, we think, 
because, as McDougall himself seems to admit, the simple, 
specific, one -to -one relation of emotions to instincts is an 
(1 ). Brett; "Historical Development of the Theory of Emotions ". 
(2). McDougall; "The Distinction Between Feelings and Emo- 
tions". 
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over -simplification of the facts. The derived emotions are 
left without respective corresponding instincts. Further- 
more, dcDougall's theory, just as does the theory of Prince, 
that is, the "emotion -energy" theory, leaves emotion an un- 
analyzed ultimate. We think it is analyzable, and not ultimate. 
Instinct -interest is, we think, the affective ultimate; 
and here is located the primary seat of man's moral poten- 
tiality. Instinct -interest is basic to meaning, evaluation, 
and judging, that is, to morality. Emotion is the affective 
development of this basic instinct- interest, and is the most 
powerful single factor influencing human conduct. Even on the 
perceptual level of mental activity, the interest of the sit- 
uation, that is, its meaning, is, for elementary experience, 
the most important element . (1}. If this be true, it is 
evident that, in the case of morality, which involves the 
higher mental activities of conceptual thinking and pro- 
nouncing judgments, the innate affective element can not easily 
be overemphasized. 
The relation of the affective element, instinct- interest 
and its development, emotion, to meaning makes it 
important for morality. "Primary reactions give significance 
to persons, things, and events. When this significance is 
recognized, a peculiar reaction of feeling takes place which 
is called emotion". (2). it is precisely in the recognized 
(1). See Dreyer; "Instinct in man ", p. 133. 
(2). Irons; "A Study in the Psychology of Ethics ", p. 171. 
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significance of persons, things, and events, that the moral 
attitude inheres. Westermarck makes moral concepts to have 
their origin in emotion. (1). Brown says that "moral con- 
sciousness is coterminous with emotional and volitional 
consciousness ". (21. .iicDougall says that the "emotional 
qualities are the cognitive basis of self- knowledge and self - 
control ".(3). And Pillsbury, although emphasizing the con- 
trollable rather than the controlling aspect of emotions, 
emphasizes by this very attitude the centrality of emotions 
for morality, when he says: "A large part of self -control is 
really control of the emotions ". (4). Thus, we agree with 
Hinkle in her contention that there is a demand for a dis- 
placement of the psychological point of gravity from the will 
and intellect to the realm of emotions and feelings. (5). 
We conclude that man's emotions are inextricably, vitally, 
and fundamentally involved in his morality; their importance 
is established by their constancy in functioning while other 
mental elements vary; by their fundamental character in self - 
knowledge; by their urgency; and by their resulting tendency 
to mis- development into abnormality of personal conduct. 
(l1. restermarck; "The Origin and Development of the moral 
Ideas ", Vol. I, chap. I. 
(21. Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 223. 
(31. mcDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", p. 326. 
(41. Pillsbury; "Essentials of Psychology ", p. 317. 
(51. Hinkle; 'Translation of Jung's "The Psychology of the 
Unconscious ", introduction, p. 40. 
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2. Emotions become Organized into i:entiments. 
Instinct- interest, we have held, is the innate, irredu- 
cible affective root of emotion, developing into emotion when 
it is temporarily disturbed in its operation. Emotions, in 
turn, on the ideational level, become organized into sentim- 
ents. "Any instinct may in ideational consciousness pass into 
a sentiment ". (1k. 
A sentiment is an object or idea with its affective 
accompaniment. Shand has given to psychology the concept of 
sentiment which is now generally accepted. it is taken to be 
a kind of emotional structure around some object or idea. 
Thomson describes it as an organization, a prejudice, more 
than a mere grouping of emotions; it is rather "a permanent 
set or attitude which assures that the emotions of a given 
sort will arise in situations involving the object of the 
sentiment ". (2i. A sentiment is a unit of character; in its 
simplest form, it is a single emotional tendency connected to 
an idea. it is a structure of the mind, while emotion is 
an event of mental life. (3). in his fifth law, Shand further 
describes sentiment: "every sentiment tends to include in 
its system all those emotions that are of service to its 
ends, and to exclude all those which are useless or antagon- 
istic". He further says that a sentiment is a self or 
microcosm of the entire mind. (4). 
(1). Drover; "Instinct in Man ", p. 209. 
(21. Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character ", p. 154. 
(3). Edgell; "Mental Life ", p. 217. 
(4). Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 62. 
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3. Mood. 
If an affective element, instead of becoming organized 
into a sentiment, remains in a condition of sub -excitation, 
we have a mood. hood is an emotion in a state of sub- excita- 
tion: it is an affective set, of a duration somewhat longer 
than the duration of a conscious emotion. Pillsbury describes 
mood in this sense as being an emotion of long duration and 
slight intensity; it becomes in turn, a predisposition to 
an emotion or group of emotions. (1). 
4. Temperament. 
The nature of man as a whole, considered from the point 
of view of its emotional colouring, that is, from its affec- 
tive- conative point of view, is called by the descriptive 
term temperament. Temperament is the general affective tone 
of a man's nature. The pyhsiological side of temperament 
may be considered as in large measure "the balance or re- 
sultant of all the many bodily constitutional contributory 
chemical influences". (2). 
5. Disposition. 
The sum total of all man's original tendencies - his 
innate dispositions or instincts, may be called by the de- 
scriptive term disposition. 
6. Character. 
Character is another descriptive term. It covers sentiments 
(1). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of Psychology ", p. 346. 
(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 121. 
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and habits, the innate plus the acquired. It is the "sum 
of the acquired tendencies, built upon the native basis of 
disposition and temperament: it includes our sentiments and 
habits in the widest sense ". (1). 
7. Personality. 
The term personality emphasizes the integrative aspect 
of the relationship existing between the elements constituting 
man's psychic being. Personality is made up of what Hall 
calls elemental "psyches" (2), which are sometimes very 
loosely, and sometimes compactly constellated; some of them 
may be persistently repressed, and others forced and over- 
stimulated. A personality is a universe of psyches or sentiments 
or selves in a state of more or less perfect order and in- 
tegration. 
III. Emotional normality and Abnormality. 
1. Emotional Conflicts are possible within the Personality. 
A condition of emotional conflict may readily develop 
within a personality; for "Every sentiment tende to form a 
type of character of its own ". (3). Various sentiments tend 
to develop independently, and thus may become unharmonious 
rivals for the ascendance and governance within and over the 
other elements of the personality. If the respective innate 
tendencies, which are inherently self- assertive, are left to 
(1 ). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 123. 
(2). Hall; "Educational Problems ", Vol. I, p. 200. 
(3). Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 123. 
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themselves, to develop, each in its own way, without any 
organization or integration into an harmoniously working, 
although complex whole, then certain emotional conflicts 
are inevitable. 
Instincts may oppose each other. There may be, for ex- 
ample, a conflict between the appreciation of Self and the 
contempt of Self, (1), between self -assertion and self -sub- 
mission. 
2. The Complex. 
The "complex" is a repressed tendency, usually contrary 
to the moral code accepted by the individual; it therefore 
involves a conflict, upon one side of which is to be found 
the self -sentiment. It is best to distinguish "complex" from 
": the former is the latter well on the way toward 
a pathological condition. Bernard Hart and A.G. Tansley (2) 
do not make this distinction, but use the term "complex" to 
mean any emotionally toned system of ideas. The breadth of 
this definition causes confusion in meanings. It is better, 
we think, to reserve the term "complex" to express a re- 
pressed tendency in conflict with the self- sentiment. A com- 
plex becomes a fixation of the mind; the individual rejects 
the unpleasant incident in question, as involving an un- 
acceptable sentiment, and he tends to repress it; but although 
thus rejecting it, he is tied down to it. The complex pre- 
vents the normal functioning of the mind in any situation 
M. See Stratton; "Psychology of Religious Experience ",Part I. 
(21. Tansley; "The New Psychology ", pp. 57 ff, p. 73 
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which arouses the emotion associated with the original un- 
pleasant experience. "When the complex is struck on - -- the 
whole mind reacts just explosively and exclusively to that 
complex ". (1). 
3. Affective Normality is Relative. 
Even in normal men and women there can be detected the 
beginnings of conflict and dissociation, and the condition 
of abnormality is merely one of degree: in "normal" individ- 
uals, dissociation has not reached such proportions as to be 
called dual or multiple personality. Most persons have within 
themselves unreconciled contradictions which are possibilities 
of abnormality and which become abnormalities if allowed to 
develop in that direction. "Unity of personality is merely 
ideal ". (2). "The normal typical mind is a scientific fic- 
tion never fully realized ". (3). Just as cases "of hysteria 
show all degrees of mental disaggregation, from mere alterna- 
ation of mood and conflict of motive compatible with mental 
health, to extreme cases where two souls seem to share the 
tenancy of one body" (4), so also do the various degrees of 
mental integration present unbroken series of conditions, 
ranging from the closely knit type of personality which is 
dominated by one consuming purpose down through increasingly 
abnormal cases which present conditions of extreme multiple 
Personality. There is no difference in kind between the 
(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 75. 
(2). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions ", p. 385. 
(3) Sully; "The Human Rind ", Vol. II, p. 311. 
(4). Brown; Op.Cit., p. 195. 
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normal and abnormal, but rather only a difference in degree. 
No personality is perfectly integrated, with a completely 
ordered hierarchy of sentiments nicely graded, with a supreme 
dominating purpose at the top; and there is no definite 
place in the series where it can be said that normality ends 
and abnormality begins. "He who remains healthy has to struggle 
with the same complexes that cause the neurotic to fall ill ".(1 . 
The reason the neurotic falls ill is, that he has not 
faced the conflict of motives by recognizing and openly ac- 
knowledging them, and thus resolving the conflict. "Danger 
of disorder comes when the contending motives work obscurely, 
unrecognized, or disguised by rationalizations, reasons which 
we invent to explain or excuse our yielding to the promptings 
we do not acknowledge; and especially is there danger of dis- 
order when one of the unrecognized motives is of a nature 
such that we will not, dare not, recognize it, but rather 
repress it ". (2). 
The reason the healthy minded person does not fall ill, 
on the other hand, is, that "his character has been formed, 
from a well- balanced disposition under the influence of un- 
questioned ideals and of a definite supreme goal or master 
purpose ". (3). Normality and morality rest upon the inte- 
gration of sentiments under a single master sentiment. 
(1). Hinkle; translation of Jung's "The Psychology of the 
Unconscious ", introduction, p. X. 
(21. McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology ", p. 217. 
(3k. McDougall; Op.Cit., p. 216. 
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IV. Strength of Character Involves Organization of 
Sentiment Systems. 
One essential condition of a strong character is the 
organization of the sentiments into some harmonious system 
or hierarchy; "happiness arises from the harmonious operation 
of all the sentiments of a well- organized and unified person- 
ality - -- towards closely allied and harmonious ends ". (11. 
Although integration as a principle operates also on the 
purely perceptual level, it is on the higher, the ideational 
and conceptual levels, that it has special importance for us 
in this essay. 
We may summarize an analysis of sentiment, and see its 
development under the influence of the principle of integra- 
tion. An instinct is an interest -disposition. The instinct - 
disposition is perceptual, involving only perceptual conscious- 
ness. The sentiment -disposition is ideational, and is a senti- 
ment because it is ideational. Interest dispositions are 
either native or acquired, but a sentiment is more than a mere 
acquired interest -disposition on the ideational level; a 
sentiment involves, in its activity, an emotional excitement, 
whereas the activity of an interest -disposition involves 
merely worthwhileness, or interest -experience. In the human 
being, although the acquired sentiments play an analogous 
part on the ideational level to the part played by the in- 
stincts on the perceptual level, they also involve a synthesis 
(1). McDougall; "Social psychology ", p. 161. 
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or an integration of a higher order. 
This synthesis may be seen when the normal instinct - 
interest is obstructed in its passage into satisfyingness. 
Formally, the interest experience, determined by an acquired 
interest, passes into satisfyingness without any emotional 
excitement; but if there is a disturbance, due to some inter- 
vening obstacle, the necessary energy to oversome it is 
drawn from the appropriate sentiment. This fact implies that 
under normal conditions, there is a connected dispositional 
whole, constituted of interest- dispositions and sentiments, 
presenting in its arrangement a kind of hierarchy. 
V. Idealization Effects Integration. 
"Ideal formation" represents a level of psychic integra- 
tion still higher than the "sentiment formation ", just as the 
latter represents a higher level than the instinct. The form- 
ulation and acceptance of an "ideal ", as we shall see (11, 
involves on the part of the person, a reflecting and a judg- 
ing for his own Self. All such sentiments of value, that is, 
"ideals ", thus become integral parts of the "Self ". Here the 
self- sentiment enters as a support for any other element to 
which value has been adjudged by the Self. idorality rests 
upon these value -judgments pronounced upon concepts: that is, 
rests upon idealization. As value is value for a Self, and 
judgment is judgment by a Self, therefore morality is ob- 
viously essentially and vitally connected with the sentiment 
of Self. 
(l ). See Chap. X. 
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The goal of personality is character, effected by way 
of the integration of sentiments through the personal accept- 
ance of an ideal. Roback, although making character to be 
too negative a thing by his emphasis of inhibition, rightly 
emphasizes this integration and coordination by way of an 
accepted "regulative principle" (1) or. abstract "ideal ". He 
defines character as "an enduring psycho -physical disposition 
to inhibit instinctive impulses in accordance with a regu- 
lative principle ". This integration marks completeness of 
life, and "complete human life is the supreme good ". (2). 
Allport, speaking from a behaviouristic standpoint, expresses 
the same idea in these words: "Integration of drives and sub- 
servience of the minor ones to the major ones are essential 
for human efficiency and happiness. - -- In some individuals 
we find a self -inculcation of excellent habits in the interest 
of the major drive, leading to a hierarchy of harmonious 
drives in a total integration of personality ". (3). Guyau 
says tersely: "Morality is the unity of the being ". (4). And 
Sorley says that "in his own life, as far as it is a moral 
life, each individual seeks system or unity ". (5). That is, 
personality has integration as its goal. "Man is of necessity 
a moral being, for the moral impulse is simply the effort to 
(11. Roback; ''The Psychology of Character ", p. 450. 
(2). Hall; "Educational Problems ", Vol. I, p. 204. 
(3). Allport; "Social Psychology ", p. 111. 
(4). Guyau; "Education and Heredity ", p. 79. 
(5). Sorley; "Recent Tendencies in Ethics ", p. 134. 
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systematize all particular tendencies by reference to an 
end which possesses intrinsic worth ".(1). A moralized in- 
dividual possesses an "all-inclusive end for the organism as 
a whole, and this end has a necessary reference to the essen- 
tial nature of the organism". It is "in the ¡lie subordina- 
tion amongst themselves of the conflicting systems of in- 
stincts and in their control by our higher mental functions" 
that the moral value (of instincts) lies". (2). On the other 
hand, inadequacies in the associations of innate emotional 
elements with the mental powers of man are the cause of all 
important errors of conduct and of all the burdens of men or 
of societies. (3). 
But man is not yet so harmoniously integrated within 
his emotional and sentimental constitution, that he is a real 
"in- dividuality ", that is, wholly "un- dissociated ". (4). "Man 
is still only on the way towards self- harmony and individual- 
ity ". The goal of "complete and permanent control, in full 
self- consciousness, of his whole psychic inheritance from 
higher animals, as also of these new elements that result 
from his own mental activity as man ", has not been attained. 
If such a goal were attained, man would experience complete, 
harmonious, moral life, for right conduct means harmony with- 
in the personality, and as we shall see (5), a resulting 
wider harmony between the person and society. The contribu- 
(li. Irons; "A Study in the Psychology of Ethics ", p. 172. 
(2). Thouless; "An introduction to the Psychology of Religion", 
p. 129. 
(3). .Hinkle; Jung's "The Psychology of the Unconscious",intro. 
(4). Simpson; "Iulan and the Attainment of Immortality ",p. 251. 
(5) See Chap. All I . 
169. 
tion of the ideal to conduct is "peace in action ". (1). 
The personality in which the number of harmonious 
sentiments is large, is superior to one in which the number 
of harmoniously functioning sentiments is small; for each 
sentiment results from personal experience, and breadth of 
experience is therefore implied in a multiplicity of senti- 
ments. rurthermore, as the number of sentiments increases, 
intricacy of organization and of affect -pattern is increased. 
So, if, in such a more highly complex pattern, harmony ex- 
ists, it is indeed the harmony of a superior type of person- 
ality. And if a personality, inclusive of many and intense 
emotional units, is harmoniously organized under the sov- 
ereignty of a worthy master sentiment, that personality is 
a high type of individual. " -- -the richer and better organ- 
ized is our character, the greater is our good - --- ". (2). 
But even if the master sentiment is not of the highest 
kind, it may still be an effector of integration of personality. 
Strength of character depends upon the extent and degree to 
which the sentiments are interconnected with one another, 
and are governed by fixed principles, not upon the quality 
of the master sentiment. A personality harmonized under a bad 
master sentiment is still a strong character if the integra- 
tion is comparatively complete. "Character stands for the 
(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct ", p. 264. 
(2). Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 225. 
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hierarchy of motives, as it has become established for any 
individual" (1), but the FINEST type is,, of course, complex, 
strongly and harmoniously organized, and directed toward the 
realization of a HIGTER goal and ideal. 
The governing sentiment for one person may be a quite 
insignificant one in the judgment of another person: for ex- 
ample, one man may be completely engrossed in a detailed 
study of the Greek particle , and in enthusiastically 
pursuing his study of that word in all its uses in the whole 
range of Greek literature, he may manifest a trait akin to 
genius; but such a pursuit would be considered by another 
man as quite unworthy of the emotional enthusiasm which his 
friend shows toward it. Strength and stability of character 
may be by an intense, persistent, emotionally tinged 
interest in the Greek particle 45'1, just as certainly as by 
an interest, say, in world politics. In either case, stabil- 
ity of character would be shown, not so much by the kind of 
object which furnishes the nucleus of the dominating sentiment, 
as by the completeness and strength of its dominance over the 
other elements within the personality. 
Instability of character, on the other hand, is marked 
by a variability in master. sentiments. If the governor is 
changed frequently, the actions of the individual manifest 
the frequent changes. 
(1). Edgell; "Mental Life ", p. 245. 
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VI. Integration of Personality and the Unconscious. 
1. "The Unconscious ". 
Personality may fail of attaining its goal of an efficient 
integration of sentiments, because of conditions existing in 
"The Unconscious ". Let us first see what The Unconscious is, 
and then consider some of the possible conditions existing 
therein which might cause a failure in integration and thus 
prevent moralization of the personality. 
However the unconscious is characterized, it is to be 
considered a real and integral part of the personality. 
"Subconscious resources are OUR resources ". (1). There may 
be conflicts within a personality which amount to dissocia- 
tion, but the dissociated element still belongs to a somebody. 
If a dissociated element becomes the dominating power in the 
activity of A, and he acts in ways of which he is wholly un- 
aware in the succeeding normal state, as for example in a 
fugue, it is still A who is said to perform the acts. Either 
Dr. Jekyll or Mr. Hyde may be the governor of the individual's 
behaviour, but in either case, it is the Jekyll -Hyde individ- 
ual who owns both tendencies, and acts, now under the domin- 
ance of the Jekyll tendency, and again under that of the 
Hyde tendency. In cases of less pronounced abnormality, or 
in "normal" cases, this ownership of alternating tendencies 
is more plainly evident: thus it is obviously the individual 
(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience ", p. 538. 
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who owns his alternating moods which influence him to act 
now this way, now that. 
The subconscious resources, whether they seldom, or 
never, emerge into consciousness, are nevertheless continu- 
ously active. Only a small part of the content of the uncon- 
scious may ever emerge into consciousness, but what remains 
below does not, because of its submersion, remain inactive 
and uninfluential upon conduct. The "group of prejudices and 
sentiments" which structurally constitutes the unconscious, 
functions "in endo -psychic processes ". (1). 
Freud holds that all psychic phenomena are manifesta- 
tions of the unconscious, and the phenomena of conscious ex- 
perience are superficial, the former producing and explaining 
the latter. His mechanical theory erroneously extends the 
meaning of "The Unconscious" until the conscious is relegated 
to a place of minor importance in psychic life. On the 
physiological side, Freud holds the unconscious to be con- 
stituted of active neural mechanisms, the energy of which 
shows itself in "wishes ". This wish- energy of the unconscious 
becomes manifest in such phenomena as wit, phantasy, hysteria, 
dreams, slips of the tongue and pen, and forgetting. 
The psyche, the mental life, is divided by Freud into 
three levels: the conscious, the foreconscious, and the un- 
conscious. The conscious is the sphere of normal mental 
personal awareness. The foreconscious is composed of elements 
(1). Dreyer; Lecture, January 21, 1927. 
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which are capable of becoming conscious, but are not so: 
they are available for conscious use, and can be recalled 
from the foreconscious ante- chamber into the audience -cham- 
ber of consciousness. The unconscious is the sphere of re- 
pressed wishes: that is, repression has dissociated them 
from the conscious personality. These repressed wishes are 
not eliminated nor annihilated, but are only overlaid. So 
in the unconscious the primitive psychic life remains in- 
tact. Freud emphasizes this unconscious to such a degree that 
everything conscious is made to have a preliminary step in 
it: the unconscious is considered the basis of psychic life. 
Repressions are effected from the earliest months of life, 
and each new repression is an addition to the sum of sub- 
merged tendencies which sum constitutes the unconscious. 
Repressions are effected usually because the tendencies re- 
pressed are rebellious against the dictates of moral and 
social ideals and customs. These tendencies are practically 
all regarded by Freud as specializations of, or deviations 
from, the sex instinct. Libido is the energy with which they 
strive to gain expression in the sex instinct. Thus there is 
involved in repressed tendencies, in complexes, a conflict, 
and the powerful resulting affect is unpleasant. The censor, 
an ill- defined term of Freud's, is a repressing force or 
forces, a barrier protecting the conscious against painful 
invasions from the unconscious. To evade the censor, and thus 
to succeed in entering the conscious, the repressed wishes 
must be reclothed, assuming a symbolic character. This sym- 
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bolization is commonly effected in dreams, phantasies, and 
so forth. Thus for Freud, a study of dreams is all important 
as a key to an explanation of all psychic phenomena. 
Not only is Freud to be criticized for his mechanistic 
view- point, but there is, we think, no warrat for extending 
the meaning of the unconscious to such a confusing degree 
as to force it to displace the conscious elements as the 
sovereign psychic phenomena. And in the third place, he gives 
undue inclusive prominence to the sex instinct. In order to 
include within that concept everything which he does include, 
Freud is forced so to expand its meaning that this meaning 
becomes unique among all psychological theories. The expan- 
sion only effects confusion in terms. On the whole, Freud- 
ianism is an oversimplification of facts, resulting in making 
out of the unconscious "a mere fermenting dung -heap, made up 
of odds and ends of nasty and forbidden desires ". (1). 
C.G. Jung repudiates the pan -sexuality of his earlier 
master,Freud. he includes within the term "unconscious ", not 
only the individual's repressed tendencies or complexes, but 
also all the instinctive foundations of his mental life, and 
a somewhat vaguely defined "collective unconscious ". This 
latter includes racial elements - unconscious psychic patterns 
which have never been experienced by the subject, and which 
"are engraphically determined, entirely at the level of un- 
ill. ìvicDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology ". 
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conscious activity ". (U. These are Jung's "archetypes", 
innate tendencies belonging to the individual to explain 
his world in terms which figure largely in mythology and 
folk -lore. Jung thus classifies the 
constitution of the Personality. 
1. The personal conscious elements constituting the conscious 
personality, the "moi conscient", (das Ich). 
2. The personal unconscious elements constituting the in- 
dividuality (das Selbst), or the "moi inconscient" or "sub - 
conscient". 
3. The conscious and unconscious elements of personal nature 
constituting the person. (2). 
Thus for Jung, there is, besides the "conscious I ", 
(2) a personal unconscious consisting, first, of complexes 
which were once conscious, and secondly, of sense perceptions; 
and (3) also a collective unconscious which is a depository 
for racial elements. In Jung's theory, the unconscious be- 
comes "the source of all our more imaginative life, our in- 
spirations, our intuitive insights and prophetic glimpses ". (3). 
Jung is to be criticized for his indefiniteness along 
certain lines. What, for example, is the relation between the 
personal unconscious and the collective unconscious? The 
theory seems to place upon the inheritability of character- 
(1). Gordon; "Personality ", p. 178. 
(2). Jung; "La Structure de l'Inconscient ", in "Archives de 
Psychologie ", Vol. XVI, p. 177. 1916 - 1917. 
(3). McDougall; "An Outline'of Abnormal Psychology ", p. 22. 
176. 
istics a burden heavier than it can scientifically bear. 
Pierre Janet holds that the mental life is a flow of 
sensations which, in the normal man, cohere, or are synthe- 
sized in a complex stream. in the abnormal or neurotic, the 
stream falls apart or fails to attain unity because of a 
deficiency in the energy necessary to secure the synthesis 
and coherence. Such poverty of energy Janet calls "la 
misere psychologique ", and he holds that, for such a con- 
dition, "Most methods of psychological treatment are methods 
of economy which in one way or another try to conserve and 
augment the psychological forces of the patient ". (1). rie 
claims that most acts of misconduct are only manifestations 
of the deficiency of this energy: "Il me semble possible 
de que la plupart de ces troubles de la conduit 
ne sont que des degrés de la méme dépression plus ou moins 
profonde ". (2). The dissociated individual becomes the seat 
of two or more streams, generally one major stream and one 
or more minor collateral streams. 
Janet's theory resembles what Oliver L. Reiser calls 
"spiritual behaviourism ". Reiser says: "The fundamental 
reality of the universe is energy ". (3). "Where the integ- 
rative action is insufficient, ( "la lisére Psychologique "? ) 
the central unity breaks down into the separate selves or 
psychic isotypes, and multiple personality results ". Such 
(l}. Janet; "La Tension Psychologique, ses Degree, ses Os- 
cillations", in "British Journal of Psychology ", Medical 
Section, 1920 - 1921, p. 5. 
(2). Janet; Op.0it., p. 213. 
(3Ì. Reiser; "Spiritual Behaviourism ", "The Monist. April,1927. 
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a theory as Janet's is, we believe, justly criticized by 
McDougall as being "a mere mechanical dynamism" (11, with 
the purposive nature of mental activity too exclusively ig- 
nored. This tendency toward " more mechanical dynamism" is 
revealed by Janet in such words as the following: "if we 
knew the tendencies which are operative, we should be able 
to predict exactly the reactions and at the same time the 
conduct seemingly unforeseen. Without speaking here of the 
role played by the inventions and progress, the great diffi- 
culty of foreseeing depends on the fact too little recog- 
nized, that man changes incessantly, that is, that at two 
different moments he does not present the same mechanism 
or the same tendencies ". (21. 
Rivers holds that experience becomes unconscious by the 
process of unwitting suppression, which he considers to be a 
form of forgetting. This is a protective mechanism for con- 
sciousness. An emotional or affective experience, or an in- 
tellectual experience with a strong affective tone, is es- 
pecially liable to be suppressed. The danger instincts, with 
their unpleasant emotion of fear, are emphasized by Rivers. 
Experience shut off from consciousness by suppression of the 
unpleasant is inaccessible to consciousness directly, but 
can be recalled under certain special conditions such as 
(1). McDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology ", p. 11. 
(2). Janet; ùp.Cit., p. 223. 
178. 
sleep, hypnotism, free association, and certain pathological 
states (psycho -neuroses). (1). Rivers contends that "the 
main function of psycho -neuroses is the solution of a con- 
flict between opposite and incompatible principles of mental 
activity. Instinctive processes and experience associated 
therewith pass into the unconscious whenever the incompati- 
bility passes certain limits ". (2). For Rivers, as for Jung, 
the significance of the dream lies in a present conflict 
rather than in a past conflict, as r'reud holds. 
Morton Prince (3) says that psychic phenomena may be 
classified into three groups: those of personal conscious- 
ness, of co- consciousness, and of unconsciousness. The co- 
conscious and the unconscious constitute the sub -conscious. 
Dissociated states are psychic phenomena belonging to the 
co- conscious. Prince characterizes the unconscious, from a 
neurological standpoint, as "the great storehouse of neuro- 
grams which are the physiological residua of our mental 
lives ". (4). This neurographic theory of prince's is anal- 
ogous to the neurological aspect of the "mnemic phenomena" 
of Bertrand Russell and Semon, or of Broad's "mnemic per- 
sistents ". For Prince's theory, all inner psychic life be- 
longs to experience and is subject to the same laws of con- 
servation as any other part of experience. Elemental ideas 
(l). Rivers; "Instinct and the Unconscious ", p. 17. 
(2). Rivers, Op.oit., p. 6. 
(3). Prince; "A Biological Theory of the Unconscious ". 
(4). Prince; "The Unconscious ", p. 149. 
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which make up the experience of any given moment tend to be- 
come organized, that is, synthesized, and conserved. "Such 
a system, conserved, may be called an unconscious complex 
or neurogram or system of neurograms. It is a complex or 
synthesis of dormant ideas, a neural disposition. Every 
system of ideas, therefore, implies conservation through an 
organized unconscious complex ". 
Dreyer has characterized the unconscious as "sub- person- 
al consciousness ", "consciousness mainly at or below the 
perceptual level, and therefore consciousness in which appe- 
tite and instinct will have the fullest play: but to identify 
the unconscious with instinct is impossible. The unconscious 
is wider than instinct, though undoubtedly instinct plays 
in the realm of subpersonal consciousness a part that is 
certainly more prominent, if not more important, than in the 
realm of personal consciousness ". He represents the "strata" 
of consciousness schematically as follows: 
).conceptual level -Rational Purpose. 
A. Personal consciousness 
1/2.Subconceptual level. ideational 
\i 
level. Desire. 
1.2erceptual level - Instinct. 
B. Subpersonal consciousness 
'2.Subperceptual level. Appetite. 
(continuous lines show normal relationship, broken lines 
possible distribution). 
The unconscious or subpersonal consciousness is considered as 
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underlying at all times the conscious or personal conscious- 
ness, "just as the instinctive propensities underlie the ends 
and purposes of our rational activities, and it is uncon- 
scious because it represents either a stage of psychical 
evolution beyond which we have passed by normal development, 
or a mass of experience upon which we have, as it were, tried 
to turn our backs by some more or less abnormal process of 
dissociation, repression, or substitution, but instinct has 
precisely the same psychological position and function in 
subpersonal as in personal consciousness ". (1). 
In summarizing, the unconscious may be considered as the 
depository of the records made by affectively -toned experi- 
ences. The unconscious thus becomes a group of prejudices and 
which, though submerged, remain an integral part 
of personality, and active, and at times powerfully influen- 
tial upon conduct. These elements of the unconscious may in- 
clude among their number some submerged sentiments which have 
been relegated to the " subpersonal consciousness" because of 
an unpleasant affective tone, being possibly in conflict 
with an individual's accepted code of conduct and with social 
custom. In its physiological aspect, the unconscious is the 
sum total of mnemic persistents, or neurographic residua of 
affective experience. 
(1). iirever, "Instinct and the Unconscious ", in "British 
Journal of Psychology ", vol. 4. 1919 - 1920. 
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VI1. innate Tendencies, Submerged into "The Unconscious', 
are a äource of Disintegration of :Personality. 
conditions may easily exist in this complex depository 
of sentiments which cause, or amount to, dis- integration of 
the personality. Instinct tendencies which come to be con- 
sidered by an individual as unharmonious with his accepted 
code, may be submerged into the unconscious, in an attempt 
to eliminate them. But it is dangerous to mental health thus 
to suppress innate tendencies; they are to be trained and 
controlled, but they can not be safely submerged: suppression 
of these forces, because they are the raw material of the 
complete, integrated, moralized personality, is both un- 
successful and unmoral. In case of loss of, or lack of, a 
mental equilibrium between these instinct- tendencies and their 
controlling forces, (a condition which causes the psycho - 
neuroses), various ways of re- establishing the equilibrium 
are tried by different subjects. These attempts are unsuccess- 
ful. 
l.Unsuccessful Attempts at Dealing with Conflicts within 
the Unconscious. 
According to Rivers (1), neither an instinctive suppress- 
ion, which is usually a defensive, unwitting process, nor a 
conscious process of repression is a successful solution of 
Rivers; "Instinct and the Unconscious ", pp. 122, ff. 
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conflict. Repression, according to Rivers, belongs to the 
order of intelligence; it is epicritic, rather than belong- 
ing to the order of instinct which is protopathic. The sub- 
ject of an epicritic process (an anxiety- or repression- 
neurosis) may consciously and voluntarily "thrust out of his 
consciousness the painful experience, together with the 
affects and conative tendencies connected therewith" - but 
such an attempt at solution is as a rule unsuccessful. 
A third unsuccessful way of dealing with inner conflict, 
is the attempt on the part of the organism to escape from 
the conflict by substituting another form of instinctive re- 
action for that which naturally tends to be brought into ac- 
tivity. The subject may regain a temporary and superficial 
comfort by the occurrence of symptoms which enable him to 
escape the conflict rather than face it. Such symptoms, for 
example, are those of hysteria, which shows such character- 
istic manifestations as paralyses, anaesthesias, and a con- 
dition of heightened suggestibility. This condition of 
hysteria is "due to the substitution, in an imperfect form, 
of an ancient instinctive reaction in place of other forms 
of reaction to danger ".(1). For example, a wild animal, on 
being frightened, will often stand perfectly still, para- 
lyzed. If this ancient instinctive reaction is substituted 
by man for more intelligent forms of danger reactions, there 
is manifested, in the substituted reaction, an hysteria 
(1). Rivers; Op.Cit., p. 135. 
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characteristic. 
Again, phobias may exist in the unconscious, as a re- 
sult of a previous suppression of a painful experience of 
fear, and lie there, maintaining a potentiality for activity 
whenever conditions are suitable for evoking the fear involved. 
In the fifth place, the subject with an unresolved conflict 
between instincts and controlling forces may be seemingly 
"compelled ", by pressure of the conflict, to perform meaning- 
less actions, the performance of which apparently gives him 
comparative relief from his neurosis, provided of course, 
that the meaningless acts do not themselves arouse social 
attention or opposition. This substitutional solution of a 
conflict, because the subject's reaction is not to the actual 
situation, is inadequate. "Compulsion neurosis" does not 
satisfactorily meet the issue. 
A method of attempted solution of conflict, involving 
flight from reality, a method common too, among "normal" 
individuals, is rationalization. This is a process of self - 
deception by the false fabrication of excuses for the sub- 
ject's own condition and actions. Obviously, such failure to 
deal with actual conditions is inefficient. 
Paranoia, as a defence mechanism for the organism, re- 
sulting from feelings of inferiority, and tending toward 
compensatory delusions of grandeur, is, of course, no ade- 
quate solution to conflict. 
Neither is day -dreaming an adequate solution; nor is its 
exaggerated form of hallucinatory and delusional states, 
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aggravated forms of which illustrate the condition of de- 
mentia praecox. No reaction by an organism is efficient and 
normal which shows a flight from actual, existing conditions 
to which the organism is, after all, subject. 
Finally, conflict within the elements constituting a 
personality, may result in the dissociation of a rebellious 
element from the main personality, and a successful tempor- 
ary assumption by it of authority within the personality 
over the other elements. The result is duality of personality. 
In extreme cases, in manic states, dissociation may advance 
to such a point that it seems that the whole controlling 
organization breaks down completely, and the various unorgan- 
ized, unrestrained instinctive tendencies run riot. 
VIII. Moralization Involves Organization of Rather than 
Annihilation of Instinct -tendencies. 
A general conclusion from these brief summaries of some 
unsuccessful attempts at solutions of conflict (1) is, that 
attempts at annihilation of innate tendencies is not a heal- 
thy disposal of them, for instinctive tendencies are so pow- 
erful that they can neither be annihilated nor safely dis- 
regarded, nor successfully suppressed. They may break through 
the attempted repression, or they may slip through in secret 
ways which the subject will not recognize, or "the dam is a 
success, and the valley below it is dry and sterile ". (2). 
(1) See Rivers; Op.Cit., pp. 122, ff. 
(2). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character ", p. 159. 
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The fact is, the instinctive tendencies can not be eliminated, 
and even if their elimination were possible, it would be 
neither desirable nor moral to eliminate them, containing as 
they do, not only the potentiality for bad, but just as pow- 
erful potentiality for positive good. Eliminate them and you 
eliminate the basis for morality as well as for immorality. 
Not annihilation, but control and organization of instinctive 
tendencies is the basis of ethical conduct. Morality is the 
socialized behaviour of the integrated personality. The 
elimination of instinctive tendencies would be the elimina- 




INTEGRATION AND IDEALS. 
Moral failures are the result either of a faulty, in- 
complete socialization of hereditary endowment, or of a fail- 
ure at integrating the instinctive elements within that en- 
dowment. A failure in integration is marked by the absence 
of a singleness of life- purpose , a lack of a master senti- 
ment which dominates within a whole well- ordered hierarchy 
of sentiments within the personality. Or moral failure may 
result from lop -sidedness; that is, what integration there is, 
is of a restricted portion of the personality, so that the 
result is that after all the personality as a whole is not 
integrated, and some necessary activities are sacrificed by 
the subject. Such an exclusiveness of interest is morally 
perilous, for it tends to omit many duties which call for ex- 
ercise; and because of this disregard for duties which are 
socially considered urgent, the subject may easily become an 
active law -breaker, by running amuck of customs which he con- 
siders unimportant, but which society regards as the final 
moral code. Or such an individual may develop either an active 
hypocrisy or a real dissociation. 
I. Integration Involves Idealization. 
Integration is a principle applicable to all degrees of 
complexity of neural and affective organization. The nervous 
system of the individual inherits a certain degree of organ- 
ization among the neurones which are its constituent vital 
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elements. The main units of man's inherited organization are 
the instinctive dispositions, each tending to function in- 
dependently of the others. This independent functioning of 
these elements develops sentiments, within each of which 
several instinctive dispositions may be integrated into an 
harmonious system. In order to achieve integration within a 
personality, these various systems of sentiments must be 
nicely ordered into an hierarchy of character, of which the 
dominant system must be powerful enough to exercise an author- 
itative influence over all other sentiment -systems, subordin- 
ating them to its own master -purpose. Thus a character is 
formed. Dissociation results if several sentiment systems 
continue in an unresolved competition for mastery, perhaps 
alternating with each other in their mastery. The problem of 
integration of personality, and of the moralization of an in- 
dividual, becomes the problem of finding such an undisputed 
master sentiment, of finding an "ideal" which is the resultant 
of the conceptualization of experiential elements, and the 
evaluating of, and the choosing between, these various con- 
ceptualized clamants for choice. 
1. Alfred Adler's "will to power" as the Integrating 
Factor.. 
Alfred Adler asserts that the desire for power is the 
most powerful and fundamental element of man's nature - the 
one ideal able to be the integrative force of the personality. 
This desire for power is conceived of as the so- called "mas- 
culine protest" manifested by the individual as a compensation 
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for some inferiority of function. Every one desires to be 
"a complete man ", and hence, a deficiency or weakness in one 
direction tends to evoke an excess of compensatory reaction 
in another. "Every bodily or mental attitude indicates clear- 
ly its origin in a striving for power, and carries within it- 
self the ideal of a kind of perfection and infallibility". 
Thus Napoleon, ridiculed for his small stature, protested 
against this inferiority by a compensatory desire for power. 
" - -- the psyche has as its objective the goal of superiority ". 
Although this goal is a fiction, "it has become the principal 
conditioning factor of our life ". (1). According to this the- 
ory, it would seem that ambition and pride, which are natural 
developments of a self- assertion which is compensatory for a 
feeling of inferiority along some particular line, would tend 
to become the goals of every individual. 
But Adler's is only a partial view: it is only the pos- 
itive aspect of the possibilities latent within a condition 
of inferiority. Another aspect, a negative one, is, that an 
uncompensated feeling of inferiority may manifest itself in an 
exaggerated habitual attitude of self -submission. When self - 
submission has developed to an exaggerated degree, it becomes 
the inferiority complex. 
II. The Sentiment of Self- regard as the integrating Factor. 
The healthy minded individual is marked by an integration and 
(1). Adler; "The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology ", 
p. 7, and p. 9. 
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balance between these two tendencies. Self- assertion and self - 
submission, harmonized, each functioning in a normal way and 
to a normal degree, constitute self- respect. A self -respecting 
individual corresponds closely to the Aristotelian "high - 
minded" man. 
Self- respect, the sentiment of self- regard, develops, just 
as does self -consciousness, only in society. Let us see how 
this important sentiment develops in the child. At birth, the 
child has only the potentiality for self -consciousness. His 
reactions are only a series of wild physical movements, un- 
directed to any definite goal, and not referred to any "Self ", 
which is as yet only a latent possibility within him. But he 
soon discovers a difference between an object which he ex- 
periences as being a part of his own body, and an object which 
is beyond that body. Then he soon learns that some of the ob- 
jects beyond his body are more actively responsive to his re- 
actions than are some other objects, that is, he learns by ex- 
perience the difference between persons and things. At this 
point he has, vaguely at first of course, discovered his 
physical me, and distinguishes also, from it, his social en- 
vironment. Now this social environment has a name for him, 
which he soon learns to consider as his own possession, and 
this name becomes a hook upon which he can hang references to 
"himself ". His Self is expanding, assimilating all his ex- 
periences: what he sees becomes his; what he hears becomes his; 
he develops rapidly as he learns that he can receive into 
himself all his numerous experiences. His "Self- in -its- 
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social -setting" continues to develop rapidly as he learns 
that, besides only passively receiving from his social en- 
vironment experiential contributions to his Self, he can also 
actively influence that social environment. But his control 
of this environment, as he discovers, is not absolute. Pun- 
ishment, and social approval as well as social disapproval, 
forces itself upon his attention, and it is not long before 
he learns to prevent the unpleasant punishment and to court 
the pleasant approval of others, by foreseeing these social 
attitudes toward his various possible lines of action, and 
governing his actions accordingly. He is learning, more and 
more, to refer social standards to "himself ". He does so by 
learning to recognize the social expressions of emotions 
which accompany and precede the social judgments of his actions, 
and he discovers that he also has certain feelings toward the 
actions of others. In other words, he learns to interpret the 
emotions which he feels, in the light of the expressions of 
emotions which he experiences as accompanying the actions of 
others. And he learns that certain emotions which he expresses 
meet with social approval, and that he, in turn, prefers the 
social expression of certain emotions to the manifestations 
of other emotions. So it is by experience, that his emotional 
life broadens, that he passes judgments, and thus that he be- 
gins, always under social influence and pressure, to form 
systems of moral attitudes, evaluating certain actions as 
"good ", and others as "bad" - desirable and undesirable. The 
final stage is, on the one hand, the abstracting from all the 
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desirable actions the common element, and likewise from the 
undesirable; and on the other hand, the distinguishing differ- 
ences: in this process of abstraction, of conceptualization, 
and of differentiation, language is indispensable. Thus, with 
other persons constituting a "social" field, the sentiment of 
self- regard develops. The child refers to himself the possibil- 
ity of a prized social esteem; it is for himself that he fears 
social disgrace; for himself is dishonour before society an 
unpleasant contemplation: in short, the "Self-in-its-social- 
setting" has become the object of the developed sentiment of 
self- regard. This sentiment is not merely a sentiment among 
other sentiments, but is, as we have shown in the account of 
its growth, "the synthesis of all the sentiments ". (1). The 
development of this self -sentiment is the one indispensable 
condition to a nicely ordered, hierarchical integration. It 
may be described as a psychological structure representing 
the original innate structures as modified by experience, and 
involving on the ideational level, where we saw its organiza- 
tion had been effected, the all- important "integrating fac- 
tor - -- the Idea of the Self ". (21. 
We have discovered in the self -sentiment or the sentiment 
of self - regard or self -respect the "only sentiment which can 
adequately fulfil the function of dominating and harmonizing 
(1). Dreyer; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education ", 
p. 77. 
(2). Dreyer; Op.Cit., p. 112. 
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all other sentiments ". It is the Self which "comes to rule 
over conduct ", and the result is serenity. (1). "It is in 
self -respect which does not permit of selfishness that the 
best character appears to find its strength ".(2). Shand's 
statement in this respect is: "In all normal individuals there 
is a love of something to give some order and unity to their 
lives; and the system which is found generally preeminent is 
the great principle of self -love or the self- regarding senti- 
ment". (3). That is, the sentiment of self- regard is the only 
sentiment able to rule among all the sentiments. 
III. The Nucleus of the Self -sentiment is the Empirical 
Ego, the Self. 
The nucleus of this important sentiment of self -regard 
is the "self ", the empirical ego, which is a psychological 
structure, resting upon past experiences which have become 
ordered into a system of dispositions. It extends to include 
everything which is apprehended by the "me "; everything, as 
we noted above, which is apprehended, becomes a part of "me ". 
nor psychology, the Self does not mean the "Pure Ego "; 
although psychologists may hold, philosophically, that the 
Ego owns the states which constitute the Self. Neither for ex- 
perimental psychology does this complex whole, which is 
supposedly composed of Ego and the states it is supposed to 
(1). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 269. 
(2). Thomson; "Instinct, Intelligence, and Character ", p.242. 
(3). Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 57. 
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own, constitute the Self; for empirical psychology, the ques- 
tion of a pure or transcendental Ego is not vital; rather, 
The Self, whether or not an Ego exists, is the whole, as com- 
posed of the states in their inter -relations, laying aside, 
as a problem for philosophy, the question of a Pure Ego which 
owns these states. 
1. James on "the Self ". 
James (1) explains the concept "Self" somewhat as follows: 
A man's "me" is the sum total of all that he can call his. Of 
this me there are three classes: the material me, the social 
me, and the spiritual me. The material me includes such ob- 
jects as my clothes, body, family, home, property. The social 
me is the recognition which I get from my mates; that is, we 
are not only gregarious, but we have an innate propensity to 
get ourselves noticed, and noticed favourably, by our kind. 
The spiritual me is not merely one of my passing states of 
consciousness, but is rather the entire collection of my 
states of consciousness, my psychic faculties taken concretely. 
This collection, says James, may at any moment become the ob- 
ject of my thought and awaken emotions like those awakened 
by any other portions of the me. When we think of ourselves 
as thinkers, all the other ingredients of our me seem relative- 
ly external possessions. The very core and nucleus of our self, 
as we know it, the very sanctuary of our life, is the sense 
(1). James; "Psychology; A Briefer Course ", pp. 176 - 181. 
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of activity which certain inner states possess. (1). 
The enthroned Self of the self- regarding sentiment, 
effecting an organized stability within the personality, can 
maintain its supremacy only if it recognizes the existence 
of the other constituent elements of the personality, and also 
only if it recognizes the relationships existing among these 
various "selves ", including its own Self: that is, each 
sentiment or "self ", each element of the personality, must 
enter the whole organization as a recognized element of the 
whole, in its own right. in addition, "the emotional dis- 
charge should be at no time so violent as to materially im- 
pair, through dissociation, the normal control" (2) of the 
self -sentiment. This condition of stability is possible only 
if "the Self is stably organized on a sufficiently broad 
basis ". Such organization is the essence of "Self " -control, 
which is the "control proceeding from the Self as a whole, 
and determining the Self as a whole. The degree in which it 
exists depends upon the degree in which this or that special 
tendency - "self " - can be brought into relation with the con- 
cept of the Self and the system of conative tendencies which 
it includes ". (3). In this "self " -control, or control of 
"selves ", inheres self- respect. So long as there remains with- 
in a man any vestige of self -respect, any degree of control 
(1). See also McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", pp. 369,ff. 
(2). Dreyer; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education ", 
pp. 114, ff. 
(3) Stout; "A Manual of Psychology ", p. 626. 
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of his "selves ", his case is not hopeless; but to break the 
last element of pride, or self- respect, means ruin. The 
respect of other people may be lost, but if the citadel of 
character, self -respect, has not fallen, the total disinte- 
gration of character has not been effected. If any self- regard 
remains, character is not totally destroyed. 
IV. Character is Based upon Idealization. 
1. Character as a consistency of "selves ". 
Character may thus be considered as essentially a con- 
sistency of "selves ". The healthy life, a life which mani- 
fests a healthy character, is "above all things a well -bal- 
anced life ".(1). This consistency results from the supremacy 
of the one sentiment able to exercise supremacy - the sentiment 
of self -regard. Sutherland points out (2) that morality 
assumes a more noble aspect when, to sympathy and cheerful 
compliance with duty which is external, there is added a 
complete surrender to that sense of self- respect which is 
only duty with an internal sanction. 
This sentiment of self- regard takes the form of a "self - 
conscious devotion to an ideal of character ": that is, the 
stabilization of personality, the formation of a strong char- 
acter, involves the formulation of ideals which afford the 
elements of personality an acceptable unifying centre of power. 
(l). Fite; An Introductory Study of Ethics ", p. 337. 
(2). Sutherland; "The Origin and Growth of the iioral Instinct ", 
Chap. XVI. 
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Furthermore, that man has a stronger character, psychologically 
speaking, whether it be good or bad, who shows a greater 
singleness of aim, and for whom that aim is the more power- 
fully regulative, the broader, and the more coherent. (1). 
To our present point Stout writes: "The process of ideal con- 
struction through which the concept of Self grows, is gradual, 
and reaches different degrees of perfection in different per- 
sons. The more highly systematized and organized it becomes, 
the more effective it is. Self control is greatest in the 
man whose life is dominated by ideals and general principles 
of conduct ".(2). That is, "the more completely the various 
inner forces of an individual are focussed upon the attain- 
ment of a certain end, or pursuing of a certain line of ac- 
tion, the more power will be manifested in that direction ". (3). 
As we have noted, the sentiments are organized on the 
ideational level. But such ideals and principles of conduct 
as are effected on the rational level in the mental life, 
may, as a result of the individual's reflecting upon them, and 
consciously identifying one of those ideals with his Self, 
and making it his own, supersede those sentiments of the 
ideational level. Shand notes this process as a second stage 
in the development of sentiments, a stage in which we be- 
come conscious of their ( that is, the sentiments' ) qualities 
(1). See also Ward; "Psychological Principles ", p. 468. 
(2. Stout; "Manual of Psychology ", p. 628. 
(3i. Drover; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Education ", 
p. 131. 
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and reflect on them, and strive after them with effort; - -- 
from this cause arise the Ideals of a sentiment's. (1). 
2. The process of Idealization. 
The formulation of these ideals which are the essence of 
character is a process of synthesization of those desirable 
elements which are extracted from the individual's concrete 
experiences. "The ideal is a projected synthesis of conative 
tendencies ".(2). Every ideal is preceded by actualities. " We 
find our clews to direction in the projected recollection of 
definite experienced goods ". (3). Moral ideals are generaliza- 
tions from the goods that are found in experience, and that 
are isolated from any accompanying bad elements. Thus, a child 
experiences an act of kindness, a concrete person performs 
a concrete act of kindness for the child. After several rep- 
etitions of such concrete acts of kindness, the child gains 
an abstract concept of kindness, by extracting from each ex- 
pereince the common element. Because the concept of kindness 
is constituted of the common element of concrete experiences 
which the child found to be desirable in concrete persons, he 
idealizes the concept by ascribing it to a person, either an 
actual friend whom he has not yet found to be unkind, or else 
to a mere ideational fiction and construct. The same process 
occurs in the case of other desirable characteristics which 
(1). Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 112. 
(2). Macdonald; "The Education of Ethical Consciousness ". 
(3). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct', p. 282. 
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the child concretely experiences. Personal experiences give 
the child the raw material for his ideals. These ideals, be- 
cause they are constructed only out of desirable character- 
istics, contain no undesirable elements. A hero, or ideal 
person, is thought of as perfect until, by experiencing in 
him an unexpected flaw, the child's idol is broken; but when 
the ideal is a fictional construct, no flaw enters into its 
structure. So a child who worships his hero, naturally as- 
cribes to him only those character traits which he himself 
considers good, and he does so whether or not the hero really 
possesses those traits. (1). 
When the child has thus constructed his hero out of 
traits he has judged desirable or good, and probably with a 
core furnished by some actual person, the child is then con- 
fronted by two antithetical thoughts of personality: that of 
his Self as it stands, with its well -known tendencies to 
occasional undesirable action, and over against this, "the 
sense of the ideal Self, the being perhaps temporarily em- 
bodied in father, priest, or whoever else, - the better Self, 
from whose actions the copy is to come for the further re- 
duction of the selfishly or generously capricious Self to 
order and goodness. I feel I ought to be like the better 
Self ". (2). 
Even if these ideals be only "ideational fictions and 
constructs whose unreality is admitted ", they are at least 
(1). See Part IV. 
(2). Baldwin; "Social and Ethical interpretations of i¡iental 
Development'`, p. 306. 
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psychological facts, and are indispensable to the develop- 
ment of the morality of the child. The experience of goods 
precedes the idea of the good; and the idea of the good, 
generalized from experiences, is either fictionally objecti- 
fied in an unreal individual, or is attached to the child's 
hero. Just as mathematics postulates an imaginary perfect 
circle, though no such thing exists in nature in reality, so 
the imaginary in ethics, the absolute ideal, is justifiable 
in spite of its possibly not being an objective actuality. (1). 
Furthermore, the presence in the child of the ability to con- 
ceptualize evaluated goods, ensures the functioning of that 
ability: he must form ideals because he can. His ideal has 
been formed of elements from his experience, just as the idea 
of the perfect circle has been formed by numerous experiences 
of partially perfect circles, from each of which the idea of 
perfect circularity has been abstracted. That is, perfect 
circularity as an ideal, and perfect morality as an ideal, are 
both consistent with our experiences of partially imperfect, 
or partially perfect, objects. This consistency with the 
whole of experience is necessary if the ideal is to be a 
rational one. r?urthermore, "in order that a manysided self of 
infinitely various and often conflicting impulses may be real- 
ized", it must have an end or system of ends which are mutu- 
ally consistent; that is, the various contributing elements 
of the ideal must be consistent with each other. 
(l). See Vaihinger; "The Philosophy of as if' ", p. 44. 
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3. Conscience. 
When this ideal has been self -consciously formed and 
willingly accepted by the personality, when "I ", my Self, 
the unity of my organized selves, desire to realize in action 
this ideal, I have gained "self- possession through self - 
surrender" (li to that ideal; I may defy society, for I have 
abstracted from society as I have experienced it, all that 
which I have evaluated as desirable, and have concentrated 
it into a single ideal, fictional or real, and that ideal be- 
comes now the only judge for whose decision I care, and the 
only spectator whose approval I desire and from whose dis- 
approval I shrink. lily ideal has become all the good of soci- 
ety, as I know it, concentrated, and that ideal is my supreme 
court. The push of the vital impulse has become one with the 
pull of the ideal. When possible alternatives of action are 
referred to this court of approval, conscience functions. 
This court is my conscience. 




I The Nature of Will. 
1. Will as habit. 
Dewey identifies will with habit. He considers the essence 
of habit to be an "acquired predisposition to ways or modes 
of response, not to particular acts, except as, under special 
conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means 
special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of 
stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than 
bare recurrence of specific acts. it means will ". (1i. "All 
habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they 
constitute the self. in any intelligible sense of the word 
will, they are will ". (2t. "Habit is that kind of human ac- 
tivity which is influenced by prior activity and in that 
sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain order- 
ing or systematisation of minor elements of action; which is 
projective, dynamic in quality; ready for overt manifestation; 
which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even 
when not obviously dominating activity ". (3). Dewey explains 
that the tendency to act, which is involved, the potential 
energy, needing only the opportunity to become kinetic and 
overt, is "disposition ". habit is thus energy organized for 
(1). Dewey; "Human mature and Conduct ", p. 42. 
(26. Dewey; Op.Uit., pp. 25, 40, 44 
(3). Dewey; Op.Uit., pp. 40, 44, passim. 
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use in certain channels. He further states that when habit is 
frustrated, its force is embodied in an ideal. (1). "Good 
consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an 
activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompat- 
ible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly re- 
lease in action ". 
in a sense, there is involved in will a predispositional 
element, inasmuch as it is ideally the whole organization of 
all the personality- elements in action. will does involve an 
integration, in varying degrees, of the constituent sentiments 
of a personality, an ordering of "minor elements of action "; 
for the individual does in this way carry his past along with 
him in a unique manner. But habit is to be considered dynamic, 
we think, not so much as habit, but rather because there has 
functioned, as the active mover in the various reactions 
which formed the habit, the original vital impulse. Mere bare 
habit is only a skeletal set: it is the "formal" resultant 
of these repeated reactions: it awaits a re- filling with con- 
tent, a revitalization. Habit is a containing form rather than 
a dynamic content. 
Furthermore, Dewey's hands are so tied with behaviourism, 
that he fails, we think, to discover any solution for the 
problem of the place of intelligence in voluntary conduct. 
The factor,choice, remains as it was, that is, the name rather 
than the solution of the problem of the will. 
(l).Dewey; Op.Cit., pp. 53, 210. 
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2. Will as personality in action. 
Ideally, will is the whole personality in action. Ideal 
conditions, however, never exist within a personality: that 
is, perfect personal integration or complete unification of 
Self, or complete harmonization of selves, effected by a 
single worthy ideal, is never fully realized. It follows that 
every action of a person does not reveal the whole person. 
The energy of all of his various selves or sentiment- systems 
do not always, if ever, rally to the support of the energy 
of the temporarily dominant system. Therefore any act observ- 
able as an individual's overt behaviour is not, strictly 
speaking, the expression of the whole personality. Although 
for the moment, the whole organism appears to react as an 
instrument of the harmonized sentiment- systems, still there 
actually are an indefinite number of temporarily subdued 
systems, to the exercise of any one of which the Self might, 
the next moment, lend the organism. Only under ideal condi- 
tions is the will the whole personality in action. 
H. Function of Will. 
1. Will, functioning, involves Self- conscious Conceptu- 
alization. 
Let us see how will functions. In deciding between con- 
flicting ideals, that is, in "making up my mind ", I have be- 
fore me several possible lines of action, and in imagination I 
develop the various conceptions of myself as I shall be, if 
I carry out into action each of the possibilities. My "self- 
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consciousness is an essential factor's (i) in the conceptual- 
ization involved, as I imagine myself making the various 
suggested lines of action parts of my actual life history, 
that is, as I follow out the respective representations of 
these hypothetical Selves. 
My self -consciousness is further manifested when I con- 
sider each line of action and its results, not in isolation, 
but, evaluating each, consider it in its relation to the other 
possible lines, and also to the whole Self, that is, to the 
"ideally constructed whole for which the word 'I' stands". 
"I" compare the various concepts of my various possible 
Selves: I deliberate. 
After my attention has oscillated between the several 
alternatives, one of these alternatives, with the motives for 
it, "gets a decided and persistent predominance in conscious- 
ness, so that my mind no longer tends to revert to the 
others ".(2). I follow out the representation of one hypothet- 
ical Self until the other possibilities are excluded. By ex- 
cluding these other lines from my focal consciousness, I 
"make up my mind ". The result is formulated in a judgment. 
Action naturally follows. 
2. Will is based upon Attention. 
It is evident that will is based upon attention. If one 
of the alternatives is held at the focus of consciousness, 
(1). Stout; "Groundwork of Psychology ", p. 233. 
(2). Stout; Op.Cit. 
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it will ultimately move to action. "The mere concentration 
of attention on an idea is sufficient to produce movements ". (1). 
"Effort of attention is -- the essential form of all volition 
- -- the holding of an idea at the focus of consciousness by 
an effort of attention covers every instance of volition ". (2). 
It follows that the voluntary moral life involves a "turning 
of the attention in another than its natural direction, an 
effort, - -- to change its focus from one restricted area to 
another ". (3). 
We are not here discussing that attention which is merely 
an involuntary or non -voluntary awareness of an object which, 
instead of being selected, really forces itself upon us just 
because it is spectacular; in this sense, even beasts "select" 
objects to which they attend. We mean rather, the voluntary 
attention which is distinguished from the non -voluntary and 
involuntary by the element of deliberation. Considering atten- 
tion in this sense, it is close to the facts to say that vir- 
tue is attention to a worthy object or idea; it is "the steady 
entertaining of a certain conception of life or of its several 
activities ". (4). James says, "To sustain a representation, 
to think, is, in short, the only moral act ". 
The problem, however, still faces us; "How can attention 
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larly, nor force itself upon our consciousness ? ". It seems that 
voluntary attention itself involves the functioning of will. 
The answer, we think, involves the use of the word will in a 
narrower sense. In the broad sense, will is character in ac- 
tion; in the narrower sense, it is what James calls the "fiat". 
This narrow sense needs explanation. 
III. Will, in a Limited Sense, Involves Creativity. 
Although we agree with hobhouse when he says that "the 
will is not so much a new impulse as the entire mass of im- 
pulses and feelings excited by the object, organised as a 
whole" (1); and with Pillsbury when he says that will is a 
"term used to designate the entire original disposition of 
the individual, together with its modification by experience, 
when applied to action" (2); in addition, we think that in 
choosing between alternative goals of apparently equal value, 
that is, in deliberative willing, the Self becomes conscious- 
ly, volitionally purposive in a narrower sense. The function- 
ing will in this limited sense marks the conclusion of the 
period of deliberation in which are rehearsed the several 
possible alternatives. Will in this sense is the manifesta- 
tion of "a certain creative power of original determination" 
following upon the precedent conceptualization, comparison, 
and evaluation of alternatives. Stout hints at the inner crea- 
tivity for which we contend when he says: "We attend insofar 
as our psychical activity directly produces, or maintains 
(1). riobhouse; "Social Development ", p. 142. 
(2). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of Psychology ", p. 351. 
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and develops such contents of consciousness as have a more or 
less determinate objective reference" (1) . 
The various sentiments or selves may be considered as 
mental sets, each one ready to manifest its presence by being 
evoked into a correlative behaviour, when the conditions are 
suitable. Thus Hobhouse speaks of "mass of impulses and feel- 
ings excited by the object "; and Shand (2) speaks of "tend- 
encies of emotions and sentiments ". By whatever name these 
organized potentialities for action be called, each is a 
possible ground for its respective action. Any persisting con- 
flict between them may be prevented, or resolved, by the in- 
trusion of a voluntary focussing of attention upon one of 
them. The resulting release of the successful, surviving one 
of these mental sets, constitutes willing in the narrower 
sense. This seems to be Claparéde's idea when he says; "The 
vi11 always marks a division of the self "; - -- "Every volun- 
tary act results from conflict of tendencies, and the function 
of will is precisely to resolve this conflict "; - -- "It is 
the part of will to stop this division of the self and restore 
unity ". (3). He holds that the will is the name given to that 
process which leads to the reenforcement of a group of °tenden- 
cies,and consequently to action. 
An implication involved here is that each of these dis- 
positional sets, each sentiment or emotional system, has its 
degree of what might be called will- strength. Strength of will 
(l). Stout; "Analytic Psychology ", Vol. I, p. 180. 
(2). Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 64. 
(3) Claparéde; "Does the Will Express the Entire Personality ? ", 
pp. 39, 40, 41. 
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varies with the strength of the sentiment system to which it 
belongs. "Strength or weakness of will, other things equal, 
varies with the strength or weakness of the emotion or sentiment 
to which it belongs; and hence it is that we find the same 
man strong in some directions and weak in others ". (1). 
1. Three Stages of Deliberative '7illing. 
As we have seen, concluding the period of deliberation 
during which attention is focussed successively upon the vari- 
ous possibilities of action which are dramatically rehearsed 
in imagination, is the definite fiat or act of will in the 
restricted sense. The whole process of deliberative willing 
involves, thus, three stages: first, a stage in which the al- 
ternatives are inhibited, an interval or pause in which there 
is no activity; second, a stage in which deliberation proper 
takes place, when, in the light of memory, the future course 
of consequences of each possible alternative is rehearsed, 
and there thus takes place in imagination a reflection on the 
issues of the various alternatives; and third, the act of 
willing itself, willing in the limited sense, the definite 
identification of the choice with the Self, in which act of 
identification the Self becomes consciously, volitionally, 
self -consciously, purposive. Will may be considered as the 
process of self- conscious identification of a conceptualized, 
evaluated ideal with the Self; such process of evaluation 
involving a comparison of concepts. There are involved cog- 
(l) Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 65. 
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nitive conceptualization, affective evaluation, and the con - 
ative fiat. 
2. Willing in the Limited Sense, reveals the Original 
Vital Impulse. 
If the problem of the will can be solved at all, it is 
to be done, we think, by way of the organization effected 
among the sentiments. The problem of willing is the problem 
of self- organization. McDougall holds that the third stage of 
the willing process, the act of willing in our restricted 
sense, will show, when analyzed, that the effort represents 
a store of energy furnished by the self -regarding sentiment. 
This store of energy, we think, is the conative element, 
which, as one of the indissoluble trinity of elements of each 
reaction, of which trinity the other two elements are the 
cognitive and affective, is "the driving force which carries 
us on to achieve these ends ", that is, leads us to pursue 
ideals. (1). This conative energy is really the self- assertive 
instinct; it is uniquely embodied in the sentiment of self - 
regard. That is, the core of the sentiment of self -regard 
is the instinct of self -assertion. The instinct of self- asser- 
tion embodies and thus reveals the conative energy, which 
thus becomes the ultimate driving force toward the realiza- 
tion of ideals. 
2urthermore, this core of self- regard, the instinct of 
self- assertion, is a differentiation of the self- assertiveness 
(1). See Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 81. 
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of Instinct: that is, the vital impulse which becomes special- 
ized through the various respective instincts, is uniquely 
specialized in the self -assertive instinct. The original 
vital impulse, which always and characteristically shows a 
tendency to reveal itself, becomes in the self- assertive in- 
stinct of the self- regarding sentiment of a self -conscious 
human being, the energy of a tendency to reveal A Self. In 
a Bergsonian vein, we might say that instincts manifest the 
self -unmaking on the part of the élan vital. 
Brown goes part of the way toward our conclusion when 
he says: " - -- volition is the whole character in action, with 
the sentiment of self- respect in command, within which the 
self -assertive instinct bulks large" (1). The "efficiency of 
volition, according to this description, turns partly upon 
the degree of harmonious development of the self, and partly 
upon the strength of the self- assertive instinct ". Supplemen- 
tary to Brown, we would hold that the self- assertive instinct 
is a peculiar working -out of the self- assertiveness of all 
Instinct. it is from this view -point that we can say that the 
"normal human mechanism, physical and psychological, is a 
mechanism of revelation "(2); it reveals the Primal Energy, 
the vital impulse. 
To resume. Life itself, vital impulse, as manifested in 
(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 82. 
(e). Brown, Op. Oit., p. 133. 
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the instincts, is creatively initiative; and the self- assert- 
iveness of this urge to activity is, in the case of man, u- 
niquely revealed in the self -assertive instinct. The self - 
assertive instinct becomes the core of the self -regarding sent- 
iment. The self- regarding sentiment becomes, in the case of 
the integrated, moralized personality, the sovereign among the 
sentiments constituting the personality. Thus, although will 
in the broad sense is character in action, in the restricted 
sense it is the distinct, definite, direct revelation of the 
original Primal Energy. 
James speaks of this energy in a discussion of the 
"spiritual me ": "The very core and nucleus of our self, as 
we know it, the very sanctuary of our life, is the sense of 
activity which certain inner states possess. This sense of ac- 
tivity is often held to be a ditect revelation of the living 
substance of the Soul. Whether this be so or not is an ul- 
terior question. I wish now only to lay down the peculiar in- 
ternality of whatever states possess this quality of seeming 
to be active. It is as if they WENT OUT TO MEET all the 
other elements of our experience ". (1). This internal, in- 
itiating energy, we identify with the embodied élan vital, 
which becomes differentiated into the energies of the various 
instincts, and uniquely so in the instinct of self- assertion. 
(1). Quotation in Robinson and Robinson: "Readings in General 
Psychology", p. 530. 
212. 
IV. Freedom of Will. 
Is this energy free? Does will, in the narrower sense 
of being the distinct, definite, direct revelation of the 
vital energy, show freedom? 
1. Kant and Freedom. 
For Kant, freedom is an empty and unreal abstraction. In 
his treatment of it, it is withdrawn from the practical sphere 
of nature and mechanism, of feeling and impulse. He constitutes 
for it a purely rational sphere of its own. 
2. Hegelian Freedom. 
Hegelian transcendentalism resolves freedom into a "high- 
er necessity ", the "necessity of God, losing as it does, the 
personality of man in the personality of God ". To depersonalize 
man as Hegel, Fichte, and Green appear to do, is to demoralize 
him. "This pantheistic absorption of man in God is too rapid 
an explanation; the unity thus reached can not be the true 
unity, since it negates instead of explaining the facts in 
question ". (1). 
On the other hand, freedom for man must mean more than 
his mere subjection to natural laws. Such a freedom is not free- 
dom, for it is based upon and debased into the necessity of 
nature. Only if I am a person, "an Ego on my own account" am 
I free; "if I am not such a person or ego, I am not free ". 
3. Freedom as Self- determinism. 
Herman Ebbinghaus may be taken as representative of a 
(1). Seth; "Ethical Principles "; p. 401. 
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group who explain freedom in terms of self -determinism. Those 
actions are taken as free which result "essentially from fac- 
tors within the mind, not from external factors which happen 
to impress the mind at the moment ". Their freedom does not 
mean that they have no causation, that they are free of causes, 
but they are free of the compulsion exerted by the external 
stimuli of the moment. They are free actions as opposed to 
instinctive actions, which are not free of these stimuli of 
the moment, but on the contrary, completely determined by 
them ". (11. 
We agree to this theory, but think that more needs to be 
said. For such factors within the mind which cause "free" ac- 
tion, have themselves a source: if they are hereditary disposi- 
tions or some kind of inherited elements, they are thorough de- 
terminants insofar as they have not been made the chosen motives 
of the Self; and if they have been thus consciously accepted by 
the personality, the question remains as to the entity which 
has done the conscious accepting. The problem is only pushed 
back. 
4. Dewey on Freedom. 
Dewey says, regarding the problem of freedom, that it is 
not a question of "what are the antecedents of deliberation 
and choice, but what are their consequences? - -- What do they 
(1). Ebbinghaus; "Psychology, an Elementary Text Book ", pp. 
176 - 182; translated by Max Meyer; quoted in Robinson 
and Robinson; "Readings in General Psychology ", p. 520. 
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(deliberation and choice) do that is distinctive? The answer 
is, that they give us all the control of future possibilities 
which is open to us. And this control is the crux of our. free- 
dom. Without it, we are pushed from behind. With it, we walk 
in the light. - -- When we use the law to foresee consequences 
and to consider how they may be averted or secured, the free- 
dom begins. - -- We use the foresight of the future to refine 
and expand present activity. In this use of desire, delibera- 
tion and choice, freedom is actualized ". (1). 
This view is acceptable as far as it goes, but we think 
that in addition, account needs to be taken of an immediate 
apprehension of the good - the direct intuition of what the 
Self judges to be preferable. After all, "no system of ethics 
can be entirely free from intuitionism" (2), for ethical val- 
ues, as ultimates, must be directly, intuitively apprehended: 
"our 'heart' tells us they are right". (3) . 
So Dewey, we feel, allows no place for a morally valu- 
ating attitude. He speaks only of such conditions as "equilibra- 
tion of activities" (4), and "a stable condition free from 
conflict and disturbance" (5). In short, Dewey appears to be 
too exclusively mechanistic, and as a result leaves freedom of 
(1). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct ", pp. 311 - 313. 
(2). Brown; "Mind and Personality ". 
(33). Shand; "Foundations of Character ", p. 114. 
(4). Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 252. 
(5). Dewey; Op.Cit., p. 285. 
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will unexplained. 
V. Freedom is Basic to idorality. 
However we try to discuss freedom, its nature and reality, 
it must be held to be the very basis of morality. If the per- 
sonality is to be capable of moralization, it must be con- 
sidered to be, in a measure at least, independent of external 
conditions. Personality is self- determining: "no change within 
is entirely determined from without" (1): "the flame of con- 
sciousness has prepared and arranged its own fuel ". (2). 
1. A certain Determinism is basic to Scientific General- 
ization. 
Although holding to freedom of will, we also maintain 
that there is a certain determinism involved in human action, 
for that which functions absolutely indeterminately, in a per- 
fectly unpredictable way, can not be the subject of scientific 
generalizations at all. If a determinism did not hold good for 
mind and personality, we could not foresee what people would 
do, and we could trust no one, not even ourselves. It is just 
because of the reliability within its own nature, that mind 
can gain self -mastery; when a man has no fixed character, he 
will act and think according to numerous, ill- regulated mo- 
tives, that is, chaotically, disintegratedly. The kind of de- 
terminism which constitutes human freedom is that which in- 
heres in the integrated personality. 
(1). Stout; "Analytic Psychology ", Vol. I, p. 156. 
(2). Stoat; Op.Cit. , p. 155. 
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The more cautious psychologists today hold to such a 
self- determinism rather than to a bald determinism: they 
"take as their system, not the antecedent processes of the 
mind only, but the entire mind, right up to the present mo- 
ment. - -- This is a doctrine of self -determinism rather than 
determinism, because it is determinism within a self which is 
growing, and which acts as a whole. - -- So far as conduct is 
the outcome of the whole mind working in its unity, so far it 
is self- determined and free in the only sense in which we 
can understand freedom ". (1). The only determinism which 
allows for freedom, the only acceptable determinism, is self - 
determinism. 
Self- determinism does not exclude a consistency or rel- 
evance between successive mental events, but rather implies 
it: what "precedes" or over -laps forward into, and what 
"follows" or over -laps backward into, that mental event which 
is developing in the span of time called the "specious present ", 
are both obviously related to that present: "when anything 
occurs in the mind, there is sufficient reason why it should 
occur rather than not occur ", but this "principle of relevan- 
cy" is not mechanical determinism. 
A mechanical determinism is not acceptable, because the 
primal energy, which becomes differentiated into the self - 
assertive instinct, the core of the all- important self -regard- 
(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality ", p. 278. 
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ing sentiment, is spontaneous. It is even unpredictable in its 
functioning except to the degree of organized integration 
which maintains among the various sentiment systems of the 
personality through which it is functioning. in this self -con- 
scious guidance by the personality of the functioning of the 
free primal energy, there inheres a "consciousness of efficien- 
cy" (1), a consciousness of an ability to do things, to cause 
differences, to create. 
Und, as revealing the operating of the free vital impulse, 
is creative. This free creativity is basic to morality. "The 
belief in a certain creative power of original determination 
is a necessity of our moral nature ". "The mind, in its high- 
est flights, creates new things, thinks in ways that have 
never been thought before ". (2). It seems to us that both 
mechanism and a thorough -going teleology err in assuming that 
"all is given ": "both alike ignore the fact of continuous 
creation ". (3). It is in this self- conscious creativity of 
the organized personality that the moral potentiality which is 
unique to man, inheres. Iuan alone of all creatures is able, 
self -consciously, to identify an evaluated ideal with his Self. 
VI. Freedom and Integration. 
1. Freedom is Proportional to integration. 
Freedom is proportional to integration. If several ideals 
(1). Quotation from Principal T. Hywel Hughes. 
(2). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", p. 448. 
(3). Brown; Op.Cit., p. 238. 
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or ends are competing for acceptance by the Self, and as long 
as they remain thus unharmonized, the individual's store of 
energy is dissipated, he is not free to react with all his 
energy concentrated upon a single line of action. He is bound 
to a degree of slavery which is proportional to the degree of 
dissociation. Freedom of will is proportional to integration 
of personality; when there is conflict between any elements 
of personality, there can be no true freedom, for freedom 
means freedom to act, freedom to function, but inner conflict 
hinders total functioning. "The completely harmonized self is 
the completely free self ". (1). "A person is free and is acting 
freely when he is most himself in carrying out an action ". (2), 
2. Integration is based upon Idealization. 
Now an organization of personality around an ideal assures 
action that is consistent with that ideal. Constancy of action 
resulting from the acceptance of an ideal marks an integrated 
personality. Since an integrated personality is the only free 
personality, it follows that free activity is really predict- 
able. So Webb found a character element in intelligence which 
corresponds to a "persistency of motives ". (3). The moralized 
or integrated individual shows this persistency of motives, 
a steadfastness in pursuing an accepted end: he manifests a 1 
consistent behaviour, which is predictable in proportion as the 
ideal, in identification with the Self, dominates the person- 
(1). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals ", p. 81. 
(2)_ Brown; Op.Cit., p. 278. 
(e). Webb; "Character and Intelligence ". 
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ality, that is, in proportion to the degree of integration. 
"Organization assures adequate direction of mental energy ". 
This adequate direction of energy, this persistence, is noted 
by -'oback, when he describes what he calls "the consistency 
urge ". (1) He postulates this consistency urge as the basis 
of all conduct typifying a person of character - one who 
"employs one standard of action both for himself and others ", 
which standard is to be applied "from the angle of an impar- 
tial spectator ". 
If one acts counter to the organization of his personal- 
ity, against his accepted ideal, he thereby surrenders his 
freedom, he becomes inconsistent, self -contradictory, he feels 
"conscience pricking him ", he is "kicking against the goads" 
of his innate tendency to completeness, he is not submitting 
to his own accepted supreme court; and the dissociation is 
unpleasant. 
Integration of personality results in free, consistent, 
predictable behaviour. "True freedom manifests itself in con- 
stancy and stability of character ". (21. 
3. Integration is basic to Moral ?responsibility. 
In the integration of personality, also, is to be found 
the basis for personal responsibility. A normal person is 
responsible: for an integrated personality, responsibility 
is a self- evident fact; moral responsibility rests upon the 
(1). Roback; "The Psychology of Character ", p. 486. 
(2). Temple; "Tens Creatrix ", p. 172. 
220. 
unification, harmonization, integration, of the selves of a 
personality. A disturbance of this unity results in irrespons- 
ibility. Blame for "immoral h conduct, therefore, should in 
some conceivable instances, be shifted from the shoulders of 
the erring individual to those persons who caused, or per- 
mitted the conditions which caused, the dissociation. 
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Chapter XII. 
REASON AND SELF- REALIZATION. 
I. Reason is Jot a Faculty. 
In our account of moral freedom, reason was not directly 
considered. It needs further treatment. 
Reason can not be considered an isolable ability, a 
divine gift miraculously conferred upon man, a "faculty ". 
Reasoning, as a process of self- conscious reflective thought, 
is, we think, an emergent upon the human plane (lj; but to 
call Reason a human faculty is only to re- christen the phenom- 
enon, and to leave it as it was before - unexplained. Neither 
is reason to be thought of as a "conative energy ", a force 
which impels to action, or effects the identification of a 
course of action with the Self. neither can reasoning be sat- 
isfactorily explained by holding, in a behaviouristic fashion, 
that in common with all thought, it is only an implicit lan- 
guage habit. (2) . 
The whole person functions when reason functions, just 
as the whole person functions when will functions: "The whole 
of the rational self enters into its thinking and doing ".(3). 
It can be said that it is the personality which functions 
through "will- reason" (4), if at the same time it is remem- 
(1). See Gordon; "Personality ", p. 99. 
(2). See `'iatson; "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behav- 
iorist", pp. 316, ff. 
(3). Jones; "A Faith that Enquires ", p. 65. 
(4). S.S. Laurie; "Ethica ", p. 316. 
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bared that to every conscious reaction there exists not only 
cognitive and conative aspects, but an affective aspect as 
well, and that none of the three aspects exists independent 
of the others. 
II. All Thought Involves Affect. 
Thought, being a conscious reaction, involves affect. (1). 
Rignano makes affect fundamental to reasoning. he says: "Thus 
the faculty of paying attention to what we are thinking about, 
and so of maintaining coherence of thought and exercising the 
power of criticism; the faculty of imagining new combinations 
by means of old mnemonic elements; the faculty of classifying 
and introducing a certain order into the chaotic mass of facts 
presented to our senses; the faculty of creating concepts 
more and more general and abstract; and so forth; all these 
faculties of attention, coherence, criticism, imagination, 
classification, and abstraction, which gradually raise the 
reasoning from its primordial intuitive forms to the highest 
deductions of science, are all shown by our analysis to have 
an affective substratum". (2) Athout maintaining that affect 
is the whole of the process of reasoning, we would hold that 
all conscious reactions, including reasoning, involve in 
addition to, and indissolubly united with, cognitive and con - 
ative elements, an affective element. 
III. Reasoning as Imaginative Trial and Error. 
(1). See Gordon; "Personality ", p. 100. 
(2). Rignano; The Psychology óf Reasoning ", p. 388. 
223. 
Reasoning in a specific sense may, as a term, be applied 
to the second, the deliberative stage of the attention -will 
process, that is, the stage in which the various alternatives 
to action, with their respective issues, are imaginatively 
rehearsed in the mind. This process involves, first, "holding 
possibilities of action, or objects for valuation, or ends 
for choice, in consciousness, and measuring them one against 
the other in a simultaneous field - or in a field of alter- 
nating objects, any of which can be continually recalled. 
Second, the process yields a universe of valued objects as 
distinguished from a subjective consciousness of desires and 
feelings. Third, the process may be described also as one of 
'universalising' the judging consciousness. .ourth, the process 
is thus a reciprocal Process of valuing objects and of con- 
structing and reconstructing a self. The object as first im- 
agined or anticipated undergoes enlargement and change as it 
is put into relations to other objects as the consequences 
of adoption or rejection are tried in anticipation. The self 
by reflecting and by enlarging its scope is similarly en- 
larged. It is the resulting self which is the valuer ". (1). 
Reasoning is the trial and error process operative on 
the highest mental level, involving the imaginative, rather 
than the actual, trying out of various conceptualized ideals, 
and involving also a resulting evaluation and comparison of 
(l). Tufts; "The Moral Life ", in "Creative Intelligence ", by 
Dewey et al, pp. 363 - 371. 
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these conceptualizations, and finally a decision based upon 
the evaluations. Instead of its being a faculty which gives 
moral judgments, it is "nothing else than a series of opera- 
tions that we imagined performed - -- and limited to thought 
only in order to economize time and energy ". (l). 
IV. The Thread of Reason is Affective. 
The process of reasoning is self -conscious and involves 
the continuing operation of identification of the various 
alternatives with the thus developing Self. The question 
arises as to the character of the continuum of this process: 
what is the nature of the "thread of reason " ?. How is the 
effectiveness of the process prolonged so as to cover the tem- 
poral existence of a series of terms? 
Explanatory of this perseveration is the theory that 
consciousness and ideas are based upon motor excitation. This 
motor excitation can become associated with an "activity 
attitude ", or in other words with a "static movement system" 
connected with the arousal of an instinctive urge. If such 
association is effected between the motor excitation upon 
which an idea is based, and a bodily attitude which involves 
an instinctive urge, the persistence of the series is said 
to be explained. (2). (3). In making motor excitation the 
basis of ideas, this theory apparently subscribes to psycho- 
(l). Rignano; Op.Cit., pp. 81 - 83. 
(2), M.P. Washburn; "Eovement and Mental Imagery ", pp. 159 ff. 
(3). M.F. Washburn; "Emotion and Thought; a Motor Theory of 
Their Relation ". 
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physical parallelism. 
Woodworth explains the persistence in a similarly phys- 
ical way. The mechanism for a consummatory reaction, having 
been set into activity by a suitable stimulus, acts as a 
drive operating other mechanisms which give the preparatory 
reactions. The drive is a mechanism already aroused, but 
which outlasts the activity of the external stimulus. It can 
thus persist because a neural centre does not always, after 
arousal, relapse into immediate quiescence. The continuing 
residual neural quiver in one centre may act as a drive to 
another centre. Thus by means of a communication of conserved 
nervous energy, Woodworth explains neurologically the per - 
severation which is our present problem. He deals only with 
the neurology of the question. (1). 
Hollingworth emphasizes, in the reasoning process, the 
existence of at least two cooperating "cues ": one or more 
"instigating details" or stimuli; and one "specifying detail" 
or "motive ". Motives are physical, bodily sets, "at least 
originally organic states ". They constitute the perseverating 
element in the process: they are relatively permanent, "per- 
sisting as an enduring influence within the sphere of which 
many instigating clues in turn function and lapse ". A motive 
involves a state of organic unrest which constitutes a "prob- 
lem". Problem solving consists in "the satisfaction of a mo- 
(1). Woodworth; "Dynamic Psychology ", pp. 39 - 42. 
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tive, the gratification of an impulse ", the "neutralization 
of a persistent stimulus ". Reasoning thus becomes little more 
than the quieting of organic unrest by means of a release of 
the physical tension involved in an unsatisfied bodily set. 
This bodily set is the continuum which accounts for the pro- 
longation of the effectiveness of the reasoning process. (1). 
Although there are probably physical correlates to all 
mental processes including reasoning, the psycho -physical 
problem involved in physical explanations of reasoning is not 
our problem. _Neither do we accept a purely organic or neuro- 
logical explanation of the phenomenon. Rather, we would only 
emphasize the affective element involved. 
We believe that within the deliberative stage of the 
reasoning process, the series of identifications between the 
imagined alternatives to reaction and the developing Self, 
manifests an affective continuum. The trials of the trial 
and error process are threaded together by the perseverating 
interest in the goal of the process. Interest, an affect, is 
the core of purpose; reasoning is a purposive thinking; the 
thread of reason is therefore affective. Rignano calls this 
affective continuum "the affectivity for the end ". (2). 
V. Reasoning is a human Emergent. 
Reasoning, reflective thinking, on the highest level, 
(1). Hollingworth; "The Psychology of Thought", pp. 250 ff. 266. 
(2). Rignano; Op.Cit., p. 93. 
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involves, as we have seen, conceptualization: in the deliber- 
ative stage of the attention -will process, imagination con- 
structs new combinations; the conclusion of the process is a 
new fact. Reason is creative. Only man among animals can thus 
create. Reasoning is a human emergent. 
VI. Doubt and Belief. 
An issue of the fact that only man is mentally creative, 
is, that only man can believe and doubt. J'or "belief and doubt 
essentially involve integration on the level of reflective 
thought:' (1). Doubt precedes belief. Doubt is an unpleasant 
affective experience resulting from the failure of one or the 
other of several alternative intellectual propositions to 
become, or together to issue into, a new integrating ideal or 
accepted proposition for the personality. The unpleasant ten- 
sion, a kind of anxiety, is resolved when one of the possibil- 
ities is judged preferable, and is accepted by the evaluating 
Self; or when a new proposition issues from the preceding ones 
and is accepted by the personality. There then ensues belief 
in the new proposition, or idea, or ideal. Belief is thus 
"an organization of pleasurable affective patterns on the plane 
of reflective thought. - -- The more perfect the coordination, 
the freer from unpleasurable tensions will the affective 
pattern be, and therefore the 'stronger' the belief ". (2) . 
(1). Gordon; "Personality", p. 107. 
(2). Gordon; Op.Cit., p. 107. 
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Doubt may be converted into belief by reasoning: that is, 
the suspense of judgment in the attention -will process is 
ended when attention is finally focussed upon one member of 
the series to the exclusion of the others and reaction follows. 
Reasoning involves the formulation of a new belief by way of 
a judgment based upon beliefs already held. Doubt, however, 
continues as doubt as long as judgment is suspended. Doubt is 
an affect of anxiety and fluctuating uncertainty on the in- 
tellectual plane: it is the unpleasant affect persisting as 
long as the attention -will series is not judicially concluded. 
The accepted proposition resulting from the process of reason- 
ing becomes "a belief ". Viewed from this angle, we may say: 
"The most desirable personality is presumably he in whom there 
is a well organized system of beliefs, constituting a sat - 
isfactory philosophy of life". (l). 
VII. Integration and Self -realization. 
The harmony and integration of personality, effected by 
the will, that is, by the identification of such an accepted 
ideal or philosophy of life with the Self, can be termed 
self -realization. The attainment of a strong character, an 
organization of the individual life into an ordered hierarchy 
with a master sentiment supreme, this is, literally, "Self" - 
realization, for it is the unifying of the developing innate 
raw materials of personality. it is "to become what one is 
(1). Gordon; Op. Cit., p. 116. 
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capable of becoming ". (1). It is "to constitute out of your 
natural individuality, your true, ideal, or personal self ".(2). 
it means being a person. This realization by the individual 
of his distinctive capacities is man's supreme end. (3). The 
goal of each individual is the realization of his possible 
Self; it is the identification of the ideal with the Self; and 
it is the continuous progress toward an increasing degree of 
integration. nere, in this pursuit of this common goal, the 
deeper interests even of enemies are identical. 
VIII. Integration is Effected by Conversion. 
This integration, this self-realization through the accept- 
ance of an ideal, is effected by conversion, whether conver- 
sion be an apparently sudden event or a progressive develop- 
ment. A condition of practical integration, that is, a moral 
life, is not always attained solely by a continuous progress 
toward the goal of identification of Self and ideal; nor is 
it solely to be attained always by a sudden catachlysm within 
the personality. Although all of life seems destined to be a 
continuous struggle against partial dissociation and toward 
a more complete integration, still, there may be experienced 
by a disintegrated, that is, unmoral, personality, an upheaval 
among the elements constituting that personality - a psycho- 
logically spectacular integration which suddenly, and in a 
(l). Hocking; Lectures on "The Philosophy of the State ", 1921. 
(2). Seth; "Ethical Principles ", p. 199. 
(3). See Irons; "The Psychology of Ethics ", p. 159. 
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catachlysmic way, changes the individual's whole outlook on 
life, and completely reverses the habitual reactions of former 
days. This is "sudden conversion ", but it is psychologically 
little different, except in its apparent suddenness, from the 
gradual process; both are examples of progress toward the goal 
of personal harmony and sentiment -integration, that is, toward 
morality in conduct; but the one type accomplishes, to the 
observer at least, a comparatively large part of the journey 
at a single bound, while the other type attains the goal by 
apparently more gradual stages in development. Conversion is 
the whole process involved in making a moral Self, Self being 
"a group of powers united in the service of a harmonious sys- 
tem of purposes ". (1). Conversion is this unification of a 
divided Self. 
1. Conversion may be religious. 
Por psychology, conversion is not identical with a relig- 
ious experience. Conversion may be furthered within a person- 
ality by any means sufficiently powerful in its influence, to 
impress, and, to varying degrees, change and order the dis- 
organized state of the elements within that personality. These 
means may be "line upon line, precept upon precept ", each in- 
fluence entering the individual's unconscious, there to "cer- 
ebrate unconsciously or to incubate" (2), until some shock 
(1). See Pratt; "The Religious Consciousness ", p. 123. 
(2). James; "Varieties of Religious Experience ", pp. 206 - 
210. Also footnote, p. 236. 
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causes them to burst into consciousness from the subliminal 
and effect what may be a most radical change in conduct, and 
which is, to observers, a sudden change. But, on the other 
hand, although psychologically all conversions are not relig- 
ious, still, the shock which causes the explosion may be some 
powerful, strongly emotional religious experience. 
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Chapter XIII: 
INTEGRATION OF INNATE SOCIAL ELEMENTS. SELF AND OTHER. 
I. A "Spiritual Whole" as Integrator of Personality. 
One line of approach to the solution of the problem of 
personal integration is, that each human personality may be- 
come the organ of a "Spiritual Whole ", which uses the person- 
ality as a vehicle for its, or his, activity. This theory is 
reminiscent of the Stoic doctrine that, in proportion as divin- 
ity inheres within a person, to that degree does that person 
become a citizen within the city of god. The modern theory 
is that, insofar as the Spiritual Whole or. the "one self -con- 
scious mind in society" is operative within a personality, 
there can be no dissociation, for that one mind must be self - 
consistent, and continuously so. 
1. The Hegelian State. 
One form of this theory is Hegel's concept that there is 
a Universal Will operative, which is objectively presented in 
the State, and functions through the individuals comprising 
the State. Thus Hegel says: " - -- particularity is the outer 
visible way in which the social principle exists" (1): that 
is, the Universal Will manifests itself in particular individ- 
uals. 
2. Schopenhauer's "Blind Will ". 
Another concept comparable in essence to the theory of 
(1). Hegel; "Philosophy of Right ", Part III, Sec. 154. 
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one "Spiritual Whole" in society, is Schopenhauer's concept 
of a blind will which functions through individual ego's.(1). 
3. Rousseau's "General Will ". 
Rousseau conceives of a general will which assures person- 
al inner harmony in virtue of its being the recipient of the 
submission of the individual wills which are under it, and 
which yet constitute it. The general will is not thought of 
as being an entity preexistent to the individual wills which 
submit themselves to it, but is itself created by the acts of 
submission of these constituent individual wills. "Each giving 
himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is not 
one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights 
which we concede to him ourselves, we gain the equivalent of 
all we lose, and more power to preserve what we have. - -- Each 
of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the 
supreme direction of the general will; and in return we re- 
ceive every member as an indivisible part of the whole. This 
act of association produces a moral and collective body, which 
is composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, 
and which receives from this act, its unity, its common self, 
its life, and its will ". (2). 
All such theories as Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, and Rou- 
sseau's, manifest an unsatisfactory lack of psychological 
analysis of the individual personality. Furthermore, such con- 
(1). See Part I, p. 104, ff. 
(2). Rousseau; "The Social Contract "; Book I, Chap. VI. 
"Oeuvres ", Vol. VI, pp. 20 - 21. 
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ceptions as disembodied wills and spiritual wholes are psycho- 
logically fantastic: wills are not isolable entities; they are 
personalities in a dynamic aspect. Nor can a will be created 
by the acts of submission of various individual wills, as 
Rousseau's words intimate is done. And Hegelianism does injus- 
tice to the individual, tending to lose him within the uni- 
versal. 
It seems to us, therefore, that any theory pretending 
to secure a solution of the Self -Other problem must in a sat- 
isfactory, analytic way account for the individual personalities 
involved, neither calling them mere disembodied functions 
such as wills, nor submerging them into a unified and unify- 
ing whole. 
4. Bradley's Self- realization. 
Bradley seeks to evade this annihilation of individual- 
ity while still holding to a whole which functions through 
it. He says: "But I am one among others, therefore can not be 
infinite. The answer is - -- I am both infinite and finite. I 
know myself as a member of a moral organism, the members of 
which are related in no mere external way. I know myself as 
a member; I am aware of my function; but I am also aware of 
the whole as specifying itself in me. The will of the whole 
knowingly wills itself in me; the will of the whole is the 
will of the members, and so, in willing my own function, I do 
}mow that the others will themselves in me. - -- 'Realise 
yourself as an infinite whole' means 'Realise yourself as the 
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self- conscious member of an infinite whole by realising the 
whole in yourself ". (1). 
Bradley tries to save the individual from Hegelian 
annihilation, but his treatment of it is hesitating and quali- 
fied. He seems to confuse individuality with personality; the 
confusion becomes especially evident in his denial of the 
personality of absolute. (2). In this denial, he leaves ill - 
defined his substituted concept of "the super -personal ". To 
us, personality is the highest human concept. 
II. Dewey's Solution of the Ego -Alter Problem. 
Dewey solves the conflict between Self and Socius by 
saying that "Right is only an abstract name for the multitude 
of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, 
and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some 
account. Its authority is the exigency of their demands, the 
efficacy of their insistencies ". (3). This solution emphasizes 
the element of social pressure upon the individual to the 
apparent exclusion of individual creativity. He identifies 
morality with social custom. 
We would maintain that neither theory is correct: neither 
one like Hegel's which submerges individuality; nor Dewey's 
which seems to disregard the free creativity of the individual 
in the making of moral decisions. Rather, we think that moral- 
(1). Bradley; "Ethical Studies ", Essay II. 
(2). See Part I, p. 124. 
(3). Dewey; "Human iAature and Conduct ", p. 326. 
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ity is based upon the integration of elements which are innate 
in the individual, some of which are social, and that morality 
is therefore a social phenomenon; but it is not social to the 
exclusion of the free core of a self -conscious individuality. 
III. Innate Social Elements to be Integrated. 
Among man's innate tendencies, the integration of which 
constitutes moralization, there are certain social elements, 
which are, as Shaftesbury and those following him pointed out 
afresh, just as innate as self -love, or any other commonly 
accepted natural tendencies. Even Alfred Adler (1) admits 
that there is at least the beginning of sociality in the very 
limitation of the conditions of community of life into which 
man is born. 
Such non -voluntary limitation of the individual's will to 
power, by the mere presence of other people with similar 
wills, might tend to permit the development of some of the 
innate bases for socialization, but obviously, such necessity 
can not be the direct root of any integration of social el- 
ements. 
There is, however, a higher necessity which might be so 
considered: not the necessity founded upon the social limita- 
tion of a will to power by the mere presence of other similar 
wills to power, but rather the necessity founded upon the 
recognition that each psychical organism, each person, is but 
a part of a wider whole, and is not wholly independent and 
(1). Adler; "The Practice and Theory of individual Psychology ", 
p. 9. 
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self -contained. That is to say, "we grow up with instincts 
and desires determined by conditions of our life and that of 
our ancestors. This life is social, but imperfectly social. 
Hence love, affection, generosity, candour, honesty, truth- 
fulness, modesty, courage, are as much a matter of 'natural' 
instinct, reacting on early surroundings; as the desires for 
personal gain or esteem ". (1). Thus it can be said that "The 
moral law is an expression of the fact that man is an organic 
part of an organic whole ". (2). 
1. Primitive Passive Sympathy. 
Of these fundamental innate social elements, whose organ- 
ization goes toward constituting moralization, primitive 
passive sympathy is one. This capacity is manifested in the 
case of beasts, for example, when one of a flock of wild 
birds is moved to action by some strange object in the en- 
vironment and the bird takes to flight, possibly with a sharp 
cry which can be easily distinguished as peculiar to that 
kind of sudden action: we seem safe in interpreting the action 
of the bird as it flies and cries, as being manifestations 
of fear. Immediately the whole flock follow the first bird in 
flight and outcry, each individual uttering the cry which is 
distinctive of such sudden action, and this, too, apparently, 
without their being directly aware of the cause of the whole 
proceeding, except that they have noted the reactions of the 
(1). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution ", Vol. II, p. 247. 
(2). Irons; "The Psychology of Ethics ", p. 172. 
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leader. Instinctive behaviour has been induced in the members 
of the group by means of the manifestations of signs of 
primitive emotion in one of the group. 
kcDougall defines this primitive passive sympathy as 
the liability or capacity to be stirred to that kind of in- 
stinctive behaviour whose signs are displayed by other mem- 
bers of the species ". (1). 
In the case of the child the same phenomenon may be seen. 
Although. in the case of the human being, primitive reactions 
are with greater difficulty isolated from other elements such 
as habit and imitation, than is the case with the simpler 
animal reactions, we can still safely maintain that the "child 
responds to the emotions of those around him - -- in virtue 
of - -- the sympathetic induction of emotions, or primitive 
sympathy - -- ". (2). There is in the child, a general instinctive 
tendency to experience a feeling with another, when its man- 
ifestations are observed in that other; this tendency is the 
fundamental social element of human personality called prim- 
itive passive sympathy. By virtue of this tendency, the child 
can interpret "directly the expressive signs of an emotion, 
whether it is an emotion he has already himself experienced 
or one which he has never before experienced ". (3). Nor are 
the child's responses mere simulations of purely instinctive 
(1). McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", p. 156. 
(2). Burt; "The Definition and Diagnosis of Loral Imbecility ", 
pp. 22 - 23. 
(3). Dreyer; "Instinct in Lan ", p. 238. 
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responses, but "all the emotional attitudes of the persons 
with whom the child comes frequently in contact mag become 
characteristic also of him ". 
It can probably be held that the degree and range of this 
sympathy depend upon the clearness and extent of the repre- 
sentation of the signs of the emotion shown in that other 
member of the group. 'urthermore, the emotion thus aroused as 
a result of the existence in the individuals of the group 
of the tendency of primitive passive sympathy, and aroused 
through the sympathetic induction of that emotion, may be 
any emotion whatsoever. Primitive passive sympathy involves 
the subjective sharing of any of the various emotional ex- 
citements which the individuals of any particular species may 
manifest. 
In the case of the development of morality, it is to a 
large extent by this sympathetic contagion of emotions that 
the child's moral sentiments are shaped. A person who is ad- 
mired by a child effects in the child an attitude of wonder 
and receptive submission toward him, and as a result, the 
hero's emotional responses, and his attitudes, and the emo- 
tions themselves, including as a result the moral sentiments, 
are sympathetically induced in the child. We know the emo- 
tions of others intuitively, by way of sympathy. The child 
thus learns to know himself and others, and his developing 
emotions take on the nature of those of the people about 
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him. (1) . 
This primitive passive sympathy is the essential basis 
of the higher forms of sympathy. Active sympathy, with its 
developments and differentiations, develops in man, within a 
social environment, from passive sympathy. As these higher, 
active forms of sympathy develop in the individual, his moral 
world is more and more widened to include within it the real- 
ization, not only of his own capacities, but the capacities 
of his fellows: he becomes mentally objectified. (2). So in 
the higher form, sympathy becomes the propensity to "feel 
with others ", as they struggle on to self- realization - to 
treat them as we would be treated in our struggling toward 
the same goal. 
It is with some reason, therefore, that Sutherland can 
say that, when we have traced the capacity of sympathy to 
a reasonable degree of cogency, we have witnessed the growth 
of a natural form of morality, in the latter stage of which 
"where sympathy is called love, it is the basis of morality - 
indeed, is the morality of the religions of Jesus and 3uddha ".(3). 
Sully, too, although elsewhere seeming to explain con- 
tagion of feeling through imitation rather than through an 
instinctive tendency to experience emotion directly, gives a 
(1). See Drover; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Educa- 
tion", pp. 85 - 86. 
(2). See Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience ", p.135. 
(3), Sutherland; "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct ", 
Chap. XI`s. 
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satisfactory summary: "Sympathy means feeling excited by the 
manifestation of a like state in another --- In its higher 
and more complete form, sympathy is 'fellow -feeling', that is, 
feeling with and for another, which involves an imaginative 
'intuition' or realization of his affective states ". (1). 
Sully further notes the developed active form of this fellow - 
feeling when he says that "the benevolent man, who is ready 
to sacrifice personal comfort for others, is a man in whom the 
sympathetic or 'altruistic' feelings are so strong and dom- 
inant that he finds his happiness in beneficent action, and 
would be miserable if cut off from this ". (2). 
2. imitation is Instinctive, but not an Instinct. 
A second innate social tendency which is fundamental to 
moralization is imitation. Although there seems to be an innate 
basis for the similarities observed in the behaviour of differ- 
ent individuals, we would not consider imitation to be any- 
thing so specific as an instinct. Indeed, mere similarity of 
organic structure and similarity of stimulating environment 
would assure similarity of response. Again, some of those ac- 
tions which are sometimes termed the result of an instinct of 
imitation, are explicable merely as the result of the "imita- 
tor's" attending to the action of the imitated, and as previ- 
ously explained, the vital impulse produces the reaction 
(1). Sully; "The human Mind", Vol. II, p. 106. 
(2). Sully; Op.Cit., p. 243. 
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appropriate to the action attended to. 
In the case of the learning of spoken language, the 
child's so- called imitation is, we think, more basicly ex- 
plicable as follows. The suitable movement of the child's 
vocal apparatus produces sound, and he simultaneously hears 
his own voice and feels the muscular movements involved. he 
thus associates the two. Then, when he hears a similar sound 
coming from another source, he easily associates that noise 
with his own vocal sound, and with his own vocal movements. 
Thus the sound of another's voice comes to elicit the child's 
vocal response, just as the hearing of his own voice had 
tended to do. That is, in virtue of the preformed association, 
he will tend to utter the sound which he hears. But this is 
originally only a conditioning of reflexes rather than the 
working of an instinct of imitation. Later on in the develop- 
ment, conscious imitation does operate, but whatever innate 
element is the basis of such a later function, has, by that 
time, been overlaid quite thoroughly by habit, and the func- 
tion can not be termed an instinct. 
At one extreme of the series of those who discuss imita- 
tion, are to be found the psychologists who, accepting the 
existence of no instincts at all, explain imitation behaviour- 
istically in some such way as 2loyd H. Allport, who says in- 
stinct is a mere descriptive term covering observed uniform- 
ities of behaviour. (1). J .B. zatson accepts no instincts, 
(1), Allport; "Social vsychology ", p. 242. 
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holding that the fundament= of behaviour is purposeless, 
physiological, mechanical reflex, and that all later develop- 
ment of conduct is explicable as a compounding of these el- 
ements, by way of a conditioning of them, through association.(l }. 
Janet offers as an explanation of so- called imitation, that it 
is an organic predisposition to the performance of all acts 
capable of performance by others of the species. This organic 
predisposition to a similarity of actions, that is, imitation, 
conserves the budget of energy of the organism. Because it is 
thus a conservator of energy, it is the origin of moral -re- 
ligious conduct, for whatever conserves that budget is good. (2). 
Janet thus takes a position which has a biological basis, 
just as Allport and Watson do. 
At the other extreme of the series, are such instinctiv- 
ists as G. Tarde, E.A. Ross, and J.M. Baldwin, who give to 
imitation, as an instinct, a fundamental position in their ex- 
planation of society. Thus Baldwin, including sympathy and 
suggestion under imitation, makes the latter the liaison be- 
tween the individual and society. 
I:cDougall holds that imitation has an innate instinctive 
basis, but is not a primary instinct, lacking specificity of 
the evoking object, definiteness of response, and manifesta- 
(1). See Watson; "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behavior- 
ist". 
(2). See Horton; "The Origin and Psychological Function of 
Religion according to Janet ", in "American Journal of 
Philosophy ", Vol. XXXV. 
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tion in sub -human individuals. He says it is better explained 
either on the ground that perceived actions are followed 
simply because the gregarious instinct so prompts; or that the 
reactions in question are based upon primitive sympathy. (1). (8). 
We agree substantially with McDougall and Dreyer, consid- 
ering imitation to be the general instinctive tendency to 
copy directly, either deliberately or unconsciously, the be- 
haviour of another. (3). Imitation is so closely related, in- 
deed, to the other two general innate tendencies of sympathy 
and suggestion, that, "from the objective side, it may be 
quite impossible to say whether any behaviour is due to im- 
itation, to sympathy, or to suggestibility ". The functioning 
of imitation is facilitated in the imitator by the apprehen- 
sion of superiority in the imitated, and the assumption of 
an attitude of self- negation toward the superior, on the part 
of the imitator, that is, of course, if the difference be- 
tween himself and the superior is not imagined to be so great 
that it inhibits imitation completely. 
Thus, as involving an enhanced suggestibility toward an 
imagined superior on the part of the child, imitation, even 
when not consciously and deliberatively functioning, enters 
vitally into the development of morality; and this too, even 
though imitation is not to be considered a primary instinct, 
(1). See McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ",p. 173. 
(2). See McDougall; "Social Psychology ", pp. 107, ff. 
(3). See Dreyer; "Instinct in _an ", pp. 230, ff. 
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and not a sole basis for morality. 
3. Suggestibility. 
A third general instinctive tendency which functions in 
the development of a moralized personality is suggestibility. 
It is non -rational - a "tendency under certain circumstances, 
to accept or act upon the opinions and beliefs another person 
would have us accept and act upon, without ourselves having 
logical grounds for accepting them ". (1). This process may be 
conscious or unconscious. A person may consciously accept a 
suggestion just because he has no good reason for refusing it; 
and a hypnotized person will unconsciously accept a suggestion 
for the same reason. 
Suggestion is plainly an important element in the social- 
ization and moralization of the child, being a condition which 
is, in the individual, conducive to the reception of the inter- 
ests and sentiments and moral code of the community in which 
he lives. Suggestibility tends to make the immature human being 
receptive to social standards. 
IV. Integration of Personality Involves Harmonization of 
"Self" and "Other ". 
An integration of man's innate social elements involves 
the harmonization of "Self" and "Other ", of "Ego" and "Alter ". 
Integration involves socialization; that is, self -interest and 
other- interest must be included in the integration of person- 
ality, if that integration is to be considered in any measure 
(l). See Dreyer; "Instinct in ian". 
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complete. 
But so distinctive and so powerful seems the emphasis 
which the Self puts upon his own welfare; and so strongly 
appears self -love and self -preservation to influence action; 
and so exclusive and driving to the individual appears the 
appeal of his own happiness; that it is not strange that some 
writers hold that "the attempt to establish an absolute coin- 
cidence between virtue and happiness, is, in ethics, what the 
attempt to square the circle is, or to discover perpetual 
motion ". (1). 
1. Altruism is as Fundamental as Egoism. 
It must first of all be maintained that the struggle for 
the life of others is, evolutionarily, practically as old as 
the struggle for the life of one's self: the roots of love are 
as ancient and fundamental as the roots of selfishness. The 
roots of love began to grow "with the first cell of life 
which budded on this earth"(2); an unselfish reproduction or 
a giving up of Self for others yet to be, is as fundamental 
as nutrition, or as a careful attention to the welfare of the 
individual Self. These two elements of self- giving and nutri- 
tion, of self- preservation and propagation, appear and develop 
and persist side by side. "From the dawn of life altruism 







"The Science of Ethics ", p. 430. 
"The Ascent of Tian ", p. 276. 
"Data of Ethics ", Sec. 75, p. 201. 
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simultaneously. 
But these two tendencies, merely by virtue of the simul- 
taneousness of their evolution, do not necessarily function 
harmoniously within the individual personality. Just as any 
several innate tendencies may lack harmonious development and 
integration among themselves, so may these two be unharmonized. 
Lnd further, just as it is within the personality that all in- 
tegration takes place, so it is also within the personality 
that the harmony between the interests of others and of Self 
is to be effected: the only field where any integration can 
take place is the personality. Integration, including integra- 
tion of "Self" and "Other" is an inner phenomenon; its field 
is the personality. 
This inner process of harmonizing Self and other, more- 
over, does not involve, on the part of the individual, a sac- 
rificing of his individuality, but, as both elements belong 
inherently to himself, the harmonization of them is INVOLVED 
in the development of his complete individuality. Other el- 
ements are just as innate and just as legitimately the in- 
individual's own, as are the self -love elements of his person- 
ality: the innate other -regarding element must be recognized, 
and must be included in any integrated whole, just as surely 
as the more "private" interests of the individual. 
The idea of Self and that of Socius are born together, 
and develop together, in society; they are never separable. 
Indeed, individuality itself is a social phenomenon, for the 
social environment sharpens the outline and makes for the in- 
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dividualizing of the Self. (1). And if this feeling of self- 
hood, self -consciousness, can appear only in society and under 
social influences, the selves of a personality can not be har- 
monized so long as we contemplate the mere individual in isola- 
tion from society. "Mutual dependence more or less intimate, 
is indeed, universal, and to the extent of this dependence, 
Ego always has interest in Alter ". (2). 
'i'rue happiness, or well- being, or "EJSo p-ovto.- ", rests on 
the successful integrating of the two elements of Self and 
other within a personality, as well as on the integration of 
any other elements. If these develop, each independent of the 
other, a dissociation results which is just as real as if the 
elements involved were any other pair of interests. But even 
man's egoistic desires which instinctively crave their own 
gratification, "can only be fulfilled by adapting them to the 
real world and to the social group ". (3). Westermarck 
claims that because "acts beneficial to the individual are 
at the same time beneficial to his companions ", "the distinc- 
tion between ego and alter loses much of its importance'.(4). 
Interest in Self and interest in others are both innate, and, 
being innate, must be harmonized if the personality is to be 
integrated, socialized, and moralized. 
(1). See Coe; "The Psychology of ''eligion ", Chap. XV. 
(c). Ward; "Psychological Principles ", p. 393. 
(3) Jung; "The Psychology of the Unconscious ", p. 41. 
(4). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of Loral Ideas ", 
Vol. II, pp. 195 - 197. 
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2. Interests of Self and of Other are really Identical. 
The integration of Self and socius, we think, can be 
effected because they are not several independent, impenetrable 
monads existing and developing side by side in the personal- 
ity, but they are so interpenetrated each with the other, that 
their interests are practically identical. it is not the ab- 
stracted Self that is involved in the process of moralization, 
but the "Self in relation to others ", and the basis of this 
relationship of interests lies deep within the personality. 
It is only in proportion to the unselfishness of a life that 
it can be enlarged and enriched itself. (1). "The lover widens 
his experience as the non -lover can not. He adds to the mass 
of his idea- world, and acquires thereby enhanced power to 
appreciate all things. - -- The altruist alone can accumulate 
that treasure of idea through which all things must be en- 
joyed that are enjoyed." (2). Even self -feeling can not de- 
velop without an objective reference, that is, unless that 
self- feeling is also altruistic or other -feeling, ego- altru- 
istic, or semi -social: "truly to serve humanity is to realize 
ourselves, and at the same time to aid others in the same 
task of self- realization ". (3). The interests of Self and of 
other are identical. 
This is true because socius is latent within Self: in- 
(1) See Seth; "Ethical Principles ", p. 271. 
(2). Docking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience ", p. 136. 
(3). Seth; Op.Cit., p. 276. 
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terests of others inhere in interests of Self, or interests 
of Self inhere in interests of others; they interpenetrate. 
«mhe elements of social service steep themselves in self -feel- 
ing" (1): "It is in going beyond ourselves that we really find 
ourselves" (2). Jung states this condition in characteristic 
fashion when he says that libido is bi- polar, dynamic self - 
wards and dynamic other- wards. T'.C. Sharp says that "benevo- 
lence" is a force, the desire for the realization or attain- 
ment of a good; and this force manifests itself in two differ- 
ent directions, egoism and altruism. (3). 
Thus the real contrast is not between egoism and altru- 
ism. "The true contrast is between the partial or exclusive 
on the one hand, and the comprehensive and rational on the 
other. - -- The collective achievement appeals to the individu- 
al as his own aim writ large ". (4). Harmonization of Self and 
other within a personality consists in the realization by 
that personality that his interests are one with the interests 
of others. 
V. The Parental Instinct as the Basis of harmonization 
of Self and Other. 
The parental instinct, being innate, and constituted of 
the two elements of self- regard and other- regard, is a basis 
for the harmonization of self- interests with the interests of 
(1). Hobhouse; "Social Development ", p. 150. 
(2). ;ark; "Factors in Conduct ", p. 110. 
(3). Sharp; "Some Problems in the Psychology of Egoism and 
Altruism ", in "Journal of Philosophy ", Vol. XX, p. 85. 1923. 
(4). Hobhouse; Op.Cit., pp. 161, 171. 
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others. The parental instinct is "the mother of morality - -- the 
only truly altruistic element in nature" (1); and it can be an- 
alyzed into the two elements of pure altruism and the extended 
self -regarding sentiment; in its completest form it arises 
"from a fusion of the purely altruistic with the extended self - 
regarding sentiment ". (2). Shand agrees with this analysis 
when he says that the parental instinct "is a system and not 
merely a group, because all these instincts are inter- organ- 
ized for the preservation of the offspring. And therefore the 
disinterested character of this system is not merely acquired, 
but it is also an innate characteristic ". (3). We thus inherit 
"an innate disposition - -- to love" which is "quite naturally 
disinterested ". Ribot also agrees that the "tender emotion is 
simple and primary, being the source of all altruistic, social, 
and moral manifestations ", and "the maternal sentiment is the 
gate by which the feeling of benevolence made its entrance 
into the world". (4) . 
This parental instinct, or 9ibot's maternal sentiment, a 
fusion of self- regard and love, is not unique to either sex, 
although the female probably in most cases inherits it in a 
more intense form than does the male. Irrespective of sex, man 
inherits, in the parental instinct, a fusion of self- regard 
(1). 'cDougall; "An Outline of Psychology ", p. 131. 
(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 172. 
(3). Shand; "The Foundations of Character ", pp. 40, 43, 45. 
(4) Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions ", pp. 236, 281. 
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and other -regard: here is manifested an affective bi- polarity; 
socius is here latent within the Self; self- feeling and other - 
feeling are interpenetrated each with the other. It is an ab- 
normal condition to be exclusively self- loving or exclusively 
other -loving; indeed, a complete exclusiveness of either is 
almost incomprehensible; there are probably only degrees of 
abnormality in this respect, as in the case of personality in 
general. 
The theme of Hirst's book "Self and Neighbour" agrees 
with ours. He holds that moral good is common good. In the 
ethical sense, as far as mere impulses of his nature go, man 
is exclusively neither egoistic nor altruistic. Family life 
supplies the instinctive basis of morality because it effects 
a natural unity of interest among its members. Socius is here 
seen to be latent in ego. Common good is community. A synthe- 
sis of Self and other reveals itself in the parental sentiment. 
In this sentiment we find the psychological possibility of 
that ethical love which, in the experience of "community ", 
effects the unification of Self and neighbour. This sentiment 
of love, Hirst notes, in the form of parental affection, is 
thus based upon instincts which are of biological importance 
to the race. 
VI. Moralization Involves Self- sacrifice. 
In the functioning of the parental instinct, there is 
frequently seen a self- sacrifice on the part of the individual. 
The question comes: "Which self is it which is sacrificed ? ". 
Integration implies an hierarchy of selves in which only one 
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system is supreme among the constituent systems : that is, in 
order that one system may be supreme, other systems must be 
subordinated: in order than one self may be dominant, some 
other self or selves must be sacrificed. The very essence of 
integration, moralization, self -realization is "self " -sac- 
rifice. Thereby the individual, The Self, loses the self 
which he has evaluated to be the lower or less important self, 
in order to save the higher. In the case of the parental in- 
stinct, it frequently results that the parent loses his phys- 
ical self to the extreme of giving his life for the off- 
spring, in order that his other self, or the other element of 
his parent -self, namely the extended self- regarding sentiment 
as embodied in the offspring, might not be sacrificed. so it 
is "natural" for a parent to give up his life for his offspring, 
because that offspring is his own self extended; but it is not 
so "natural" for the offspring to give his life for the parent, 
because the parent is not the embodied extended self -regarding 
sentiment in the way in which the offspring is of the parent 
who is the immediate source of the offspring's being. 
We conclude that socialized self -realization means not 
only the capability of self- sacrifice, but rather, that self - 
realization involves self- sacrifice. "Self- sacrifice and self - 
realization are parts of the same act ". (1). One self or more 
(1). Jones; "A waith that Enquires ", p. 286. 
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must be sacrificed, that the dominant self may be in a posi- 
tion of integrating authority within the personality. 
This principle of self- sacrifice is capable of expansion, 
to include within it the people by whom any personality is 
environed. Each person, or the idea of each person, of whom 
I gain experience, becomes the core of an incipient sentiment, 
which thus becomes one of the systems constituting my person- 
ality. Now in the process of the formation of an ordered hier- 
archy of sentiments or selves, it is conceivable that one of 
these sentiment systems, with a friend at the core of it, 
could become the dominant system of my personality. That is, 
I might love that person better than my physical life; the 
other -love sentiment being supreme over the self -love sent- 
iment. Humanity could not well exist if the one, from among 
the group could not sacrifice himself for the other. Inherent 
in the very idea of self -realization, or integration of person- 
ality, is the possibility that that sentiment system could be 
made the supreme goal of the personality, which has as its 
object of reference or core, another person. 
The highest conceivable self -realization involves self - 
sacrifice. The self I sacrifice as being of less worth might 
be the sentiment of self centred around my physical body, and 
the sentiment system or self which I count the most worth- 
while, that is, the dominant sentiment system of my personality, 
might be conceivably centred around the idea of my country; in 
which case, there arises the possibility that my highest self - 
realization might mean for me the sacrifice of my "physical- 
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self " -sentiment, in favour of my "fatherland -self " -sentiment, 
with the result, "I die for my country ". But only in that way 
would I realize that self which I have evaluated most highly. 
Only by dying would I live. 
1. Self- sacrifice Consummates Self -realization. 
So self- sacrifice, instead of implying the sacrifice of 
individual personality, really consummates the development 
of personality. 
'A have been speaking of what Shand calls "The most con- 
spicuous of these greater systems, love ", in which "there is 
an organization of the lesser systems of many emotions ", (1); 
or of what Wallas calls "the disposition of Philanthropy ", (21, 
or the love of one's fellows as such. If humanity in general, 
therefore, were to become within me the core of a dominant 
sentiment system, I would, as a result, show toward each con- 
crete example of humanity "the disposition of Philanthropy ", 
and this attitude would mark me as a perfectly moralized 
personality. Then I would love even my enemy, because he, as 
surely as does my friend, concretely represents humanity, the 
sentiment of which rules my personality. 
VII. Socialization of Innate Tendencies is Fundamental 
to Irioralization. 
If it is remembered that there is an innate basis for 
the harmonization of Self and other, the influence of society 
f11. Shand; "The Foundations of Character ", p. 35. 
(2). Wallas; "The Great Society ", pp. 151, ff. 
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upon the process of moralizing the individual can not easily 
be overemphasized. We agree that "moral conduct is essentially 
social conduct" (1), but we think that external social pressure, 
exerted upon the un- moralized individual, is but an aid in 
the integration of the personality: it is not the sole factor 
either in that integration or in moralization. "The moral 
tradition which sums up the experiences of the race, though 
not so decisive as the instincts, is wisely regarded by those 
who seek happiness. - -- But for society to make this code com- 
pulsory, is to deprive the individual of that free choice 
upon which his happiness depends. So it is embodied in public 
opinion ". (2). 
The influence of public opinion is powerful, and social 
pressure is on the whole necessary and beneficial to the in- 
dividual; for the social code, which is based upon society's 
experiences which have been found to be beneficial, may be 
considered as a worthy guide and curb to the unrestrained play 
of the individual's innate impulses. Without this restraint, 
these impulses would tend to run riot; and the élan vital, 
which we consider to be the ultimate urge to action, would, as 
Dewey holds, "likely have the attributes of the devil in spite 
of its being ennobled with the name of God ". (3). 
A child, therefore, endowed as he is with various im- 
(l). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 179. 
(2). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals ", p. 96. 
(3). Dewey; "Human Nature and Conduct ", p. 74. 
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pulses to untrained, chaotic action, finds himself in immedi- 
ate conflict with society. "Childhood is one long conflict be- 
tween individual instinctive tendencies and the social tradi- 
tions and ideals ". (1). The beginning of the child's moral- 
ization is the process of socialization of his impulses, and 
paralleling this socialization is a process of integration 
of those impulses. 
Phylogenetically as well as genetically, the starting 
point for the development of human ethics is custom, arising 
and maintaining itself, not at first through any reflective 
thought as to what is best, but "by the play of human im- 
pulses within the limits of a life lived in social groups ".(2). 
The limits of a life lived in social groups are, we ad- 
mit, tightly drawn. Social pressure is, to an almost over - 
whelming degree, formative of the individual's moral code. 
Bosanquet states even, in an Hegelian way, that the measure 
of morality "seems to be the actual identification of the 
private self with the universal self - the actual surrender 
of the will (of the individual) to the greater will of the 
system to which we belong ". (3). Pillsbury, also, says 
plainly that "in general, the ideals of the individual are the 
ideals of his community ". (4). 
The explanation of this social authority over the in- 
(1). Rivers; "Instinct and the Unconscious ", p. 157. 
(2). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution ", Vol. II, p. 264. 
(3). Bosanquet; "The Psychology of the Moral Self", p. 113. 
(4). Pillsbury; "The Essentials of .psychology ", p. 351. 
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dividual is not hard to find: the individual must live in so- 
ciety, and he can live in society only when obedient to the 
rules of society; he is social by nature, and the satisfying 
of that social demand within him all but necessitates his 
obedience to the social code. After his wide observations 
along this line, Westermarck concludes that the traditional 
notions as to what is good or bad are commonly accepted by the 
majority of people without further reflection. (1). 
McDougall gives as a further explanation of this custom- 
ary individual submission to social customs, the fact that 
group selection functions. He says: "The principal condition 
of the evolution of a moral nature was group selection among 
primitive societies constantly at war. - -- a society with an 
inferior moral code, strictly conformed to by its members, 
would, in the long run, have better chance of survival than 
one with a higher code less strictly observed'. (2). 
Thus, from the standpoint both of the individual and of 
the group, the usual submission of the individual to the group 
code is readily explicable. so in the end, the moral sentiments 
of the group in which a child's life is mainly passed, "tend 
to mould his into conformity "; for the external power of so- 
cial rewards and punishments, praise and blame, admiration and 
scorn, respect and ridicule, with which the child's group en- 
forces upon him its traditional code, as he conforms to or re- 
(1). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of :oral Ideas ", 
Vol. I. 
(2). McDougall; Doug The Group Mind", pp. 264 - 265. 
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bels against that standard, is usually too great to be long 
withstood. 
1. Inner Sympathy aids in the process of Moralization. 
But there is, in addition to this outer social pressure, 
and aiding in the socialization of the individual, an inner 
force, which, being innate and instinctive, is also powerful, 
as an ally, cooperating with the outer pressure of society. 
This inner ally is the innate sympathy -tendency, which ex- 
ercises an impulse toward a harmony of feeling and emotion 
with one's fellows. Between the outer social enforcement, and 
the inner sympathetic -tendency toward social harmony, the so- 
cialization of the individual's impulses progresses more or 
less rapidly. 
But the first advances toward socialization are made at 
the point of the bayonet. Innate impulses know, at first, no 
restraint: they only push toward an active functioning: their 
satisfaction is their consummation. The immediate first result 
in the child's experience is, therefore, conflict with so- 
ciety, probably in the person of one of the immediate family; 
and the child experiences at least a partial defeat in the un- 
restrained exercise of his impulse. That is, society partially 
succeeds, after a struggle, in enforcing its code upon the 
unY+illing individual. The child's first sense of duty is 
obedience; (1); at the lower levels of morals, it is his sense 
of what is demanded of him by those about him. it is only at 
(1). See Part IV. 
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the higher moral level that his sense of duty becomes what he 
demands of himself, in virtue of the ideal of character which 
he has formed and accepted. Progress toward this level of 
morality is made by way of the foreseen social approval and 
disapproval of his contemplated actions; and by way of his 
associating society's approval of his actions with his own 
approval of the same actions of others; and by way of the con- 
sequent formulation of ideals made up of those actions which 
have been discovered to be suitable, or good, both by society 
and by himself. 
Westermarck goes so far as to identify the moral emotions 
with the emotions of disapproval and approval, which are re- 
lated, respectively, to anger and revenge on one side, and 
gratitude and other forms of kindly emotion on the other. He 
makes all these states to fall under the general heading 
"retributive emotions ". (1). 
2. Socially developed Self- consciousness is Basic to 
man's Moralization. 
But there is more to the process of moralization of the 
individual than the visiting of social retribution upon the 
child's non -conformist head. It is in society that there de- 
velops within the individual that self -consciousness which is 
a characteristic unique to man, and which is fundamental to 
a true moralization. Until self- consciousness has well devel- 
oped, the child's innate impulses tend to drive toward sat- 
(1). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of the .:Loral 
Ideas ", Vol. I, Chap. H. 
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isfaction blindly. The individual is ego- centric. But after he 
has become conscious of his Self in relation to other Selves, 
and his own Self has become clearly recognizable to him as 
differentiated from other similar Selves, he begins to try to 
live in harmony with the code of those other Selves around 
him. It is only after he has thus become able to distinguish 
himself as an individual in society, that he is able to re- 
alize what is wrong when his impulses and the social code 
conflict, and only then can he begin to learn to evaluate the 
two, and to discover that it is often the better way to pre- 
vent an unequal contention between himself and society, and to 
act accordingly, that is, in a "socialized" way. Society thus 
becomes "the birthplace of moral consciousness ". (1). 
3. The Individual's Ejective Consciousness aids in the 
process of íioralization. 
There is a further development of the relationship be- 
tween the individual and society with its increasingly domina- 
ting influence over him. That is, instead of considering the 
actual positive punishment or disapproval which will result 
if he transgresses the social code, the individual gradually 
develops a concern for the favourable approval of his fellows, 
and forms in his mind a picture of himself as he thinks he 
will appear to them if he acts this way or that. he then acts 
in accordance with the imagined judgment of this "looking- glass- 
self ". Nis "looking -glass- self" or his "ejective conscious- 
(1). t;estermarck; Op. Cit. , Vol. II, p. 740. 
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ness" (1) is the awareness of thoughts and feelings as belong- 
ing to other minds than his own, the awareness of the contents 
of other people's minds. He becomes more and more subject to 
the idea of what he thinks others think of him. The effect of 
this ejective consciousness is, that "it substitutes mental 
for physical causes of social behaviour - -- The self- exhibit- 
ing instinct is stimulated rather by what he imagines other 
people are thinking of him than by any external stimuli ". The 
value of the ejective sense of the moral self is seen in "the 
great sensitiveness we have to these supposed opinions of 
others about our conduct. --- There is therefore a constant 
progress through the action and reaction of society upon the 
individual and of the individual upon society ". (2) . 
This process is aided by the individual's becoming 
"accustomed to expect from others what he presently comes to 
find that they expect from him. 5o he comes to see himself 
as others see him, when he is praised or blamed for acts that 
he has long been ready to approve or disapprove in them. In 
a word, his self- consciousness becomes conscience ". (3). 
VIII. Socialization and Integration are Both Involved 
in noralization. 
We conclude, then, that morality has no significance a- 
part from the relation of an individual to some other in- 
(1). See Washburn; "Social Consciousness ". 
(2). Baldwin; "Mental Development ", pp. 329, ff. 
(31. Ward; "Psychological Principles ", p. 395. 
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dividual: morality is a social phenomenon. But the other side 
of the process as well must be kept in mind, namely, the in- 
tegration of the sentiment systems or selves within the per- 
sonality. Socialization and integration develop intertwinedly 
to form a moral human being. 
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Chapter XIV. 
MORALITY AND RELIGION. 
Integration is a principle operating at all levels within 
the individual mind. The nervous system manifests its operation; 
the perceptive level exemplifies its working; ideation pro- 
ceeds according to this principle; and conceptualization is a 
process of integration of imaged elements which are unified 
into a concept. 
1. The Ideal is not Anti- social, but Has No Counterpart 
in Society. 
Integration of personality, integration on the highest 
level, a unifying of the sentiment systems, is effected by the 
formulation of an "ideal'. The "ideal" is a conceptualized 
sentiment which has been accepted by the Self as the supreme 
sentiment among all the sentiments. it is the ruling motive 
of the whole personality, the supreme law of conduct, the final 
court to which the person, irrespective of other laws, looks 
for approval. As this ideal has been formed out of character 
elements experienced in other individuals, living, normally, 
in society, it is not anti -social: because of the continuous 
precedent influence which social customs have had upon the 
formulation of the ideal, it is not wholly independent of so- 
ciety, nor is it totally contrary to existing customs. But 
because its constituent elements were not experienced in a 
single individual, that is, because of the eclectic constitu- 
tion of the ideal, made up as it is, of elements chosen from 
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many individuals in society who exhibited the respective re- 
spected character traits; and because in the process of thus 
abstracting these traits they have also been imaged as the 
more perfect; - therefore, the ideal has no human counterpart 
in society. 
A person who holds such an ideal, has attained an inte- 
gration which places him without the law: he may become a law 
unto himself. (11. He is ruled by a law which to him is above 
the law of society. But this law is not contrary to the high- 
est social law, even if it is far in advance of the place to 
which the slowly developing existing law of society has yet 
come. such an integrated personality becomes a moral trail- 
blazer for society, often persecuted by a society which fails 
to recognize its own best elements as constituting the ideal 
which the person in question holds, and failing to see that he 
is only an advance guard on the road to a higher social moral- 
ity, which the rest of society is destined to travel very 
slowly and labouriously, until it too, sometime in the future, 
shall attain to the level whither he, the martyr of today, has 
already come. Thus society follows in the wake of her martyred 
prophets and seers. poback calls attention to this fact when 
he says that "society has evolved to a great extent through the 
efforts of those who were unwilling to conform to the society 
of their day ", and sometimes such "maladjusted souls - -- de- 
(li, See McDougall; "An Outline of Psychology", pp. 439 - 443. 
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termine the normality of future generations ". (1). 
H. Man Conceives a Developing Ideal, which Remains 
Unrealized. 
By its very nature, the ideal is never fully attained. It 
is always a projection into the future. Because it can be grad- 
ually approached, and bit by bit realized, it continues to 
lure the individual onward; but because it is an eclectic con- 
ceptualization composed of fine traits of character theoretical- 
ly abstracted and isolated from the various individuals who 
possess them; and because these traits have been, in imagina- 
tion, perfected; and because the ideal develops and grows as 
the person's experiences multiply; - therefore, the ideal 
can not be fully attained. 
This projected ideal develops for the individual by way 
of accruing experiential concepts. The human being experiences 
in a fellow, a trait which he evaluates as desirable; and in 
another of his fellows he sees another socially desirable 
characteristic. Thus the ideal for the individual begins to 
be formed, when he attributes to an imagined individual all 
these desirable traits which he experiences in various persons. 
As he thus forms his ideal, the traits which he attributes to 
that ideal personage undergo a process of purgative abstrac- 
tion from all contaminating associated traits, and in addition 
to this purifying isolation of them, they are also imaged as 
(1). Roback; "The Psychology of Character ", pp. 512, ff. 
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the more perfect. The result is a concept of a kind of super - 
personality. The actual objective existence of this ideal may 
indeed be doubted or denied, but it is, as a concept, just as 
real psychologically as any other element of the mind: for 
psychologically, even a wrong concept is as truly a concept 
as is a right one. For morality, there are no more'important 
psychological facts than these conceptualized ideals or val- 
ues, determining as they do, conduct and character. (1). 
III. An Ideal for Humanity. 
The accruing elements of this ideal are as limitless in 
scope as the experiences of the mind of man. Each individual 
human mind can so formulate ideals, and, indeed, is so consti- 
tuted as an evaluating subject, as to make the process of 
ideal -formulation necessary. But in these individual formula- 
tions of ideals, there is not only much in common as a result 
of the common humanity inhering in each individual, but there 
results also an Ideal for Humanity, constituted from the el- 
ements of all the individual ideals. The identification of 
the Ideal for Humanity with any individual Self would make 
the words of Leibnitz true: "1'individualité enveloppe 
1'infini ". 
1. The Ideal is conceived as Personal. 
Man tends to make this Ideal personal. All the personal 
characteristics which the child experiences as desirable, can 
(1), Ward; "Psychological Principles ", p. 469. 
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not, it is felt, exist in a condition of isolation and sep- 
arateness from a personality, for it was in a person that he 
first experienced them. So the child makes ejective, an ideal 
person, considering that person an actual being, separate 
from himself and others, a distinct personality. "There must 
be, somewhere, feels the child, a self which answers to all 
the elements of the law: to the charity, the love, the beauty 
of the ideal, whose presence in my thought makes my own self 
morally so incomplete. - -- The great spirit becomes the way 
of speaking of this being - that is, it is the race- child's 
way. - -- So there is always a direct objectifying of the re- 
ligious sentiment in the world. Men are theists in some 
form". (1) . 
The point we wish to make is, that there is fabricated 
by the normal human mind a personal projection to which the 
various desirable traits, as they are experienced, may be as- 
cribed, a person as the accepted objective embodiment of those 
ideal characteristics. This projection becomes a gallery for 
whose approval alone the individual cares: it may be one's 
particular idealized hero; "it may be his dead mother or his 
best friend; it may be what he believes to be the group con- 
sisting of the best men of all ages; it may be the Christian 
saints; or it may be God ". (2). The ideal Self is projected 
out of and beyond the individual: it is "embodied in the 
(1). Baldwin; "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Hental 
Development ", pp. 339, 447. 
(2). McDougall; 'T4n Outline of Psychology ", p. 441. 
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moral sanctions of society and finally in God ". (1). 
IV. Humanity's Personalized Ideal is its God. 
The place to which we have come is this: man apotheosizes 
desirable character traits and ascribes them to an objective 
person as his ideal. As the child experiences in all his ac- 
quaintances imperfections which prevent his permanently con- 
sidering any one of them a satisfactory ideal, he gradually 
constructs for himself an imagined ideal who possesses only 
desirable traits, and no undesirable ones, and these desirable 
traits in a perfect degree. Man is forced by his very nature 
to fabricate a God, a Deity, a Person beyond himself who is 
wholly good, and who is infinite, as including at least all 
goodness conceivable by man. (2). 
V. The Ideal as a Mere fiction. 
The idea of God is a mental creation (3), standing as a 
convenient generalization for those things which for us are 
the greatest values in human social experience, the totality 
of human purposes and values. (4). Man desires physical and 
psychic power, therefore this projected idea becomes part of 
the Ideal of God; the question "whence ?" arises, so the creator 
idea is projected. What all men prize most and desire most they 
project into the idea of God. So religion comes to be man's 
(1). Baldwin; "Mental Development in the Child and in the Race ", 
p. 328. 
(2). See also Tansley; "The New Psychology ", p. 161. 
(3). See Leuba; "Psychology of Religion ". 
(4). See Ames; "The Psychology of Religious Experience ", p. 313. 
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whole bearing to what seems to him best or highest. (1). 
It may be argued that such an ideal is a mere fictional 
fabrication, and that the relationship felt by man to exist 
between himself and this ideal, to which he ascribes also 
objectivity, is a sign of abnormality. Thus Lill says that 
"mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective 
existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to 
ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching 
and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read 
in them what takes place in the world without ". (2). ;tie think 
that kiill here describes, however, not a healthy normal mys- 
ticism, but an abnormal introversion. Such abnormality, how- 
ever, is not unique to the mystical experience, nor is mys- 
ticism identifiable with abnormality. A mystic may manifest 
abnormality, and give us such a picture as riobhouse paints: 
" - -- a picture of the emaciated hermit dreaming, in a trance 
of semi- starvation, of himself as one with the centre of 
things, a God self -created by his own afflicted brain" (3): 
but of such a condition, we would emphasize the abnormality. 
1. Man's formulated Ideal is psychologically real. 
In the case of man's fabrication of an ideal God, man 
must still act "as if" he believed in the actual reality of 
the existence of the ideal. (4). For ideals are necessary to 
(1). Stratton; "The Psychology of the Religious Life ", pp. 
327, 328, 332, 338. 
(2). Mill; "Logic ", Vol. II, Book V, Chap. III, Sec. 4. 
(S) Hobhouse; ",Morals in Evolution ", Vol. II, p. 105. 
(4). See Vaihinger; "The Philosophy of 'as if' ", p. 323. 
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self -conscious man whose nature it is to form conceptions, 
to evaluate things and ideas, and to desire what he judges 
to be best. 
Man's projected ideal must be something either real and 
actual, or fictional; if only fictional, it is at least a 
psychological reality, influencing action as powerfully as 
any objective actuality. 
VI. Idealization Is the Source ofMan's Ideas of Evil 
Spirits. 
Thus far we have taken it for granted that the formula- 
tion of an ideal results in the idea of a good God. But it is 
just as possible that a man may take as his ideal an imagined 
individual who is constituted of the magnified character 
traits which are socially undesirable, and get as a result of 
the process, a devil for his god. Such a man may appear to be 
internally just as free as the man who fashions for himself 
a good God, for "a man is free internally whenever the ends 
he pursues have his whole- hearted approval, whether he says 
with iriilton's Satan, 'Evil, be thou my good', or with Jesus, 
'Thy will be done' ". (1). _-gut such an individual is not 
moralized, nor is he likely to be allowed to go free in so- 
ciety: the socialization process has been omitted. Integra- 
tion of a personality around and by an anti -social sentiment 
system may issue in an apparent inner harmony, but the person 
thus inwardly "harmonized" is out of harmony with society, and 
(1$. Ward; "Psychological Principles ", p. 405. 
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society's highest ends, so he is not moral. Indeed., his inner 
integration is, after all, only apparent, for integration 
must include the harmonization of the other -regarding elements 
which are just as innate as the self- regarding elements. 
The process of projection accounts for the ideas of all 
"spirits ", good and bad alike. 'Shen man feels moral conflict 
strongly, he tends to objectify the two sides of it, and he 
objectifies the forces on the side of moral goodness as 
God ". (1). Coe also maintains that both gods and spirits are 
projections of what men have felt in themselves when emotion- 
ally excited; the self -projection of emotional situations into 
objects thus personalizes them, and makes them friendly or 
unfriendly, gods or devils. (2). 
The ideal which a man entertains - the concept which he 
evaluates, in its constituent elements, as being good - de- 
clares what that man is. The God he fabricates for himself re- 
veals his character. "His personality will not be shown merely 
in what a man is, but what he is striving to be ". (3). The 
moral progress of an individual consists in his development 
toward a likeness to his ideal, his God. As this ideal improves, 
the individual makes moral progress. Moral development con- 
sists in the "improvement of the 'gallery' before which we dis- 
play ourselves". (4) . 
(1). Thouless; "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion ", 
p. 46. 
(2). See Coe; "The Psychology of Religion ", Chap. DTI. 
(3). Ward; "Psychological Principles ", p. 464. 
(4). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 263. 
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This gallery, or god, or ideal, is the "form which we feel 
our conceptions would take if we were able to realise them in 
a satisfying degree of unity, harmony, significance, and uni- 
versality". (1). 
VII. The Ideal Has Objective Reality. 
1. Introspective reports of Normal Men agree on their 
Experience of an Objective Correlate to their Ideal. 
We agree with Leuba, Ames, Coe, and Stratton, that the 
idea of God may be considered as a product of the human mind, 
but claim in addition, that the introspective reports of normal 
individuals as to their direct experience of an objective God, 
an actual correlate to their fabrication or projected ideal 
a real Being, must be accepted by empirical psychology just as 
unhesitatingly as the consistent introspections of normal 
subjects on any other experience. Normal mystics do report an 
experienced "impinging" upon their consciousness; and behind 
the impinging there must exist an Impinger. (2). It seems to 
us that the data of this normal human experience make necessary 
the belief in an actual, existing, objective correlate to the 
unrealized value which constitutes the goal of man's striving - 
his ideal. man's fabricated god demands as its archetype and 
correlate, an actual God, who is the Impinger. 
These data of normal human experience are what Otto calls 
the "numinous feeling ". Man has immediate consciousness of 
(1).Baldwin; "A Handbook of Psychology ", Vol. II, p. 201. 
(2). See James; "Varieties of Religious Experience ". 
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God just as he has immediate consciousness of himself: the 
one experience is as invincible against disproof as the other. 
The testimonies of many subjects who can not be classed as 
abnormal or neurotic in their reactions, are to the effect that 
the immediate experience of God is real to them. These intro- 
spective accounts of experience, given by dependable subjects 
whose actions in other directions are unhesitatingly accepted 
as normal, must be accepted as being as dependable as the in- 
trospective accounts of any other class of experiences of 
subjects who agree in their reports. If these normal concurring 
religious introspections of numerous individuals are rejected, 
all normal introspections must suffer the same fate. 
If, on the other hand, these normal conscious experiences 
are admitted to be legitimate, as we think they must be, there 
must be for them an object of reference, for "the fundamental 
characteristic of a conscious experience is its reference 
to an object, whether or no it is itself the object of a fur- 
ther act of reflection ". (l). James speaks of this conscious- 
ness as a consciousness of " 'something there`, more deep and 
more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' 
by which the current psychology supposes existent realities 
to be originally revealed ". (2). It is a "sense of reality, a 
feeling of objective presence ". 
Hocking describes this experience as "an experience of 
(1). Laird; "Problems of the Self ", p. 33. 
(2) James; "Varieties of religious Experience ", p. 58. 
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not being alone in knowing the world ". This immediate appreci- 
ation of the presence of this other Knower rests, not upon a 
specific religious instinct, but it does imply that man's 
mind is furnished with a potentiality to receive an idea of 
that Other Mind. "We are able to read our signs as we do, be- 
cause we already expect them to mean something ". But we have 
no organ differentiated for knowing other minds directly any 
more than we have for knowing our own minds directly. There 
is no perceptual inlet for man's knowing himself, and yet self - 
knowledge is an admitted phenomenon; likewise, the phenomenon 
of knowing Other Mind must be admitted. "If the subject- object 
relation were the true ideal and explanation of knowledge, 
we could not know ourselves any more than others. ?or we have 
no physical knowledge of our own mind ". (1). Spiritual things 
are spiritually discerned: there is necessary in the sphere 
of morals and religion - the sphere of values - this, an 
ultimate element of intuition. 
Conscious normal human experience presupposes the actual 
existence of the object experienced. "In finding God to be a 
necessary object of experience, have we not, in a way sufficient 
and decisive, proved his existence?" There can be no normal, 
continuous, consciousness of a non -entity. 
S.S. Laurie speaks as follows regarding man's direct 
apprehension of God: "I both feel and know absolute -infinite, 
universal- Being, prius, ground, and potentiality of all that 
(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience ", pp. 
236, 250, 252. 
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exists, more closely and intimately than i know that leaf 
outside there. The 'thing in itself' is nothing save this 
very Being determined -so through the dialectic of Being in 
its movement of finite determination. - -- the true infinite 
is Being as non -finite ground of the finite - the not as yet 
finitised, the determining not -determined, the conditioning 
not- conditioned, the potential not -yet ". (1). 
VIII. Religion is .Not Pathological. 
1. Emotional reaction of man to the totality of existence 
is normal, and necessary. 
We have been calling this numinous feeling normal, that 
is, saying that introspections reporting it are the introspec- 
tions of persons who can not, from their other reactions, be 
called abnormal or neurotic. llie would now further maintain 
that the emotional reaction to totality is as normal, and as 
necessary, for the living, self- conscious organism, as any 
other reaction, and this emotional reaction is not, in fact, 
isolable from the intellectual and conative. Given a normal, 
live human being, and, as a total environment for him, life 
as a whole, or the totality of existence, or the living uni- 
verse, then that human being, by his very nature as a normal 
self- conscious being, is necessitated to react to it in some 
way or other: in a broad sense, this reaction, including its 
inherent emotional element, is the religious attitude. 
(1). Laurie; "Metaphysica ", pp. 160, 162. 
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This response to totality, with the involved affective 
aspect, can not be considered to be the response only of a 
diseased mind, or a sign of infantile regression. This re- 
ligious experience is normal, not neurotic: it arises, not 
from abnormal mental conditions, but so far as the individual 
is facing the totality and the innermost mystery of existence. 
This attitude, not merely to personal and social ends, but 
to human life as a whole and its final meaning gives com- 
pleteness to human character. (1). 
2. The result of a Religious Attitude upon a neurotic 
individual is curative. 
Agreeing with Streeter and Brown, we would further claim 
normality for this religious attitude because the result 
upon a neurotic individual, of his accepting his highest 
moral conceptualization, his highest conceivable ideal, as 
the centre of his life, is curative rather than the reverse. 
That is, conversion is, for psychology, integration of previous- 
ly unharmonious elements in the personality - a return to 
health rather than a sign of disease. And the religious ideal, 
by way of its integrative function, acts as such a means of 
conversion for the distracted mind. It is a real cure, and not 
a fantastic hallucinatory experience which only satisfies the 
individual but does not cure him. Brown, after his wide ex- 
perience in psychotherapy, and after submitting to a psycho- 
(1), Sorley; "The Moral Life ", p. 24. 
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analysis himself, writes: "I have become more convinced than 
ever that religion is the most important thing in life, and 
that it is essential to mental health ". (1). 
He further points out that the mystical experience, being 
"an experience of apparently direct union with the Divine ", 
is, as a communion, "ingeneral, a healthy form of experience ". 
It is isolation from environment, and not communion, that is 
abnormal. 
3. The Religious Attitude and Teurosis are not Identifiable. 
Finally, the idea of God can not be considered as a cre- 
ation of a neurotic mind, for the religious attitude and neu- 
rosis are not identifiable. Some geniuses, not intensely re- 
ligious, are neurotic; and some very religious persons are 
not neurotic. Furthermore, as Streeter has pointed out, there 
is no proportionate variation between the intensity of the 
religious experience and the extent of the neurosis: if there 
were, "atheism would be a sign of a complete cure of neurosis ". 
Nor is an increase in religiousness signalized by increase 
in mental disorder. We must conclude that the religious atti- 
tude can not be identified with neurosis. 
We thus maintain that the numinous feeling is a normal, 
not neurotic experience. Religion is not a pathological neu- 
rosis. It is normal for man to react toward totality as he 
conceives it, and such reaction, so far from being a sign of 
(1). Brown; "Lund and Personality ", pp. 268, 281 - 283. 
279. 
mental disease, is really both a sign of health, and also is 
itself curative of mental disease. 
IX. An Objective Correlate to Idan's Projected Ideal Exists. 
1. A mere fiction would not continue as an object of belief. 
We would now maintain that the object of reference for 
man's normal, conscious, numinous experience, must be more 
than the mere idea of God, that is, the object of reference 
must lie behind that idea: it must BE God. We have previously 
found that God is a "necessary object of experience ", and not 
a mere mental creation of man. Furthermore, such a "mere cre- 
ation of the mind of man" could not be to man a continuing 
evoker of a religious attitude. The religious reaction of man 
would not continue, in such a case, to be a universal phenom- 
enon, for "if the world of man's moral and religious life 
is the mere projection of the emotional imagination, it is a 
world in which that life can not continue to live ". (l1. Ilan 
can not live on exploded fictions: "the insight that his 
deepest life is but 'the baseless fabric of a vision' must 
bring with it, sooner or later, the downfall of the life thus 
undermined". If there were not objectivity to match the pro- 
jection of man's idealizations, man would lose the power and 
desire to project those ideals, ideals behind which his trust- 
ed realities continually turn out to be mere fancies. Even if, 
in the absence of a god, man as we know him now must fabricate 
(1). Seth; "Ethical Principles ", pp. 406, 407. 
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a fictional one, still such an unreal fabrication could not 
continue to be an object of reference for the religious ex- 
perience of continuously, normally, religious man. The sur- 
vival of a religious attitude toward an ideal imagined as a 
personal entity, supposes the actual existence of such an 
ideal as imagined. Men continue to report that they are dis- 
covering, as others before them have done, Leaning in the u- 
niverse - have experienced immediately an objective, personal 
correlate to their ideal. This experiencing of Reality, or 
this worship of God, has such an enduring hold on men, that 
we have here "a remarkable perversity, if, somehow, the hope 
of knowing God is continuously being unrealised and frustra- 
ted". (1). And a God who is being known, must exist. 
2. ivecessity of Being belongs to Perfection of Being. 
Thus far, in speaking of a real God -experience, as in- 
trospectively reported by normal men, we have not left the 
field of introspectionist psychology. We believe that these 
data of psychology, the reports of introspection, warrant the 
positing of an objective correlate to man's projected moral 
ideal. .Now, if we dare, we should like to transgress the lim- 
its of a strict empirical psychology long enough to say that 
it further seems necessary that an objective correlate to 
man's projected ideal actually exists, because this ideal, 
man's highest conceivable perfection, must, from the nature 
(l). Hocking; "The Leaning of God in human Experience ", p. 152. 
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of the case, have existence as its attribute. In his ideal, 
which is a concept as we have see, constituted of apotheo- 
sized character traits, man possesses an idea of a Being as 
perfect as he can conceive. 2or him, therefore, this conceived 
Being is absolutely perfect, as distinguished from any con- 
ceived being of a less degree of perfection. But he can con- 
ceive of a Being of the greatest conceivable degree of perfec- 
tion as existent - as he actually does do - so existence 
must of necessity be an attribute of that conceived Being. For 
if he conceives of such an ideal, but claims to disbelieve 
in its existence, he still conceives of a being to whom he 
can not conceive a superior. Only he affirms that this being 
does not exist. But he is here self- contradictory, for the 
being which he conceives as the most perfect whom he can con- 
ceive, is thus found to be inferior to some other being, who, 
in addition to all his other perfections, possesses also the 
attribute of existence. Necessity of being therefore belongs 
to perfection of being. it seems to us that this line of 
reasoning holds good, whether or not "existence" is considered 
merely as another attribute among attributes. 
Anslem first stated this course of reasoning, and it has 
probably never been better stated. (1 /. Augustine tersely 
says: "God is more truly thought than he is described; and 
exists more truly than he is thought ". 
Tie have noted several converging lines of thought: phil- 
See Anselm; "Prosologion ", II. 
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osophical need, and psychological experience, and moral con- 
sciousness, all testify to the existence of an objective 
correlate to man's ideal. if either of these by itself be con- 
sidered inconclusive, together they seem to be complete: "if 
the God revealed by religious experience is found to be, in 
fact, the God required by the moral consciousness, and the God 
required to explain the world a 2 we find it, and the God re- 
vealed in historical Christianity, then the probability that 
each of these largely independent lines of approach to God 
is based on error, becomes small ". (1}. ',;e have mentioned 
the psychological religious experience, and the moral con- 
sciousness, and the philosophical need; presently we shall 
deal with the last of these lines of thought mentioned by 
Thouless, namely, the hypothesis offered in the Christian 
religion. (2 ). 
in our treatment of the problem of the objective corre- 
late to man's ideal, we have thus far held to the following 
tenets: 
1. The survival in man of the religious attitude demands an 
object of reference for that attitude. 
2. The idea of God is not a mere projection of a diseased 
mind, but rather, the projection is a normal process. 
3. The highest perfection conceivable by man must have existence 
as an attribute. 
(1 }. Thouless; "An Introduction to the rsychology of Religion ", 
p. 282. 
(2 ). See Chap. XV. 
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4. The reported God- experiences of normal dependable subjects 
must be accepted as unquestioningly as any other introspective 
data. 
5. God- experiences of normal men presuppose a God experienced. 
3. Lan' s consciousness of his imperfection implies a 
rerfect. 
Let us consider another point. Self- consciousness, as 
we have seen, arises only in the social experience. Lan be- 
comes conscious of himself only in the society of others. Self - 
consciousness involves other -consciousness. it also involves 
a consciousness of the dependence of self and others , that is, 
a realization of the finiteness of Self and others. A self - 
conscious man knows himself to be not independent. But he can 
know himself to be finite only because there is an Infinite. 
Man knows his finiteness, not in comparison with other fi- 
nites, but in comparison with an Infinite. Man's self- conscious- 
ness involves a consciousness of his finiteness both in knowl- 
edge and in goodness: he knows his moral ideal is unattained, 
and he feels that an actual moral ideal must exist, because 
he knows himself to be only an approximation to it. In saying, 
"I am not perfect ", he distinguishes himself from an entity 
which is perfect, just as when he says, "I ", he distinguishes 
himself from "other ". Consciousness of Self as finite implies 
the existence of a Self which is Infinite. (1). 
(1). See Descartes, p. 36, of this Essay. 
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4. Creative Energy becomes Differentiated into Instincts. 
The final point we desire to make in connection with the 
question of the existence of an actual correlate to man's 
projected ideal, is the hypothesis that a Creative Energy ex- 
ists behind the functioning of the various instincts of man, 
and becomes differentiated in the urges of the specific in- 
stincts: there is a "general 'go' of the personality" which is 
"oriented in various directions ". (1). 
In the first place, it is to be noted that the whole man, 
as a living organism, is impelled to move toward a complete- 
ness which he considers satisfying. This completeness or ful- 
ness of life is the goal of life, the "most compelling motive 
of life ". (2). (3). This law of completeness operates at all 
levels: the "goal" of the reflex might even be said to be the 
completion of the reflex act; the goal of the instinct is 
its functioning to the point of complete fulfilment; the goal 
of every higher organized system within the personality is the 
completeness of that system, which is to be attained only 
through its unhindered activity; so also the goal of the in- 
dividual man is completeness of life, and, like every organ- 
ism, he moves or strives toward his completeness. There is 
manifested a need of the whole man, when, on a higher level, 
With the rise within him of the conception of spirituality, 
(1). Gordon; "Personality ", p. 134. 
(2). Hadfield; "Psychology and Morals ", p. 8. 
(3). See Tansley; "The New Psychology ", p. 157. 
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he feels that he "must enter into relations with the univer- 
sal spirit ". (1). 
In order to arrive at some conclusion about the nature 
of this fundamentum "need ", "drive ", or "urge ", we shall con- 
sider several concepts, all of which point to our thesis re- 
garding the existence of a Creative Energy behind instincts 
and functioning through them. 
a. "Life Impulse ". 
The first of these concepts is Drever's "life impulse ", 
which we have already noted. In describing this life impulse, 
Dreyer uses the following words: "A very strong case - -- can 
be made for the view, that our whole experience is determined 
by an activity which is also experienced, but which does not 
arise from experience. For the origin of this activity, we 
must look, as it were, behind experience, - -- our hypothesis 
is, that this activity, which we experience, but which also 
determines experience, is the 'life impulse' become conscious 
in us ". (2). 
b. A second concept to be noted is what Dreyer calls 
"instinct interest ". He says: "'.le ought to be able to get a 
clearer notion of the interest factor involved in instinct - 
experience. Interest is the universal characteristic of be- 
haviour- experience. it is also the primary meaning of the 
situation, in that it is the immediate consciousness of a re- 
(1). Hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution ", p. 87. 
(2). Dreyer; "Instinct in Lan", p. 84. 
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lation between self and presented situation, a relation that 
is primarily felt. The only aspect in which instinct interest 
differs from interest in general, is that it is not determined 
by or derived from previous experience of the situation, or 
due to needs which have arisen as a result of experience, but 
is due to original needs - - -". (11. 
c. "Feeling of worthwhileness ". 
One phase of this interest, the author describes by using 
the term, "a feeling of worthwhileness ". The instinct interest, 
or this feeling of worthwhileness, is, on its first appearance, 
affective. (2). It is fundamental in the "primary tissue" of 
meaning. It is the basis of emotion, in that, "emotion is due 
to the temporary suspending of, or disturbance of, the normal 
transition from worthwhileness to satisfyingness ". The point 
to which we here call attention is not to a theory of emotion, 
which we have discussed previously, (3),but to the fact that 
we have here an affective ultimate, which is one stage prece- 
dent to emotion itself, and furnishes an affective basis for 
meaning and the conscious evaluation of situations and objects. 
In McDougall's well -known definition of instinct, he speaks 
of the tendency of the instinct's stimulus to attract the 
attention of the possessor of the instinct. From the side of 
the conscious reacting organism, this capacity to appreciate 
(1). Dreyer; "Instinct in Lan ", p. 141. 
(2). Dreyer; Op.Cit., pp. 130, 142, 143. 
(3). This Essay, p. 153. 
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the instinct's efficient evoker, is very similar to _:r.ever's 
"feeling of worthwhileness" on the part of the subject. It 
further seems that a development or differentiation of this 
affective ultimate which is descriptively termed "worthwhile - 
ness", is what McDougall calls "purpose ", the teleological 
element in instinct. James's hen (1) shows this instinctive 
appreciation of value and meaning of a situation, in consider- 
ing the nest full of eggs as most obviously something to be 
sat on. 
d. "Purpose ". 
The next concept to be noticed is "purpose ", a develop- 
ment of the innate appreciation of worthwhileness. The pur- 
posive, teleological factor does begin in a humble way as 
little more than a mere modification of mechanical process, 
in which there is but a slight trace of any purposive element, 
but its control is gradually extended "till it begins to 
occupy the position of a central organizing power" in the case 
of the higher conscious behaviour. 
The lowly beginnings of purpose are not in conflict with 
the modern physical tenet that matter itself is not, after 
all, such a hard and exclusive substance as was once thought, 
but is rather "ultimately explicable in terms of energy ", 
(2), (3), that is, for a mode of behaviour. 
(1). James; "Psychology ", Vol. II, p. 386. 
(2) So, Eddington, in (Afford lectures, 1927. 
(3). Simpson; "Man and the Attainment of Immortality ", pp. 9, 26'7. 
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e. "Root Interest ". 
We next note what hobhouse calls "root interest" - a gen- 
eral alertness, which is wider than any specific instinct. He 
says: "An important case among higher animals is that where the 
instinctive tendency, vague and general in itself, gets pre- 
cision from experience by the elimination of responses which 
do not satisfy the root -interest, and the encouragement of 
those that do. - -- Man has his innate impulses and tendencies 
- -- roughly correlated with the root- interests ". Even the animals 
seem to have a continuous feeling of anxiety and stress as 
long as danger appears to threaten. "It remains that this gen- 
eral alertness is something much wider and therefore closer 
to the root- interest, than any specific instinct ". (1). 
f. "Sense of Want ". 
McDougall speaks of a "sense of want" inhering in the 
living organism as such. we are justified in "assuming that 
the persistent striving towards its end which characterises 
mental process and distinguishes instinctive behaviour most 
clearly from mere reflex action, implies some such mode of 
experience as we call conative - -- which in animals is a mere 
impulse, or craving, or uneasy sense of want ". (2). 
g. "Hormé ". 
McDougall's hormic theory posits an energy, or hormé, which 
McDougall identifies with Jung's "libido ". It means all in- 
stinctive energy, all energy liberated from the instinctive 
(i). Hobhouse; "Social Development ", p. 138. 
(2). McDougall; "Social Psychology ", p. 29. 
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dispositions. "It is related to Bergson's 'élan vital' ". 
nc " means "force, attack, press, impetuosity, violence, 
urgency, zeal ". Hormé is the total instinctive energy which 
is capable of liberation through instinctive reaction. (1). 
h. "Religious Aspiration ". 
Hocking speaks of religion as "anticipated attainment", 
the "function of in- letting or osmosis, between the human spirit 
and the living tissue of the universe wherein it is eternally 
carried ". "Every instinct, in what it deeply drives toward, 
shows the trait of religious aspiration - -- creativity in some 
sort is what satisfies, and alone satisfies every instinct, and 
creativity is precisely what religion strikes out in them, in 
the process of holding them to their own unity ". Religious 
aspiration is this creativity. Thus, our human life, with its 
functional basis of instincts, is "only an apprenticeship in 
creativity ". This creativity is dependent for its finality upon 
"the independent ", of which my best creativity must win the 
consent "before it can take the status of truth, even in my 
own eyes ". "All finite creativity contemplates this other, which 
by implication is not a product of its will; it is this radical- 
ly independent reality which religion seeks to know and which 
alone it can worship ". Thus "God, who is truly said to explain 
man to himself, must explain me to myself. What I require to 
find in a god is that 'this is what I have wanted; this is 
(1). vicDougall; "An Outline of Abnormal Psychology ", p. 27. 
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what I have been meaning all the time. The world as I now see 
it is a world in which, as a primitive, various, infinitely 
discontented will, can completely live and breathe' ". (1). 
i. "Élan Vital ". 
We next note Bergson's concept of "elan vital ", which 
closely resembles McDougall's "horma ". Bergson says he sees 
"in the whole of evolution of life on our planet, a traversing 
of matter by the creative consciousness, an effort after free- 
dom, a force of ingenuity and of invention, something which 
remains imprisoned in the case of beasts, and which becomes 
loosed in a definite way only in man ". (2). Bergson's vitalism 
means that will is free; life is free, spontaneous, creative, 
and unpredictable; it is the expression of élan vital, which 
pushes forward in man against matter, matter being both its 
stimulus and obstacle. Living souls are the forces creating 
both themselves and their world.,Behind and above all these 
individual embodiments of élan vital is the original and origin- 
ating Whole, the ultimate vital impulse or God. Bergson's idea 
resembles the meaning in the ancient Latin hymn: 
"Deus rerum tenax vigor". 
j. "Libido ". 
Jung's "libido" is a relative unity whence issue the mul- 
tiplicity of instincts. It is "the divine in us ". It is psychic 
energy, a characteristic manifestation of life, capable of 
(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience ", pp. 
23, 25, 31, 153, 154, 451. 
(2) Bergson; "L'Energie spirituelle ", p. 19. 
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transformation from one form to another. "The whole art of 
life shrinks to the one problem of how the libido may be freed 
in the most harmless way possible ". (1). 
k. "Attitude to Appropriate an Unrealized Value ". 
Another concept contributory to our conclusion is what 
Irving King calls "the attitude to appropriate an unrealized 
value ". King thinks of religion as "a specialization out of 
a primitive and relatively undifferentiated consciousness ". 
"Religious consciousness is a form of reaction whose stimuli 
are some sort of an unrealised value which the reaction serves 
to appropriate ". (2). 
Corresponding closely to this concept of King's is that 
concept which Brown calls "a direct vision of the idea ", a 
concept involving, on man's part, an intuitive appreciation 
of values. Viewing this relationship between man and Reality 
from the upper side rather than from the under side, it may be 
said that "the normal human mechanism, physical and psycho- 
logical" is "a mechanism of revelation. - -- It is only through 
a view such as this that one can allow any place for truth, 
beauty, and goodness. They are not explained in terms of 
chance reactions to environment. These values are eternal be- 
cause they are out of time, although revealed in time. The pur- 
pose of life is to get in touch with them ". The contact is 
made by man by means of his "direct vision of the idea or the 
relationship between ideas. - -- I am inclined to think that 
T. Jung; "The Psychology of the Unconscious", pp. 150,227,233. 
King; "The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness ", 
pp. 4, 1. 
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here one has the soul, the ego, reacting in its essence ". (1). 
1. "Numinous Feeling ". 
Another concept to be noted is the "numinous feeling" of 
Otto. The numinous feeling "means the unique apprehension of 
a Something, whose character may at first seem to have little 
connection with our ordinary moral terms, but which later be- 
comes charged with the highest and deepest moral significance. 
Numinous means the specific, non -rational religious apprehen- 
sion of the religious object on all its levels, from its first 
dim stirrings when religion can hardly yet be said to exist, 
to the most exalted forms of spiritual experience ". "This men- 
tal state is perfectly sui generis; as is the case with every 
irreducible and elementary datum, it is not definable in the 
narrow sense, but is only capable of discussion. - -- Our 'X' 
is not, in the narrow sense, capable of being taught, but it 
can only be evoked, awakened ". (2). it precedes the "feeling 
of dependence" of Schleiermacher, which follows as a result 
of it. The object of the numinous feeling is a "mysterium 
tremendum ", a mystery to be feared, an unknown to evoke awe. 
The elements of "tremendum' are awefulness, over- poweringness, 
and energy or urgency. The numinous feeling is the experience 
of creature -hood - "Kreaturgefuehl ". 
m. "Acknowledged Activity ", "Mind ", or "God ". 
A final concept to note is iviorgan's "acknowledged activity", 
(1). Brown; "Mind and Personality"; pp. 132 -133, 296. 
(2). Otto; "Das Heilige ", Preface, also p. 7. 
293. 
or "Mind", or "God ". Morgan says: "It will be clear, I suppose, 
from my whole treatment of emergent evolution, that the opera- 
tion of Activity - the word 'operation' is here admissible - 
can no wise be restricted to any level in our pyramid - either 
to that of life, or of mind, or of reflective consciousness, 
or of deity. Acknowledged Activity is OMNIPRESENT THROUGHOUT 
if it be present at all. It will also, I suppose, be clear 
that the avenue of approach towards Activity in each one of 
us must be sought in some kind of immediate acquaintance with- 
in the current changes of one's own psychical system. All 
other avenues of approach must be indirect as the outcome of 
reference. Within us, if anywhere, we must feel the urge, or 
however it be named, which shall afford the basis upon which 
acknowledgment of Activity is founded. What then does it feel 
like? Each must answer for himself, fully realising that he 
may misinterpret the evidence. Without denying a felt push 
from the lower levels of one's being - a socalled driving 
force welling up from below - to me it feels like a drawing 
upwards through Activity existent at a higher level than that 
to which I have attained. Of course, I am quite ready to admit 
that those who do not have this feeling of being attracted by 
the Ideal, and who build an explanation thereon, may be mis- 
taken. Hence my reiterated speaking of acknowledgment. What 
I here acknowledge is a really existent Ideal, independent of 
my emergent ideals, and of the emergent quality of deity, in 
much the same sense as I acknowledge a physical world existent 
independently 
of my perceiving it. --- This Ideal within the 
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human person, but Transcendent of his human level of deity is 
God - completing the scheme of relatedness from above. But in 
and through Activity, universal from base to apex of the whole 
emergent pyramid, God is no less Immanent. Substantial to all 
the substantial gotogetherness which suffices for naturalistic 
treatment, is the planful Activity in and through which its 
stuff has being, and is held together ". (1). 
n. Summary. 
From these various concepts, let us collect what is sig- 
nificant, and draw a conclusion. 
Behind the impetus to activity which inheres in instincts, 
we hold that there is a life impulse, libido, hormé, or élan 
vital. This original vital impulse or energy is manifested 
through living organisms. It becomes conscious in man through 
a conative striving, and thus determines experience for man. 
It is the divine in man, which is, through man, tending toward 
self- revelation. This ultimate energy becomes differentiated 
into the urges of the respective instincts, being of course 
wider than any one of these instincts. It is the basis of a 
"root interest ", a general alertness. The various instincts 
may thus be considered as a mechanism of revelation for this 
primal life impulse. On the affective side, this revelation 
manifests a feeling of worthwhileness or instinct- interest, 
which develops into a teleological purposiveness for the in- 
dividual. Here in the feeling of worthwhileness inheres also 
(1). Morgan; "Emergent Evolution ", p. 208. 
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the basis for the intuitive appreciation of values, which is 
fundamental to art, morality, and religion. The immediate 
apprehension of the religious object is based upon this intu- 
itive appreciation of values. '?eligion aspiration has its 
roots in this affectively toned urge to creative activity, 
which alone satisfies instincts. 
An "Activity ", Mind, or a Pervading Power, according to 
our theory, functions behind and through the specific instincts, 
revealing itself in instinctive "urge ". This power is the 
Divine in man. God is immanent. Moreover, normal men report 
experiences of God which must be accepted as experiences of 
Reality. God, as the religious object, "offers that identity 
without which creative freedom itself would lack for us all 
meaning ". (1). He is the Something which is creatively active 
in an immanent way in self- conscious individuals. "God" is 
the ultimate creative element in the formation of ideals, for 
His is the Primal Creative Energy which becomes affectively 
differentiated into instinct -interest. 
X. The Energy of God is the Source, and God the Goal of 
Moral Striving. 
Instinct- interest, as we have noted, when disturbed, de- 
velops into emotion; emotions become organized into sentiments; 
and sentiments or selves become the constituents of personal- 
ity presided over in the case of mental health, by a worthy 




master sentiment, which becomes, when the person evaluates it 
as supreme, the goal of the individual. "The ultimate ethical 
force which the individual individuates, that is, turns into 
elements of his own personality, is God's ". (1). Thus we con- 
ceive the energy of God to be the source, and God to be the 
goal or ideal of moral human striving. 
We can now say with Brown that religion is the chief in- 
tegrating power for personality; that it is essential to men- 
tal health. When the Self evaluates sentiments, precedent to 
a choice of a master sentiment, there seems to be implied an 
"unknown quantity" beyond Self, a something to which Self feels 
impelled to refer as a standard, and to submit. Or viewed in 
another way, we may say that a sense of failure at attaining 
his ideal, or his sense of incompleteness, of imperfection, 
remains inherent in man and this sense of incompleteness im- 
plies a standard beyond. Accompanying this sense of imperfec- 
tion, is a "desire after the peace of unity ". (2). In the 
words of Hocking: "Worship, ideally speaking, is capable of 
fulfilling all the functions of the other means of re -inte- 
grating self- hood ". (3). Religion, if sincere, is the tri- 
umphant reconciliation of all inner contradictions. 
XI. The Religious Attitude in the Restricted Sense. 
We have intimated that the affective response to the to- 
(1). Jones; "1. Paith that Enquires ", p. 186. 
(2). Leuba; "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena ". 
(3). Hocking; Op.Cit., p. 536. 
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tality of things is the religious attitude. This is true, how- 
ever, only if religion is considered very broadly to include 
philosophy, art, and ethics. The intellectual attitude to the 
universe which functions through philosophy has its affective 
tone; and the aesthetic attitude manifests also an affective 
tone; and the moral attitude, as we have seen, is based chiefly 
upon the affective elements in man's nature. But the appreci- 
ation of the true, the beautiful, and the good, that is, phil- 
osophy, art, and morality, is unified and consummated in some- 
thing still higher, the real religious experience. In the 
unique religious experience - a sane, mystical, immediate con- 
sciousness of the Divine - all the needs of man are understood 
and satisfied; here is the possibility of attaining an inte- 
grated, a complete, personality, the possibility of "unify- 
ing in wish and will, as reason does in principle, the whole 
moral existence of man ". (1). 
III. Religion and JAorality are not Dissociable, and not 
Identifiable. 
Thus we neither dissociate religion from morality as 
Ribot does when he says, "In the beginning the religious feel- 
ing is not only stranger to morality, but even in conflict 
with it" (2); nor do we identify the two as Ames does when he 
claims that religious consciousness, moral consciousness, and 
social consciousness are interchangeable terms (3); or as Coe 
does in the words, "If it is asked wherein religious value 
(1). Hocking; Op.Cit., p. 578. 
(2). Ribot; "The Psychology of the Emotions ", p. 315. 
(3). Ames; "The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 168. 
1 
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is distinct from ethical value, the answer is that it is not 
distinct from ethical or any other value" (1); or as Hall does 
when he states that religion is the ethical experience trans- 
mitted and essentially inherited.(2). 
1. The ideal of morality need not actually exist; the Ideal 
for religion does. 
Rather, we agree with Bradley when he says that morality 
has an ideal which does not yet exist, but religion has as its 
ideal a realized embodiment, an actually existing object of 
reference (3); and with Taylor when he makes the same dis- 
tinction, "It is essential to the religious experience that 
its object should be accepted as the really existing embodi- 
ment of an ideal. - -- In the ethical experience, the ideal is 
apprehended as something which does not yet exist, but has to 
be brought into existence by human exertion" (4); and with 
Pratt, when he distinguishes religion and morality by saying 
that in all religions which are well developed, there is an 
attitude to a Controller of destiny, which is religion, and 
a system of teachings about the conduct of life, which is 
morality. (5). 
2. Religion and Morality are vitally connected. 
However, religion is vitally connected with morality. As 
(1). 
(2). 
Coe; "The Psychology of Religion ", p. 
Hall; "Educational Problems ", Vol. I, 
74. 
p. 207. 
(3). Bradley; "Essays on Truth and Reality ", p. 441. 
(4). Taylor; "Elements of Metaphysics ", p. 391. 
(5). Pratt; "Psychology of Religious Consciousness ". 
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the histories of races and individuals testify, the two ad- 
vance together, and deteriorate together. Their fate seems to 
be a common one, for when a race or individual possesses a 
vital religion, there is a correspondingly high morality man- 
ifested, and when religious belief grows cold, moral customs 
grow lax: "it is a fact of observation that morals and re- 
ligion advance together and deteriorate together in the history 
of the race as in that of the individual. - -- But in propor- 
tion as sympathy, the affective sentiments, altruism, and, on 
the whole, morality, develop, the idea of God is increased ". (1). 
3. Religion affects moral practices. 
Moreover, religious belief influences moral ideas and 
practices: "enormous is the influence which the belief in 
supernatural forces or beings or in a future state, has ex- 
ercised on the moral ideas of mankind ". (21. Conscience, also, 
is in most men combined with the religious sentiment. (3). 
4. Religion involves a felt personal relationship with 
an accepted god. 
The difference between religion and morality is, that in 
the former there is the unique characteristic of a sense of 
personal relationship with a god, which is not an element in 
the latter, Moral duties become religious rather than merely 
ethical, when viewed in the light of their relationship to a 
(1). Clavier; "L'Idee de Dieu chez l'Enfant ", p. 93. 
(2). Westermarck; "The Origin and Development of Ivibral Ideas ", 
Vol. II, p. 745. 
(3). Shand; "The Foundations of Character ", p. 57. 
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Universal Order and Orderer. Religion has its duties, as truly 
as does ethics, but in religion there is the additional el- 
ement of a felt personal relationship with a god, and this 
relationship colours the whole catalogue of duties both re- 
ligious and ethical. When the consciousness of the Divine Pur- 
pose in the universe fills a man's life, and when the ethical 
feeling takes on a "moment of resignation and reverence" (1) 
to that purpose, man is on the way to becoming religious. 
The element of personal relationship in religion is brought 
out in McDougall's analysis of the religious emotion. He 
makes this emotion to include wonder, negative self -feeling, 
fear, and tender emotion. Such emotions can only be those of 
a relationship existing between personalities - human and 
super -human. 
Bosanquet's Hegelianism leads him to say, regarding the 
relationship between morality and religion, that "where the 
religious consciousness emerges, and insofar as the religious 
attitude is maintained, the finite self is really absorbed; 
and then the opposition or struggle characteristic of morality 
ceases to exist as a recognised and fundamental opposition ". (2). 
But we can not accept as the correct statement of the rela- 
tionship between religion and morality the "absorption of 
the finite self ", "insofar as the religious attitude is main- 
tained". Religion may be considered as the ultimate perfec- 
(1). Hoeffding; "Outlines of Psychology ", p. 263. 
(2). Bosanquet; "The Psychology of the Moral Self ", p. 88. 
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tion and consummation of morality; but when this consummation 
is effected, neither are individual moral beings absorbed, 
nor do religion and morality lose their respective identities. 
5. Moral practices test religion. 
:Furthermore, if morality is perfectly consummated in re- 
ligion, religion is at the same time, being continuously tested 
by morality: "ethics becomes the test to which religion must 
be put ". (1). This is true not only of the religion of in- 
dividuals, but also of the religions under which various eth- 
ical systems and moral customs have arisen and exist. "By their 
fruits ye shall know them". 
6. Religion consummates morality. 
We therefore hold that religion is the vital consummation 
of man's moral progress, furnishing him with an actually ex- 
isting ideal toward which he can advance, and at the same time, 
in that ideal, offering him a unifier for moralizing his own 
personality - "an objective unity which may be the archetype 
and architect of the subjective unity towards which the moral 
character tends ". (2). 
7. Man desires an embodied ideal. 
An ideal which is to be for man a practicable guide in 
conduct, must "stand very close to us ". Man must bear the 
ideal within himself, as we have seen - the ideal must be i- 
dentified with the Self. Thus, the objectified ideal, whom we 
(1). hobhouse; "Morals in Evolution ", 'fol. II, p. 252. 
(2). Sorley; "The Moral Life ", p. 132. 
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have designated God, must also be identified with man, if He 
is to be of any value as a guide. "Hence men have been fascin- 
ated by a conception of God- incarnate, visible in the flesh, 
in all points tempted like as we are - -- what goodness in the 
end can effectively guide and inspire us but the goodness 
which we observe and recognise in those whom we must judge to 
be in all essentials such as we ourselves are ?" (1). 
(1). Hocking; "The Meaning of God in Human Experience ", p. 211. 
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Chapter XV. 
MORALITY AND THE CHRISTIAN HYPOTHESIS. 
There exists among the world religions, one which offers 
a unique hypothesis. It deals with the essence of that which 
man evaluates as being the ultimate, and does so in such a 
comprehensive way that it is not wholly out of place to 
show how it uniquely satisfies the various elements of the 
ethical thesis which this essay has tried to present. This 
is the Christian hypothesis. 
I. Completeness for Personality. 
Christianity holds, in the first place, to the possibil- 
ity of attaining a completeness of personality (TES. E L o s }, 
which involves the integration and stabilization of person- 
ality by the developing of man's innate potentiality for 
morality. The rounder of this religion says: 'it-a-Eo-6E o e r ur1/4ET5 
TEXEkCIL f.A.+S O -lr 7 1 vfC,,y Ó OvrnV LOS TEÀELOS E.v'TL v t? 
Matthew 5;48. 
H. Socialization. 
This hypothesis claims that the process of man's inte- 
gration includes the socialization of the personality, offer- 
ing as the means of the solution of any inner conflict which 
might arise between Self and Other, the latent innate element 
of sympathetic love. 'tüe have held that the sentiment of love, 
based upon the tender emotion of the parental instinct, is 
the central and most essential factor in harmonizing the im- 
pulses for self- satisfaction with those of regard for others. 
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Christianity speaks thus regarding the innateness of love: 
It /lc L.£ri S aya:1-TWiü-£Y OTl ox.uTOS rrpuTT ya7r,t)vrEV' ^N aS tt 
1 John 4;19. And Christianity goes to the extent of saying 
that after our love has been drawn out by his love for us, 
then the harmonizing of self -love with an active, beneficent 
altruism even toward an enemy, may confidently be expected. 
Not only is the golden rule enunciated: "gat KaOwS O E-T 
c/ c i. c 
11¡R TOtt7Q'lFl Vr t. V" o 0.Ve/LVTJoI -j'jol£lT, p.UTOIs óJdo. W s tt 
Luke 6; 31: but even if other men are actively hostile to us, 
this love evoked in us and operative can be made to include 
even these personal enemies: " Lyw dE a yc ?or aya-7ra r 
Toils x°r 5 v w Y tt. Matthew 5;44. Indeed, as 
Temple says, perhaps it is true that "love is never so com- 
pletely itself as when it enters on complete self- surrender 
to conquer the indifferent and hostile, and succeeds ". (1). 
III. Objective Correlate to Man's Ideal. 
Christianity further includes in its hypothesis the 
assumption that there exists a Personal Objective Reality 
whom it identifies with the projected ideal of the integrated 
personality. It offers the authoritative suggestion: "Ye shall 
be perfected therefore even as your Heavenly :Father is per- 
fected". 
IV. This Correlate Identified with Man. 
It claims, too, that with this personal Reality, man has 
been essentially united, through the incarnation of that Re- 
(1). Temple; "Mens Creatrix ", p. 285. 
ality. This alleged Incarnation boldly says: " y w 
ci 
o 71-0- T' 1 r E.Y E GyA £ Y ". John 10;30. 
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at. 
The Christian hypothesis thus offers to man, as his Ideal, 
realized, a Concrete, Historical Person, Jesus, who is re- 
ported to have said: " ó Zoom irws É1.,.£ éwfa o..<Ev Tov 
-Trams -sr a ". John 14;9. 
Whether this astounding claim is true or not, the Speaker 
can not well be accounted for by any evolutionary hypothesis: 
He is "inexplicable in scientific categories" (1). Neither 
an environment such as He inhabited, nor an ancestry such as 
He inherited, can explain Him. It is as though "all of pur- 
pose and perfection that was implicit and struggling to ex- 
pression, becomes once for all explicit" (2). His own explan- 
ation of His Being is, that He is God, the Ideal Element 
"eventuated in history ". 
V. The Ideal and Self are Identifiable. 
But more than this, the Christian hypothesis includes the 
claim that Self -identification with this Ideal is possible. 
A union with Him is said to effect, or to be, the complete 
realization of Self and the consummation of the integration 
of the personality so united. Such a union would mean an 
infinitely increased moral and spiritual potentiality, a 
"spiritually and morally tempered condition of prepotency ". 
He Himself says that a fuller life for men is the purpose of 
(1). Simpson; "Man and the Attainment of Immortality ", p. 306. 
(2). Simpson; Op.Cit., p. 314. 
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" É Ae His coming: y ov i.vo c.3-nY Excvo-'v ?rat 1TEpLToor 
FX G,, 0-4-V. ". John 10;10. And He claims that man may be one 
with Himself and God, to attain thereby this fuller life. 
C, f Cf ^, N / / , 7 . , \ î 
" l v a ira -v7 S E Y cv U' l V' Ka V G I S Cr V, WOtT r £. V Er- O I K a y c E. v n 
mot., iva K - o.vrol £V' D iv- wOI_v' " John 17.21. 
1. The highest Self can thus be Integrated, Saved. 
In the Christian hypothesis, this fuller life means the 
realization of the highest Self. The "soul" is held to be 
something which is to be saved, or won. " os yap Co-V e Ef )N71 -"V . i > i c > > 
EQUT'oV I,1VXY Q'GJG'a.l, oTTo As.Q-ul ú-r Y; OS Ó :Y 0,7T'O -- 
EV'al r v WVx -IY 0.1JT0 U EY£ /(EV EMOV' (ÇOa TOl! 
£ v aXY aA i o U' w CT Et a. v r ̀1 r ". Mark 8;35. The 
highest Self, as the present essay has noted, must be saved 
at the sacrifice of lower selves. If these lower selves are 
not sacrificed to the higher, and the welfare of the highest 
Self alone made predominant within the personality, there 
results the "loss" of that "personality- which -might -have- 
been ", because the core of that personality was not given 
the undivided opportunity to realize the potentiality with 
which it was laden. The Christian hypothesis claims a person- 
ality divided to be a personality lost. " oú 1s Sj va T-al 
Oval. Ur LOU 6'OUA£úEly - - - - ov' fUYo.O'BE eCw óoVALv£Uv 
K" t"o.lv, w Y ó, ". Matthew 6;24. 
2. Self and Other harmonized. 
All men, united with Deity through their union with the 
alleged Self- revealing Incarnation of Himself, are said to 
become one, and there results, the hypothesis claims, the solu- 
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tion of the conflict between Self and other. The selfish 
life is said to be suicidal, for if some lesser self is 
made supreme in the personality, the higher self, which in- 
cludes "other ", can not be realized,or saved, and the person- 
ality is unintegrated, that is, lost. 
VI. The Pragmatic Test. 
On the other hand, men of all races, times, and civiliza- 
tions, say they have discovered, in some kind of an intimate 
relation with the alleged Incarnation of ?Zeality, that they 
were freed from tormenting inner conflicts, and experienced 
anew mastery of themselves and the peace which results from 
such a solution of duality or multiplicity of personality. 
Such a subject, Paul, writes thus of his integrative exper- 
ience: "a- urn /Yoat yam rw vopfr -w Tov 96oîr cara -rov co-()) ave w - 
7rOr (3 A E7TCN (SE 1' Yap- OV" Ev TolS ,L.s.E%l£d^1.v /1ti0u vTlvTP0.TEV0- 
I r i 
C` 
/ y 
)V.EVOr fopA vooS 11,04J- /Mt_ at.CX 
/ 
µa%luTl /AE v VO 
c >i i N 
T1)5 w ¡TlOs OvT1 E To /AÁ£ o , c-r-wr.o5 EyCO a v - 
. 
-;% 
c i / . / / gu,7TOS . -rs p£ .va£-7-ac el< Tov awu-TOs -r'ov c1. eraTOv -ro uTOVo 
X°rls LS- . E ov s> crToar To a1P4-o/ 
c r. 
'VA C° V ". Romans 7;22-25. 
To summarize. 'Je maintain that morality is the social- 
ized behaviour of the integrated personality. Personality 
involves affective instinct- interests which ultimately become 
organized by way of emotions into sentiment systems, which 
systems, however, may represent conflicting selves. Only the 
sentiment of self- regard is powerful enough to effect an in- 
tegration of such possibly diverse interest- systems as, for 
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example, Self and other. But no system is essentially hostile 
to any other; even self -interest and other -interest are in- 
extricably united in an innate bi -polar urge. Society im- 
presses a socialization from without, and innate sympathetic 
love impells to socialization from within, so that as a re- 
sult the enthroned sentiment of self -regard may become a wor- 
thy sovereign among the various selves, and the personality 
become moralized. The process of integration of personality 
under the sovereignty of the sentiment of self- regard in- 
volves the formulation of ideals, one of which may be chosen 
by the Self to be the dominant motive of the personality. 
These ideals are conceptualizations of desirable experiences. 
The most perfect ideal conceivable by man is more than a 
mere projection of man's desires; it has as an actual corre- 
late, Deity. In order to be a practicable ideal, Deity must 
not only be more than an Idea, but He must also be like 
unto us. "The Christian system - -- essentially based on the 
law of love, preserved the self as an eternal soul whose sal- 
vation was the keystone of the arch of conduct ". (1). The 
Christian hypothesis claims that man's goal is attainable 
by way of his union with the historical, concrete Embodiment 
of the actual objective correlate to man's projected ideal, 
which embodiment is, therefore, for man's character, both 
archetype and architect, as man struggles toward integration 
and moralization of his personality. It further claims that 
hobhouse; "Social Development ", p. 242. 
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this union with the Incarnation, instead of effecting a loss 
of human personality, is rather the perfected integration, 




PREVIOUS EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES 
TO THE 
STUDY OF I1IORALI TY. 
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Chapter. XVI. 
Mark A. May and Hugh Hartshorne have given a large bib- 
liography on the subject of character tests for the years 
1920 to 1925. (1). The list of references numbers 196. Since 
that time, many more tests have been devised and used, so that 
an up -toy -date bibliography would greatly exceed that figure. 
We shall mention here only some representative tests which 
bear more closely upon our problem. 
Some of these tests were meant to measure, objectively, 
certain types of behaviour and certain personality traits, 
and others aimed at detecting the presence of certain traits 
without any attempt at measuring them. 
A. Objective Measurement of Traits and Types. 
The attempt has been made to detect deception by pneumo- 
graphic records, and by noting changes in blood -pressure after 
lying. And Eva R. Goldstein (2) gives as her results from de- 
tecting deception by measuring association times, that the 
time required to perform simple exercises in addition and 
subtraction was increased by the consciousness of deception. 
May and Hartshorne (3) have produced a procedure for 
building a scale for measuring dishonesty. The technique is 
that of duplicating papers. Test papers were duplicated by 
the examiner, and then returned to the pupils who correct or 
grade them. Opportunities of varying ease are given for dis- 
(1) "Personality and Character Tests" in "Psychological 
Bulletin ", Vol. XXIII, No.7. July, 1926. 
(2 ). In "American Journal of Psychology ",Vol.XXXIV,p.562. 1923. 
(3). "'First Steps Toward a Scale for Measuring Attitudes ". 
312. 
honestly changing the answers before they are graded. The 
changes made by the dishonest pupils are shown by comparing 
the graded papers with the duplicates of the originals. A 
scale is based upon the ease of cheating, and the number of 
pupils cheating. 
Franz ,leigl gives (11, as one of nine parts composing a 
test, a technique for catching a child in dishonesty. But 
there is no scale attempted for measuring the trait. 
B. Measurement of Affective Aspects. 
Many tests have been devised for measuring the affective 
aspects of personality: these include techniques for measur- 
ing instincts and emotions, mood and temperament, and attitudes 
and prejudices. A method of approaching the objective study 
of character recently revived into favour is by way of the 
analysis of personal interviews with subjects. Finally, the 
content of the child mind has been studied by means of draw- 
ing conclusions from a large number of replies to questionnaires. 
Instincts and Emotions: Relative Strength of Emotions. 
Emotions have been studied laboratorially to discover 
their relative strength, in several ways. Henry T. Moore 
approached the problem through the technique of association 
times to cue words.(2). He reports that a preliminary test 
was given, in which the subject responded to customary words 
with verb forms. This gave 5's normal verb reaction time. 
(Z%. "Untersuchungen ueber Gesinnungspsychologie und Moral - 
paedagogik im Schulalter'', in "Zeitschrift fuer Paedagogische 
Psychologie ". January, 1926, p.12. 
(2) "A ',ethod of Testing the Strength of Instincts" in 
"mmerican Journal of Psychology ", Vol.XXVII, p.227. 1916. 
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Then S was asked to respond with a verb to each of a series 
of words which were heavily laden with affect. These words 
were chosen to represent what Moore calls ten tendencies of 
great social importance ( instincts 1. The time of response, 
when compared with S's normal verb reaction time, measures 
the strength of the tendency to which the word in question 
belongs. 
W.E. Blatz measured the emotion of fear by noting 
emotional physiological manifestations. (l). The emotion was 
aroused by precipitating S backward unexpectedly while seat- 
ed in a chair. Cardiac and electrical changes were registered 
by an electro- cardiograph, which is a string galvanometer 
with a photographic device which records changes in the elect- 
romotive force ofS. For recording respiratory changes, an 
electrical pneumograph was used. Changes were registered on 
the moving film. Subjects were unsuspecting. Their normal 
records were first taken. Then records were taken when the 
subjects were sophisticated. The results were: involved in the 
emotion of fear there is an initial cardiac acceleration, 
followed by a retardation. There was respiratory retardation. 
The electro- motive force in S's body was increased. 
Floyd H. Allport (2), as a laboratorial technique for 
testing emotional strength, reports the use of free asso- 
(1). "The Cardiac, Respiratory, and Electrical Phenomena 
Involved in the Emotion of Fear ", in "Journal of Experimental 
Psychology ", Vol. VIII, p. 109. 1925. 
(2). "Social-Psychology", pp. 116, 134. 
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ciation. S is asked to respond to a spoken word with the first 
word that enters his mind. The presence of a complex or an 
attempt at inhibition results in an increase in the normal 
reaction time. In using this familiar technique, Jung dis- 
covers two broad types of response words: Objective, non - 
emotional; and Subjective, emotional. Thus there may be four 
types of emotionality: the objective; a complex type which 
reveals the presence of special "sore points "; the definition 
type which gives a definition to compensate for a felt ig- 
norance; and the predicate type, which is ego -centric, possess- 
ing strong personal evaluations. 
General Emotional Instability. 
General emotional instability has been tested by the 
measurement of the psycho -galvanic reflexes. Syz (11, at 
Johns Hopkins University, found that emotional reactions 
as measured in this way did not correlate with the intro- 
spective reports given by a group of mature medical students. 
0.1. Burt used this technique (2) as one of a series of 
tests of emotional instability. When taken along with other 
tests, all of which may then act as checks on each other, the 
psycho -galvanic method has been found to be of some service, 
but there may be some question whether or not it is emotion- 
ality that it really measures. 
Paper -Pencil Tests of Emotional Instability. 
Emotionality and emotional instability have also been 
(1). "Psycho- galvanic Studies on Sixty -four Medical Students ", 
in "British Journal of Psychology ", Vol. XVII, PartI. 
July, 1926. 
(2). "The Young Delinquent ". 
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studied by means of various paper -pencil tests. Dr.S.L. 
Pressey's Cross -Out Tests are well known. The experimenter 
asks the subject to cross out from separate word lists those 
words which denote things unpleasant to him, and about which 
he has worried, and which he considers wrong. By the number 
and quality of the words crossed out, E tries to determine 
the "emotional spread" and other aspects, such as the pres- 
ence of complexes. The fault of this test is, that the in- 
trovert may ignore those words which would be indicative 
of his emotional life; this omission would be a defence re- 
action against the invasion of complexes. In any such test, 
the good -will of S must be secured. Any reticent reserve, 
however, on his part, might be overcome by allowing him to 
omit any identifying data, such as his name. 
Emotional questionnaires have been extensively used to 
study emotional instability. G. Hymans and E. Wiersma (1) 
used a list of ninety questions which they sent to 3,000 
physicians, about families which the physicians knew intima- 
tely. The questions were framed with a view to classifying 
the character -types of the children of the families. 
Woodworth attempted, according to Allport,(2} to get an 
index of emotional instability by a list of questions to be 
answered "yes" or "no ". The questions given to S provide him 
with an inventory of complaints and difficulties. Each ques- 
tion answered is supposed to mean that S is peculiar in that 
(1). See Webb, "Character and Intelligence ". 
(2). Allport; "Social Psychology ", p. 127. 
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respect. Interest is shown in the number of particular items 
reported. The average person has an average number; while 
soldiers with nervous disorders, for example, are found to 
have a large number. The purpose is to find an index of the 
degree of S's mental wholesomeness. A fault of this approach 
is, that it is based upon self- estimation, and is therefore 
liable to distortion. 
Emotionality has also been studied by the personal rating 
of subjects by several judges. S is rated by several judges 
in regard to certain selected traits. There are two varieties 
of rating: first, scoring; a subjective scale, say ï to 5, 
is imagined, and this is used as a basis to express the de- 
gree of each trait which the judge thinks S has; second, the 
ranking method, in which the judge ranks the members of the 
group to be judged, and S's score is his rank in the group. 
There are several judges, and a low average deviation sig- 
nifies the highest reliability of the judges' decision. 
Rugg of Columbia criticizes, and justly we think, this method 
by claiming that is valid only when the ratings are made 
by at least three independent judges, trained in scaling 
so that they agree on method, and who are all acquainted with 
the subjects. 
George E. Mendenhall, of Iowa University, devised a set 
of self- rating tests. The character traits were arranged in 
horizontal lines; one extreme of each trait was at the left 
of the page, and gradually graded to the other extreme at 
the right of the page. S checked the word in the horizon- 
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tal series of words lying between the two extremes, which he 
thinks characterizes himself as to that particular trait. 
Hollingworth and Allport correctly criticize all such methods 
of self - rating as unreliable. 
Mood and Temperament. Laboratorial. 
Not only instincts and emotions, but also mood and temper- 
ament have been tested. 
M.P. Washburn and students have made studies along this 
line under laboratory conditions. Her report (1) is as fol- 
lows. The cylindrical electrodes of a galvanometer were tied 
to S's hands, and S was asked to think of pleasant, then un- 
pleasant, experiences. The readings as registered by the 
movement of the bright disk on the scale were recorded. The 
subjects had previously been asked to rate themselves as to 
whether they were naturally cheerful or depressed in temper- 
ament. The results showed that for the self- judged cheerful 
group, 40% registered more than 10 degrees, and 35% less than 
5 degrees. For the depressed group, 4% registered more than 
10 degrees, and 66% less than 5 degrees. 
H.T. Moore, in 1921, arrived at an interesting conclu- 
sion after an attempt at measuring aggressiveness. He did so 
by noting the number of times S moves his eyes away from a 
straight gaze into the experimenter's eyes, while E and S 
are in personal interview. Distractions are inserted during 
(1). "Studies from the rsychological Laboratory of Vassar 
College ", in "American Journal of Psychology", Vol. XXXVI, 
p. 454. 1925. 
(2), 
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the interview: a snake and electric shock were used; and this 
was all done while S was doing a sum of mental addition. The 
generalization which Moore makes is, "a stop watch and a pair 
of fixed eyes are the only indispensable laboratory equipment 
necessary for estimating roughly the degree of aggressiveness 
in at least four - fifths of the subjects ". 
Paper- pencil : Will- temperament Test. 
Temperament has been tested by a paper -pencil technique 
by June Downey with her "Will- temperament Tests ". These tests 
claim to measure temperament by measuring 1. speed, 2. force- 
fulness and decisiveness, 3. persistence and care, of reac- 
tions in hand -writing. These three variables seem to the 
author to reveal the amount of S's available energy. r'or each 
of these three variables, Downey devised four tests, 
offering such conditions as maximum speed, disguise of hand- 
writing, speed with eyes closed, counting by three's while 
viriting, trying to persuade S that he chose one of two en- 
velops when he really chose the other, blocking the pencil 
while S writes blind -folded, writing as slowly as possible, 
copying a model, and writing in a narrow space of paper. Each 
of the twelve tests is scored by ten's. The contention is, 
that S's volitional pattern or will- profile is revealed. The 
test takes one and one -half hours per subject to give. it 
does not prophesy S's reactions, but the general nature of 
those reactions may be predicted: whether they will be strong 
or weak, aggressive or submissive, and deliberate or impulsive. 
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Mark A. May gives the judgment that the greatest value of 
these W -T tests is not as a measure of character so much as 
research methods. (1). Allport expresses his doubt whether 
the sphere of temperament is really touched by these tests.(2). 
Attitudes and Prejudices. 
Not only have temperament and emotions been tested, but 
attitudes and specific prejudices have been experimentally 
approached. 
Goodwin B. Watson at Columbia used a word cross -out 
test, a degree of truth test, a moral judgment test, an argu- 
ments test, and a generalization test. All were standardized 
and a scoring method devised. he claims that a prejudice 
profile is possible, based on these tests. A typical question 
found in the "degree of truth test" is: "Poor men can not 
get justice in the courts today ". In each case, of which this 
is an example, S may check on a scale whether the statement is 
(2) so true that no one with a fair understanding of the sub- 
ject could sincerely and honestly believe it false. 
(1) probably true, or true in a large degree. 
(o) uncertain or doubtful. 
( -1) probably false, or false in a large degree. 
( -2) so false that no one with a fair understanding of the 
subject could sincerely and honestly believe it true. (3). 
(1). May; "The Present Status of the W.T. Tests ", in "Journal 
of Applied Psychology ", Vol. IX, ivo.l, March 1925. 
(2). Allport; "Social Psychology ", p. 132. 
(3). Watson; "The Measurement of Fairmindedness ". 
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Hall reports the results of testing children for lies. 
Duprat is reported as classifying lies into 1. affirmative, 
due to exaggeration; 2, negative, elaborate denials, dissimu- 
lation etc.; 3, sophistical lies. Liars are classified into 
1. Imaginative, who correspond to the affirmative type of 
lie - pride, boasting; 2. Negative, those who lie from fear, 
shame, or anti -sociality; 3. Pathological liars. Hall also 
reports the results of W. Stern, who used subjects 7 to 18 
years of age, and of M. Lobsien who used 469 boys and girls 
9 to 14 years of age. (1). 
Specific interests have also been tested, by means of 
such methods as cross -out tests, information tests, free asso- 
ciation, and by noting children's actions in museums. Under 
this classification might be listed vocational tests of vari- 
ous kinds. 
Social Ethical Ideas and Judgment have been studied by 
methods of ranking or rating of traits, ranking of persons, 
presenting to S imagined life situations, identifying by S 
of the moral element in a situation, and by having S state 
moral reasons for questions given. 
Under the method of ranking or rating of traits, might be 
mentioned Kohs, Fernald, Droege, ;'deigl, and Brotemarkle. The 
ethical discrimination test of Kohs has S evaluate punishments 
which S thinks should accompany certain offences. 
(1). Hall; "Educational Problems ", Vol. I, p. 365. 
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G.G.Fernald has S arrange a shuffled series of crimes of 
widely varied gravity, in the order of their magnitude, from 
the least to the most serious offence. The norm is obtained 
from a group of normal legal and professional men who are 
popularly considered to be morally established. A criticism 
of this test is, that even "normal" moral individuals may 
deviate from the norm, because of personal attitudes toward 
certain offences. 
Joseph Droege reports the following. he has S evaluate 
punishments which have been inflicted upon the scholars, 
a list of which has been furnished E by the scholars them- 
selves. Droege found sex and age differences in the judg- 
ments of punishments. (1). 
Weigl had S arrange a list of acts in the order of their 
goodness, and other acts in the order of their badness. 
Brotemarkle devised a comparison test. The "Basic Moral 
Principle" is represented by two extremes, good and bad. 
Words are to be arranged by S in their comparative relation 
between these two extremes. The score is the number of de- 
viations from the norm in each case. it was found that adults 
have fewer, about half, deviations than adolescents. This 
test is probably over -difficult for immature minds, and the 
results are rather meagre. 
H'.Webb used the method ranking by persons, to approach 
(l). Droege; "Die Strafe im Urteil der Schueler ", in "Zeit- 
schrift fuer Paedagogische Psychologie ", Vol. 27, p. 
393. September, 1926. 
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the study of Social -Ethical Ideas and Judf:ment. He collected 
ratings made by school and college students, and found a 
correlative tendency which he called a "general factor" of 
character. Its presence is shown by the variety of virtues 
and its absence by the variety of defects. Desirable traits 
were found to correlate positively; so too the undesirable 
traits; the desirable and undesirable correlated inversely. 
There was found a positive correlation between admirable 
qualities and intelligence. Allport says that Webb's concept 
of a general factor "is to be explained in terms of the highly 
integrated organization of allied drives. 'G' is really a 
genetic factor, and consists in the formation of many prepo- 
tent habit trends all developed in one direction by social 
approval and disapproval. The fact of intelligence merely 
increases the rapidity of fixation of those socially useful 
habits. Intelligence, being a capacity, is innate; whereas 
excellence of character, consisting essentially of habits, 
is acquired ". (1). (2). 
Allport gives seven main requirements for accurate rating 
of persons by judges in this ranking -of- persons method of 
studying social -ethical ideas and judgment: 1. Selection of 
traits that are genuine, fundamental, and distinct; 2. Suffic- 
ient number of raters, preferably who see the individuals 
(1). Webb; "Character and Intelligence ". 
(2). Allport; "Social Psychology ", p. 138. 
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from various view points; 3. A thorough knowledge and mutual 
agreement among the raters as to the exact meaning of the 
various traits; 4. A sufficiently extended acquaintance 
during which the rater has the traits in mind; 5. Basing the 
judgments on actual facts of behaviour, and not on general 
impressions; 6. Practice in the use of the scale; 7. Avoid- 
ance of the tendency to allow a good or bad opinion of the 
subject in one trait to bias one's judgment in regard to 
another trait. (11. 
An interesting contention has been made by Terman, based 
on the ranking -of- persons method. Ratings by teachers and by 
elders, in comparison with intelligence test scores, show 
that the mentally superior child is also usually superior 
in personal and moral traits. A high correlation of intelligence 
and character is to be expected under favourable environ- 
mental conditions which usually exist in the case of super- 
ior children. Terman refutes the notion that the intellectu- 
ally precocious child is one- sided. 
In tests where imagined situations are presented to S, 
these situations may partake of the nature of dilemmas, the 
foresight of consequences, or moral judgments. 
Dilemmas, based on moral knowledge, are the basis of 
tests contrived by Hartshorrie and nay, McGrath, Fernald, and 
Schwesinger. Hartshorne and _Jay describe the process of build- 
ing a set of moral knowledge tests. The first step is to de- 
(11. Allport; Op.Cit., p. 130. 
324. 
termine the field of knowledge to be covered by the proposed 
tests, and reducing to test form as much of this material 
as possible. The whole consisted of 1. word tests, (opposites, 
similarities, and word consequences); 2. sentence tests, 
(cause- effect, true -false as applied to duties, multiple 
choice test of comprehension, dilemma stories, foresights, 
recognitions of moral categories, true -false test of moral 
principles, application of knowledge of moral principles to 
dilemmas, and social -ethical vocabulary test); and 3. the 
good- manners test, (true -false applied to etiquette) . Moral 
knowledge tests seem to reflect codes, and there is consider- 
able over -lapping among these codes. The home was found to 
be the outstanding source of knowledge of right and wrong, 
friends coming second. Girls were found to be consistently 
higher than boys. The child was found to be influenced more 
by the group code than by the individual code. (1). 
L.C. McGrath, in a cumbersome and lengthy battery, in- 
cluded four moral knowledge tests. She included questions, 
cross -outs, similarities, differences, definitions, stories, 
moral situations, and pictures in her complete battery. The 
subjects were 4,000 children. This was an attempt to stand- 
ardize a test of moral knowledge, and to find at what age 
a child is alive to respective moral problems.(2). 
G.G.Fernald's battery includes dilemmas, definitions of 
moral terms, evaluation of punishments, and the selection of 
(1). Hartshorne and May; "Testing the Knowledge of Right and 
Wrong". 
(2). McGrath; "A Study of the Moral Development of Children ", 
"Psychological Monograph ", 32, fro. 144. 1923. 
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reasons against certain types of bad conduct. 
Schwesinger used a social- ethical vocabulary test which 
she reports reveals the fact that it requires, besides native 
mental capacity and school training, a certain home cultural 
training to develop a social -ethical vocabulary. There is, 
apparently, no relation between school placement of a child 
and his honesty. Language was found to grow progressively 
through the school grades, but honesty did not show the same 
tendency. (1). 
Closely allied to the dilemma method is the foresight - 
of- consequences method of testing. An example is the story - 
completion item of Weigl' s battery, which involved a fore- 
sight of consequences. 
L.W.Kline is reported as finding, after testing 2384 
children, that judgments of right and justice by children 
between the ages of 8 and 18 are more due to emotional than 
to mental processes, and more altruistic than selfish. Girls 
are more sympathetic than boys, and more easily prejudiced. (2). 
F.C. Sharp found that in judging morals, a rigouristic 
attitude tends to disappear with intellectual progress, 
which progress inclines us to look at situations as wholes. 
With the less educated, custom or uninherited manner of con- 
duct is more potent, the general consensus of the community 
is more obligatory, and the conscience of the majority is 
(1). Schwesinger; "The Social- Ethical Significance of Vocab- 
ulary". 
(2). Hall; "Educational Problems ", Vol. I, p. 236. 
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regarded as a safer guide than one's own. (1). 
M. Schaefer and G.A.Johnston have devised tests which 
ask S to state the moral reasons for certain questions. 
Schaefer received 1109 answers to the questions: "Warum 
ist das Stehlen verboten ?" and " Warum ist das Luegen ver- 
boten?". He gives as his results: "Children from 12 to 14 
often, on the one hand, reproduce memorized rules thought- 
lessly, and on the other, some reproduce them as they have 
been, by suggestion, instilled by the authority of the teach- 
er, and of the spiritual and catechetical -religious in- 
struction". The motives which Schaefer discovered he class- 
ifies as follows: 
I. Religiously coloured motives. 
1. Egoistic. (fear of hell, etc.) 
2. Fear before God's law. 
II. Non -religious motives. ( "worldly" or "political "). 
A. Attention to their own well- being. 
1. Pure bodily punishment. 
2. Personal punishment in ideal sense. (career, 
future, opinion of comrades). 
3. Conscience. (view of himself). 
B. Well -being of S's family. 
C. Social well -being - the state. 
As to the development of an altruistic attitude, Schaefer 
found: "Up to the end of the fourteenth year, my subjects 
(1). Hall; Op.Cit., Vol. I, pp. 238 -239. 
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are, toward their environment, generally egoistic - -- after 
the fourteenth year, they are socialistically altruists ". And 
the weak -minded were found to be consistently egoistic. (1. 
G.A. Johnston reports a test given to 329 second year 
male and female students at the Glasgow Training College. 
The subjects had had logic and one year of psychology, and 
were average in intelligence and education. They were first 
asked to give a snap judgment as to the morality of an im- 
provised case presented to them. Then they were asked to re- 
flect upon their first decision, and, if they desired, to 
change their first judgment. It was found that in giving the 
reasons as the bases of their judgments, "certain classes 
have unconsciously adopted an attitude to life which expresses 
itself in all their answers to problems ". Students gave 
reasons for their judgments, but very few of them made refer- 
ence to anything that could be called a moral principle. A 
good many seemed to be at the level of proverbial morality, 
and in support of their judgments they frequently quoted 
proverbs. If any principle was given at all, it was based on 
the "motive" idea, or, in a few cases, on conscience, in- 
stinct, love, vocation. Some implied a universal principle 
by saying that the case cited was all right, but an excep- 
tion. 85,'0 believed that reason is the basis of moral judg- 
ment. After the period of reflection, 16¡) of the judgments 
(1 ). Schaefer; "Elemente zur moral -psychologischen Beurteil- 
ung Jugendlicher ", in "Zeitschrift fuer Paedagogische 
Psychologie ", Vol. XIV, p. 47. 1913. 
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were changed - 4% right to wrong, and 12% wrong to right. 
Johnston concludes: "Moral judgment cannot be merely a matter 
of instinct, nor of immediate perception or intuition, for 
in that case such a large proportion of alteration after re- 
flection would be inconceivable ". "Snap judgments imply 
conventional standards, while reflection has shown these 
conventional standards to be inadequate ". (1). 
C. Analysis of Personal Interviews. 
Analysis of personal interviews is a favourite recent 
method of investigating character traits. Meltzer, using 
this method, withna little more control than in the 2reudian 
Free Association Test, reports as follows. E addresses S 
thus: "Tell me everything ( means to you ", and he care- 
fully and sympathetically draws out the S by putting ques- 
tions to him. In the fifth grade it was found that meanings 
begin to emerge in the child's mind. The list of concepts 
used was secured from popular magazine articles, using those 
found frequently. The responses were analyzed and tabulated; 
the number of correct ideas, number of wrong ideas, number 
of correct examples, number of wrong examples, number of re- 
sponses, number of words used to explain each concept. The 
scoring was based on numerical values assigned to various 
grades of answers. (2) . 
Gruehn reports that Kuelpe, a pupil of Wundt's, found 
(1). Johnston; "Experimental Investigation of the Psychology 
of Moral Judgment ", in "British Journal of Psychology ", 
Vol. XV. 1925. 
(2), Meltzer; "Children's Social Concepts ". 
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that "psychological description could be perfected through 
careful control of the experience to be observed, more exact 
observation, and a more precise record by the observer of 
the results of his observation ". Gruehn applied this method 
to a study of religious feeling. The subjects were given 
selected religious texts to read, or were put through asso- 
ciation experiments, and were required to describe their ex- 
periences. He reports the "discovery of a new class of ex- 
periences which have been called 'self -functions' or 'appro- 
priation- acts'. These functions or acts bring ideas into in- 
timate contact with the self, so that they become personal 
possessions of the self. They help to explain the phenomenon 
of transfer, identification, and empathy. They also determine 
the hierarchical ideas. appears that 
the genuine religious experience, ideas, discoursive think- 
ing, and processes of volition play a secondary role ". (1). 
David Katz at Rostock studied the emotional reactions 
in children as revealed in their talks with adults. He and 
his wife have recorded, word for word, over 300 chats which 
they held in the evening at bed -time with their two sons, 
aged 6 years 9 months, and 5 years 3 months, and have made 
a detailed analysis of all the psychological factors in- 
volved in the answers given by the children to definite ques- 
tions. Katz reports a definite awakening of conscience within 
the children as the talks progress from week to week. The 
chats are confessional in nature, and attention is given by 
(l). Gruehn: "Methods and Results of Recent Investigation of 
Religious Feeling ". 
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the parent -observers to the establishment of desirable mo- 
tives, will power, and self- criticism within the the subjects. 
(1). 
Carl Schneider also reports the results of a similar 
Kuelpe -Girgensohn method. He chose four widely different 
subjects: an evangelical theological student, a South African 
teacher, a student claiming no religion or morals, and a 
Jewish mathematics student. The following poem was read to 
each S: 
"Ieh bin ein Wandersmann, and keiner geht mit mir, 
Ich bitte Gott, dasz ich den ìeg zum Himmel nicht verlier". 
S was then asked to introspect carefully as to his mental 
content, as he thought back over the lines. Schneider re- 
ports his result: "The whole man always speaks in each reve- 
lation of his spirit; behind each manifestation, lies his 
psychic structure as a whole, and each of its workings -out 
gives us glimpses into the total psychic life ". Although 
there is a deep -lying something, the innate source of re- 
ligious attitudes, there are individual differences which 
graduate from one limit of religiousness to the other, and 
this innate something is not a "definite religious Apriori ". 
"Although the religious- psychic life is rooted deep in the 
constitution of man, there are still differences of structure 
which evoke a variegated colouring of the religious life; 
there is not however a sharp boundary between religious and 
(1). Katz; "Emotional Reactions of Children as Expressed in 
Their Talks with Adults ". 
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non -religious structures. - -- A definite religious apriori 
of a psychic kind is only an abstraction ". Further, a trans - 
psychic minimum was found to be the source of religious be- 
lief, and in this over -psychic factor, inheres the difference 
between religion and introverted ego -decision, and between 
prayer and mere feeling. "Each religious element grows out of 
a trans -psychic minimum, a factor which is psychologically 
no further analyzable in an objective way, or an over -psy- 
chic- spiritual factor. Only through this factor is it possible 
to distinguish clearly between religion and introversion, 
prayer and feeling ". The discoverable data for the psychology 
of religion are not the undifferentiated glory of the divine 
spirit, but the differentiated manifestations of it in in- 
dividual men; trans -psychic factor is broken up into mani- 
fold forms, as light by a spectrum; " to discover these 
thousand colours and thousand forms is the task of the psy- 
chology of religion ". (1). 
D. Content of Children's Minds. 
Of numerous tests intended to study the content of the 
child mind, three will suffice as examples. 
Hall reports an early Berlin investigation. Out of 
10,000 children, 7827 boys and 5067 girls had ideas of God. 
7279 boys and 7247 girls had a concept of the number 4, etc. 
As to the moral concepts, girls were more specific than boys, 
(1). Schneider; "Gibt es einen religioesen Menschen ?" 
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and also more conventional. (1). 
In Annaberg, Germany, in 1890, Dr.D. Hartmann gave as 
his results, that of 660 boys, 32 knew the inside of the Berg 
church, 69% could count to 10, etc. Of 652 girls, 72% knew the 
church -yard, 61% had ideas of God, 34% attended divine ser- 
vice, etc. 
In the "Paidologist ", Vol. II, 1900, it is reported 
that J. Olsen, in Varde, Denmark, tested 5600 in much the 
same way as was done at Annaberg. 
Tests of such a kind are of no value except to show the 
road by which the testing of children has travelled. 
In looking over these various tests, it is evident that 
few have studied the growth of moral ideas, as moral account - 
ability develops in the maturing child. lcGrath's battery 
does attempt to find at what age a child becomes alive to 
various moral problems, but no attempt is made to trace the 
evolving of a moral consciousness. Schwesinger submits evi- 
dence to stress Terman's claim that word -knowledge is an al- 
most sure single test of intelligence; and to show the de- 
pendence of a knowledge of right and wrong upon a grasp of 
the terminology in which moral concepts are stated - a find- 
ing which is significant for the procedure adopted in the 
present essay. But she does not trace any line of genetic 
development of moral ideas. Meltzer found that it is in the 
(1). Hall; "Aspectsof Child Life and Education ", pp. 1, ff. 
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fifth grade of school ( ages 10 to 12 ) that meanings begin 
to emerge in the child's mind along the line of social con- 
cepts, and further, he traced in the minds of children the 
development of some of these important social concepts; but 
he did not study the problem from the psychological so much 
as from the sociological view- point, and he accordingly did 
not deal with the psychological aspect of the functioning 
and constitution of the child's mind. Carl Schneider dealt 
with the problem of whether or not there is a religiousness 
naturally innate to man, but did not deal with any develop- 
ment of such a characteristic. There is a field for the study 
of the development of moral ideas in the child mind, con- 






Age -Years Months School 
Parents' Occupation What Church or 
Sunday School do you attend ? 
How many brothers and sisters have you ?... 
flow many older than you ? 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PUPIL. 
On the following pages there are some questions 
for you to answer. Say just what you think, for if 
you do, your answers will count more. Your answers 
will not be shown to anyone. 
Answer each question before you go on to the next 
one. 
Don't miss out any question. 
You need not hurry, but don't waste any time. 
I. Suppose you could be somebody else -anybody whom you 
know, or any character you have read about, or heard about 
1. Whom would you choose to be ? 
2. Read carefully the following words, and underline every 
word that names something you like about the person whom you have 
chosen - things in that person that made you choose him or her. 
Underline as many words as you wish, and in any column you 
like. 
athletic cautious aid cheerful 
beautiful good charitable chummy 
brave humble forgiving courteous 
brilliant modest generous friendly 
dashing obedient gentle honest 
famous peaceful helpful honoured 
firm pure humane loyal 
heroic respectful kind obliging 
influential retiring loving patriotic 
morally brave reverent merciful peculiar 
persevering steadfast self -sacrificing politician 
strong temperate sincere sociable 
wealthy unselfish sympathetic solitary 
3. Now draw a circle around the three words 
three things you like best in this person. 
4. Do not change any of your marks, but answer this question : 
If you did not choose why didn't you ? Here are several 
possible answers to this question. Mark with a cross the one that 
gives your reason. Mark several if you want to. 
(a) I didn't think of him. 
(b) I was ashamed. 
(c) I would, if I did it over. 
(d) I admire him less than the person I named. 
(e) He was too mild. 
(f) I would not want to suffer as much as he did. 
(g) I would not want people to hate me as they hated him. 
(h) I want to live longer than he did. 
(i) He was not manly enough. 
which tell the 
II. 1. Underline every word that tells something you think is 
wrong- something you would be blamed for. 
boasting praise cad foresight 
bullying reserve clubs indiscreet 
confident self - denial exclusiveness reckless 
daring shy friendly venturesome 
dashing tattling gangs wary 
dignity timid hermit worry 
meddlesome affectionate intolerance anger 
over- dressing devoted prejudice fighting 
self - possessed flirting queerness grudge 
self - respect generosity selfishness indignant 
talking back indulgence shrewd passive 
touchiness ingratitude unsociable rage 
backward neglect anxiety revenge 
day -dreaming passion cautious submissive 
flattery partiality coward supine 
listless stinginess falter temper 
meekness tender fear unfeeling 
patience thoughtful foolhardy wrath 
2. Look over all the words again, and pick out the four which 
you think are the worst what you would be most blamed for. 
Draw a circle around each of these four words. 
3. Read the words again, and mark with a cross the four which 
you think are the least bad. 
III. Here is a question for you to answër Below it there -are 
seven possible answers. Read the question and all the answers, 
and mark with a cross the answer which you think is best: 
Why should you try to be good ? 
1. If I am bad, and get caught, I am punished. 
2. When I am good, I feel better inside. 
3. If I am good, I shall get on better in the world. 
4. When I am good, it pleases God. 
5. When I am good, my friends respect me more. 
6. I should be good just because I know I ought to be. 
7. I should be good because Nature punishes those who break 
her laws. 
8. If you have any reason which you think is better. write it 
down here :- - 
IV. Write the best answer you can to this question : 
What do you think it means to be good ? 
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Chapter XVII. 
Report of the Results of the Present Experiment. 
The problem of our experimentation is the development 
of moral ideas during early adolescence. The results obtained 
from children between 9 and 11 years were so meagre, that the 
ages of our subjects are limited, for the purpose of draw- 
ing conclusions, to 12 years and upward. The results of the 
later years are included in the tables, with the knowledge 
and understanding that the dependability of conclusions and 
the number of subjects decrease proportionately. 
A copy of the test is herewith submitted. The time re- 
quired for giving the test ranges from 40 minutes in the case 
of the younger subjects to 25 minutes in the case of the 
older. 
Construction of the Test. 
Page one of the test asks personal questions of the sub- 
ject, and also gives instructions for marking the Questions 
which follow. 
Question 1,1 asks the subject for his choice of an ideal. 
Question 1,2 gives an opportunity to underline those charac- 
ter traits which the subject thinks his ideal embodies, and 
which he likes in that ideal. Question 1,3 asks the subject 
to encircle the three traits which he likes best in his ideal 
character. Question 1,4 asks why the subject did not choose 
the Christian Ideal, if he did not do so, giving a choice 
of 9 reasons. Question 1,2 gives four columns of thirteen 
words each from which the liked and preferred traits are to 
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be chosen. Each column is arranged alphabetically. Columns 
1 and 2 contain words relating to the sentiment of self -re- 
gard: some show obviously an over -self -assertiveness, such 
as "dashing "; some show an under- self -assertiveness, such as 
"retiring "; and others show a comparatively healthy balance 
in assertiveness, such as "firm ". Columns 3 and 4 contain 
words relating to sociality: some show an attitude of positive 
sociality, such as "self- sacrificing" and "aid "; others, an 
attitude of negative sociality, such as "peculiar" and "sol- 
itary"; and some show a healthy balance of the two, such as 
"sincere" and "courteous ". 
The columns contain synonyms of varying difficulty, 
such as "friendly" and "sociable ". Some of the words in col- 
umns 1 and 2 have synonyms in columns 3 and 4, for some 
traits of well- balanced self- regard involve a certain de- 
gree of healthy socialization. This is so because ultimately 
integration of personality involves socialization: thus, 
"unselfish" is listed as a self -regarding trait, and "kind" 
as a socialization trait; the former emphasizes the self - 
regarding aspect of the category, and the latter, the social- 
ization aspect. 
Questions II, 1, 2, and 3 ask the subject to mark words 
designating traits and actions which he considers wrong, 
worst, and least bad, respectively. Four columns of eighteen 
words each are supplied. Each successive group of twelve 
words is arranged alphabetically. The first twelve, "boasting" 
to "touchiness "; and the second twelve, "backward" to "timid "; 
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and the fifth twelve, "anxiety" to "worry ", are related to 
self -regard: the third twelve, "affectionate" to "thoughtful "; 
the fourth twelve, "cad" to "unsociable "; and the sixth 
twelve, "anger" to "wrath ", are related to sociality. Some 
of the words designate an unhealthy poverty of self -regard, 
such as "backward ", "anxiety "; or a poverty of sociality, 
such as "ingratitude ", "selfishness "; others designate a 
healthy condition in self- regard, such as "self- respect ", 
"foresight "; and some, a healthy condition in sociality, 
such as "generosity" and "thoughtful "; some designate an un- 
healthy self- assertiveness, such as "boasting" and "foolhardy "; 
and some designate an unhealthy social aggressiveness, such 
as "flirting" and "grudge ". The words designating desirable 
and undesirable degrees of self -assertiveness and social 
aggressiveness are arranged haphazard, for the basis of the 
word order is alphabetical. 
Question III tests the motives for morality. The subject, 
in answering the question "Why should you try to be good?", 
has a choice of seven answers from which he chooses the one 
he thinks best. He may also write in an original answer, if 
he likes. The motives included are fear of punishment, con- 
science, worldly success, religious, and social approval. 
Answers two and six relate to conscience, the first being the 
more naively and simply expressed. Answers one and seven re- 
late to punishment; the first, to immediate retribution, the 
second to "natural causes ". 
Question IV asks the subject to give what he thinks is 
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the content of "the good ". No leads are furnished him, ex- 
cept those he discovers in the preceding questions of the test. 
Method of Giving the Test. 
In three of the five schools tested, the writer gave 
the test in person. In the case of the American school, the 
instructions were written to the principal, who instructed the 
various teachers in the required technique, and they tested 
their respective groups. In one Scottish school, the writer 
gave the technique to the various masters, who in turn tested 
their respective groups. The Scottish schools tested were 
the Flora Stevenson, Parson's Green, James Clarke, and James 
Gillespie's, all in Edinburgh. The American subjects were pu- 
pils in the Central Junior High School, Springfield,Ohio. 
These schools are henceforth designated by letters in this 
essay. 
Before the tests were distributed, the examiner said to 
the children: "I am going to give each one of you a paper 
with some questions for you to answer. Do not read the ques- 
tions until every pupil has his paper: we shall read them 
together ". The tests were then distributed, and the examiner 
continued: "On page one, the first line, write your name. If 
you do not care to do that, just say whether you are a boy or 
a girl. On the next line, write your age: thus, if you were 
thirteen years old in December, your age now, (in May would 
be 13 years 5 months. Then write in the name of this school, 
and what your father does to earn a living. If he is dead, 
perhaps your mother works, e.g. takes in lodgers; if so, write 
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that in. If both parents are dead, omit the question. Then 
write what church or Sunday School you attend. text, how 
many brothers and sisters have you? Do not count yourself, 
for you are not your own brother or sister. Then tell me how 
many are older than you. Now we shall read together the in- 
structions. ( This is done ). Now turn over to the next page, 
where the questions begin. Question 1,1. You may choose any- 
body at all - a character in a book, someone who lived a 
thousand years ago, or someone who is living now, or someone 
y;ho never lived. In question I,2, if there are any words you 
do not understand, just omit them. In question 1,3, you will 
have three circles, one circle around each of three words. 
These words may be in any column you like. Now look at ques- 
tion I,4. 'Do not change any of your marks, but answer this 
question: If you did not choose ( ) why didn't you ?'. I 
have erased a name here, so you can not answer this question 
until I give you that name. I shall give it to you when you 
have finished all the other questions. Just omit this question 
until you have finished all the other questions; then raise 
your hand, and I'll tell you what word to write in. Save 
Questionf,4 until the last. (The name to be inserted is Jesus). 
Question 11,1. here are four columns of words. Underline 
every word that names something you think is wrong. Underline 
as many or as few words as you like, and in any column. Ques- 
tion 11,2. Now read again all the words of Question 11,1, 
and pick out the four which you think are worst, and draw a 
circle around each of these four. words. You will have circles, 
one around each word. You may choose your words from any of 
340. 
the columns that you like, or from only one if you think the 
four worst are all in one column. Question 11,3: mark with a 
cross each of the four words you think are the least bad. Do 
not mark any word here that you have marked before either 
with a line underneath or a circle. Now ,question III on the 
next page. read all the answers to the question, and choose 
the one you think is best. Choose only one. i:-iark it with a 
cross. If you have a better answer of your own, write it in. 
!Question IV: "ahat do you think it means to be good ? ". Don't 
look at your neighbour's paper - say what you yourself think. 
I'll stay in the room, and if you have any question to ask, 
raise your hand, and I'll come right to you. If there are any 
words you do not understand, just omit them, don't ask me 
their meanings. Before you begin, now, are there any ques- 
tions? If not, carry on. Do your best, for I want to compare 
your answers with the answers given by pupils in (the other 
Scottish schools) and with those given by some American 
children ". 
The Children Tested. 
The four Scottish schools are all of practically the 
same standing: the parents are mostly skilled labourers and 
shop- keepers; a few are professional folk. The churches 
attended are, with exceptions so few as to be negligible, 
Christian Protestant. The families are of average size, the 
number of children ranging from one to five, with.a very few 
larger. 
The American school enrolls pupils slightly older than 
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the four Scottish schools. The "Junior High School" repre- 
sents approximately the eighth to tenth years of school life. 
The ages of the school tested range from thirteen to seven- 
teen years. Negroes number about 24% of the children tested. 
These results from the coloured children were not isolated, 
for such a procedure would have created a selected group. 
The American parents pursue occupations comparable to those 
of the Scottish parents. The churches attended show a much 
larger variety than those attended by the Scottish children: 
there are represented sixteen branches of Christianity. A 
larger percentage 'of Americans than of Scottish subjects 
report no church attendance. The families of the American 
children are larger than those of the Scottish, the number of 
children frequently rising to seven and eight. 
The total number of children tested is 1656, distributed 
by age, sex, and nationality as follows.(1). 
The Grading of the Tests and the Tabulation of Results. 
The answer given to each question by each boy and each 
girl was recorded by tally. The records of the five schools 
were isolated, in order to show any differences which a differ- 
ence in school might have caused: it was found, however, that 
the results from the five schools paralleled each other. The 
records of the two sexes, and of the various ages, by half - 
years, were likewise isolated. In the records of Question I, 1, 
for. the American results, the heading "American History" was 
substituted for the heading "Scottish history ". 
Typical preliminary tally- records are the following: 
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The preliminary tallies for the whole test, of which the 
two pages immediately preceding ( 342, 343 1 are samples, are 
herewith submitted as "Exhibit A ". 
These tallies for all the questions of the test were then 
transferred, in figures, to a single scroll, which is here- 
with submitted as "Exhibit B ". The various schools, the two 
sexes, the various ages by half -years, were still isolated 
in this scroll- record. Into this scroll- record there were 
then inserted at the various ages, sexes, and nationalities, 
the respective percentages of these ages, sexes, and nation- 
alities. The American percentages were inserted at their 
proper places in pencil instead of ink. A sample section of 
this scroll- record follows, page 345. Thus, for age eleven: 
2 boys from school "A ", and 9 from school "B ", and none from 
the other schools, that is, 33% of the Scottish boys liked 
"athletic" as a trait in their ideal: 6 girls from school 
"C ", and none from the other schools, or 16% of the eleven 
year old Scottish girls liked "athletic "; 2 boys from school 
"0 ", and none from the other schools, or 5% of the Scottish 
boys of eleven preferred "athletic ", and no girls. For the 
age thirteen, at which age American pupils enter the record, 
13 boys from school "A ", 8 from school "B ", 59 from school 
"C ", that is, 68% of Scottish boys, and 80% of American boys 
of thirteen years like "athletic ". 33 of the Scottish boys 
and 50% of the American preferred "athletic ". 5% of the Scot- 
tish girls and 8% of the American preferred "athletic ". 
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These percentages for the whole test were then graphed. 
Red ink was used for the girls' records, and blue for the 
boys', except for Graph 48, which is self -explanatory. Graphs 
1 and 2 are for Question 1,1. Graphs 3 to 22 are based upon 
Question1,2; Graphs 23 to 34 upon ,Question 1,3; Graph 35 
upon Question I,4; Graphs 36 to 64 upon Question 1I,1; Graphs 
65 to 76 upon Question II,2; Graph 77 upon Question I1,3; 
Graphs 78 and 79 upon Question III; and Graphs 80 and 81 
upon Question IV. 
'Records were then made, in Question 1,2, of the years 
at which the various traits showed their highest percentage 
of choice by the children. Traits relating to self -regard 
were isolated from those relating to socialization, for com- 
parison. This record follows on pages 347, 348, 349. Thus, 
in the case of Scottish boys, the highest percentage choosing 
"athletic" was seen from the record to be at 16 years; 
"beautiful" at 11 years; "brave" at 12 years; "brilliant" at 
16 years, and so forth. When the highest percentage of sub- 
jects chose any one trait at several ages, the earliest age 
at which the percentage reached this highest point was taken: 
thus the highest percentage of Scottish boys to choose "brave" 
was 100 - this happened at the two ages 12 and 164. 12 was 
taken as the age for the record. 
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Records were then taken in question 1,3, of the years 
at which the various traits showed their highest percentage 
of PREFERE1:NCE by the children. The self- regarding traits and 
socialization traits were again isolated. 
These records follow,pages 351, 352, 353. 
Thus, it was at 11 years that the highest percentage 
of Scottish boys chose "strong" and "obedient" as preferred 
traits; and at the same age, the highest percentage of Scot- 
tish girls preferred "beautiful ", "wealthy ", and "obedient ". 
It was at 15i years that the highest percentage of American 
boys chose "respectful" and "reverent "; at 15i years the 
highest percentage of American girls chose "brave "; and so 
forth. 
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ivote was next made of all the traits in question 1,2, 
with respect to the ages at which the sensitivity to these 
traits INC EASED. 
The same procedure was followed to note the years during 
which sensitivity to the traits DECREASED. The results were 
compiled for all four groups, Scottish boys, Scottish girls, 
American boys and American girls. 
The self- regarding traits were again isolated from the 
socialization traits, both in the results and in the graphs. 
The records of the years of increasing sensitivity and 
of decreasing sensitivity follow; that is, the years within 
which percentages of children "liking" the various traits 
increased, and within which these percentages decreased; and 
the records of those of both the self- regarding and of the 
socialization traits, and of Scottish boys and girls, and 
American boys and girls. 'Plisse results are found on pages 
355, 356, 357, 358. Thus, the percentage of Scottish boys 
underlining "athletic" increased between the ages of 11 and 
122; the percentage underlining "influential" increased up 
to 17; "morally brave ", 14 to 152; and so forth. The per- 
centage of American boys underlining "athletic" increased 
between the ages of 14 and 142, and between 15 and 16; "brave" 
increased between 14 and 142, and so forth. 
The graphs showing the increase of sensitivity are num- 
bered 15 to 18; those showing the decrease, number 19 to 22. 
There follows a collection of typical answers to ques- 
tion 1,2., pages 359 and following. 
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Hero: Jack Dempsey. American Boy, 132 years: 
athletic, brave, strong, good, unselfish, aid, cheerful, 
courteous, honest, loyal. 
Hero: Tom Mix. American Boy, 132 years: 
brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, heroic, strong, wealthy, 
good, respectful, kind, friendly, honest. 
Hero: Douglas Fairbanks. American Boy, 14 years: 
athletic, brave, brilliant, dashing, strong, wealthy, good, 
respectful, unselfish, forgiving, generous, gentle, helpful, 
kind, loving, cheerful, friendly, honest, loyal, patriotic. 
Hero: Jack Dempsey. American Boy, 142 years: 
athletic, brave, famous, firm, heroic, morally brave, strong, 
cautious, modest, obedient, peaceful, respectful, temperate, 
unselfish, forgiving, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, self - 
respecting, sincere, sympathetic, cheerful, courteous, friend- 
ly, honest, honoured, patriotic, sociable. 
Hero: Mrs. Coolidge. American girl, 14 years: 
athletic. 
Hero: Calvin Coolidge. American Girl, 14 years: 
athletic, strong, good, modest, obedient, peaceful, respect- 
ful, unselfish, helpful, kind, loving, merciful, sincere, 
cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, patriotic, 
sociable. 
Hero: Queen Elizabeth. American Girl, 14 years. 
beautiful, brilliant, dashing, famous, wealthy, good, peace- 
ful, unselfish, forgiving, gentle, helpful, loving, sincere, 
friendly, honest, honoured, loyal, patriotic, peculiar. 
360. 
Hero: Booker T. Washington. American Girl, 132 years. 
athletic, beautiful, brave, famous, strong, good, obedient, 
peaceful, pure, respectful, unselfish, charitable, forgiving, 
generous, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, self -sacrificing, 
sincere, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, hon- 
oured, loyal, patriotic. 
Hero: Queen Elizabeth. Scottish Girl, 132 years. 
athletic, beautiful, brave, famous, firm, strong, wealthy, 
cautious, good, pure, unselfish, generous, gentle, kind, sym- 
pathetic, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, sociable. 
Hero: Betty Balfour. Scottish Girl, 122 years. 
beautiful, brave, brilliant, famous, firm, strong, wealthy, 
cautious, good, humble, modest, obedient, peaceful, pure, 
respecrful, unselfish, aid, charitable, forgiving, generous, 
gentle, helpful, humane, kind, loving, merciful, sincere, 
sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, 
honouted, loyal, obliging, sociable. 
Hero: Mary Pickford. Scottish Girl, 122 years. 
athletic, beautiful, brave, famous, heroic, morally brave, 
strong, cautious, good, humble, obedient, peaceful, pure, 
respectful, temperate, unselfish, forgiving, generous, gentle, 
helpful, kind. loving, self- sacrificing, sincere, sympathetic, 
cheerful, chummy, friendly, honest, obliging, politician. 
Hero: Shakespeare. Scottish Girl, 122 years, 
athletic, beautiful, brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, firm, 
heroic, morally brave, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, hum- 
ble, obedient, peaceful, pure, steadfast, unselfish, aid, 
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forgiving, ganerous, gentle, helpful, kind, loving, sympathet- 
ic, cheerful, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, obliging. 
Hero: Napoleon. Scottish Boy, 15 years. 
brave, brilliant, famous, firm, heroic, persevering, strong, 
cautious, good, humble, forgiving, helpful, kind, honest. 
Hero: Douglas Fairbanks. Scottish Boy, 14 years. 
athletic, beautiful, brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, firm, 
heroic, influential, strong, wealthy, cautious, good, obedi- 
ent, respectful, unselfish, charitable, gentle, humane, kind, 
loving, merciful, self- sacrificing, sympathetic, cheerful, 
chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, honoured, obliging, 
patriotic, sociable. 
Hero: Jeanne Tunney. Scottish Boy, 132 years. 
athletic, brave, brilliant, famous, heroic, influential, 
strong, cautious, good, humble, modest, obedient, peaceful, 
pure, respectful, reverent, steadfast, unselfish, forgiving, 
generous, gentle, helpful, humane, kind, merciful, sincere, 
sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, 
honoured, loyal, obliging, politician. 
Hero: Betty Nuthall. Scottish Girl, 17 years, 
athletic, brilliant, modest, respectful, kind, cheerful, 
chummy. 
Hero: Suzanne Lenglen. french Girl, 17 years. 
athletic, brilliant, famous, cautious, friendly, honest, 
peculiar, sociable. 
Hero: Queen Elizabeth. Scottish Girl, 142 years. 
athletic, beautiful, brave, brilliant, famous, firm, influen- 
362. 
tia1, morally brave, persevering, strong, wealthy, cautious, 
good, reverent, steadfast, unselfish, aid, charitable, help- 
ful, humane kind, sympathetic, cheerful, courteous, friendly, 
honest, honoured, patriotic, politician, sociable. 
Hero: Prince of Wales. Scottish Girl, 142 years. 
athletic, brave, brilliant, dashing, famous, influential, 
persevering, strong, wealthy, good, humble, modest, peaceful, 
pure, respectful, reverent, steadfast, temperate, unselfish, 
charitable, generous, gentle, helpful, humane, kind, sincere, 
sympathetic, cheerful, chummy, courteous, friendly, honest, 
honoured, loyal, obliging, sociable. 
Question I,4. In answering this question, the largest 
percentage of boys and girls marked answers "A "and " "C': The per- 
centage marking "A "shows a slight tendency to decrease at 
132 to 142 in the case of the boys, and 142-, to 15 in the case 
of the girls. The curve of the graph for "B' shows a down -ward 
tendency: that is, as years advance, fewer children reported 
themselves as ashamed to choose Jesus. A negligible number 
reported a preference for another ideal (D). A number of 
children, which decreases as age increases, reported Jesus 
as "too mild" to elicit their worship as hero (E). An appre- 
ciable number of both boys and girls, but a larger percentage 
of boys, report His suffering as being a deterrent to their 
choosing Him (F). Also an appreciable number report the pop - 
ular hatred He experienced as undesirable in one whose place 
they would choose to take (G). In both "F" and "G ", the curve 
of the boys' results rises at 142 years in a marked degree, 
and in "H ", the curve rises slightly at this age. 
363. 
There follows herewith a typical section of the scroll 
record of results of question 1,4, from which the graph was 
constructed. The figures are the percentages of children 
of the respective ages márking the answer in question. Thus, 
63% of the boys of 11 years marked "A ", 32jó of the boys of 
112, 382 of the boys of 12, and so forth. No results for 
this question are available from American children. The 
results are shown in Graph 35. 
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A typical section of the scroll record for Questions 
II, 1, 2, and 3, with only the percentages given, but not 
the number of votes for each case, follows, on page 366. 
The American results are inserted in pencil instead of ink. 
From the results tabulated in the scroll record, Graphs 
36 to 47 were constructed. 
A sample reading of the section of the scroll record 
runs thus: at 11 years, "boasting" was marked "wrong" by 
87% of the boys and 96% of the girls; it was marked "worst" 
by 39% of the boys and 39¡% of the girls; it was marked 
"least bad" by none. At 13 years, "boasting" was marked 
"wrong" by 78% of the Scottish boys, 60% of the American 
boys, 75% of the Scottish girls, and 28% of the American 
girls. It was marked "worst" by 31% of the Scottish boys, 
30% of the American boys, 25% of the Scottish girls, and 12% 
of the American girls. It was marked "least bad" by 2% of 
the Scottish boys, 2% of the Scottish girls, and by no 
American children. 
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A further study of Question II,1 was made, in order to 
ascertain the ages at which the highest percentages of child- 
ren underlined the various "wrongs ". The "wrongs" relating to 
self- regard were isolated from those relating to socialization, 
and the American and Scottish results were also isolated. The 
tabulated results follow, on pages 368, 369, 370, and 371. 
A reading of these results runs thus: it was at 112 years 
that the highest percentage of the Scottish boys underlined 
"bullying ", "talking back ", "meekness ", and "foolhardy" as wrong. 
It was at 12 years that the highest percentage underlined 
"self- respect ", "praise ", "self- denial ", "shy ", "venturesome ", 
and "wary ". That is, for example, of the Scottish boys, a 
larger percentage of 12 year olds underlined "self- respect" 
than of any other age of Scottish boys; and so forth. 
A graph was drawn of these group results as follows. There 
are listed in the test, Question II, 1, 36 self -regarding 
wrongs, namely, the 12 from "boasting" to "touchiness ", the 
12 from "backward" to "timid ", and the 12 from "anxiety" to 
"worry ". The other three groups of 12's are the socialization 
wrongs. Therefore, of the 36 self -regarding wrongs, that 
is, 4 of them, were underlined by Scottish boys of 112 years; 
l6¡ by boys of 12 years, 22% by boys of 142 years, and so forth. 
These results are drawn on Graph 48. 
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372. 
A record was next taken of the years during which the 
sensitivity to the self -regarding wrongs, and also the sen- 
sitivity to the socialization wrongs, increased and decreased, 
in all four groups of children - Scottish boys, Scottish 
girls, American boys, and American girls. 
These results follow, on pages 373,374,375,376, and 377. 
The results were then graphed. gee Graphs 49 to 64. 
Thus, in the case of the Scottish boys, sensitivity to 
"boasting" as a wrong increased from 14 to 142 years of age, 
and also from 152 to 162. In the case of the Scottish girls, 
it increased between the ages of 112 and 12, and also between 
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378. 
Question II, 2. 
From the percentages on the scroll record of Questions 
II, 1, 2, and 3, graphs were constructed showing the per- 
centages of each sex, age, and nationality underlining the 
various words considered "worst". See Graphs 65 to 76. 
Then results were gathered showing at what ages the high- 
est percentages of the various groupings of children (Scot- 
tish boys, Scottish girls, American boys, and American girls) 
marked the various "wrongs" as "worst ". The table of results 
follows on pages 379, 380, and 381. 
Thus, for example, it was at 11 years that the largest 
percentage of Scottish boys considered "bullying ", "flattery ", 
"anxiety ", and "fear" as the worst of the list presented to 
them; at 12 years, the largest percentage of Scottish boys 
said "talking back" and "reckless" were worst; and so forth. 
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Question II, 3. 
The tests given to the American children furnished no 
results for this question. 
In this question, "least bad" means "best ", because the 
children were directed to mark none of the words which they 
had marked before, either as "bad" or as "worst ". In the case 
of both the boys and the girls, the traits which were marked 
by the various ages were self- regarding traits. 
The results were graphed. See Graph 77. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'or this question, the table of percentage -results 
from the scroll record follows on page 385. 
The figures underneath the respective ages are the per- 
centages of the boys and girls choosing the various reasons, 
as they are numbered in the test from "1" to "8 ". The Ameri- 
can percentages are inserted at their proper places in pencil 
instead of ink. 
Thus, for example, at 142 years: no boys, either Scot- 
tish or American, chose answer "1 "; 4% of the American 
girls chose "1 "; 7% of the Scottish boys chose "2 "; 10% of 
the American boys chose "2 "; 2% of the Scottish girls and 
12% of the American girls chose "2 "; and so forth. 
The results of Question III were graphed. See Graphs 
78 and 79. 
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386. 
In Question III there was given opportunity to write 
in an original answer. There follow herewith some typical 
answers. 
Scottish Boys. 
132 years: If I am good at my work my teacher will give 
me a good character. 
132 years: Because when I am good I think of it and 
know I am pleasing God and then I have a better feeling in- 
side myself. 
13 years: When I am good my parents are proud of me. 
13 years: By being good I am fulfilling my work and 
showing an example to others. 
122 years: If you are good your conscience does not 
trouble you, therefore you are able to face the world without 
flinching. 
122 years: If you are good and applying for work the 
employer asks certain questions and if you turn out to be 
bad then you don't get the job but if you are good you get 
the job. 
122 years: We can look the whole world in the face. 
12 years: Because when you are good you can help other 
people. When you are good you are willing to run errands. 
12 years: If I was bad I would hurt God and I would go 
to "Hell ". When you are good and please God you go to "Heaven ". 
Scottish Girls. 
152 years: i know my dead mother would like me to be 
good like herself. 
387. 
14 years: When I am good, I know I am good, I respect 
myself. 
162 years: When I am good I feel better inside, as I 
have a clear conscience. There is no reason why everybody 
should not be good. 
14 years: When I am good, I am helping children younger 
than myself, because young children especially try to imitate 
older people. 
162 years: Because it pleases those I love best in this 
world, besides pleasing God. 
16 years: A good person is an example to others. 
16 years: If you are good it pleases you to think that 
perhaps if someone takes an example from you, they will not 
have a bad one to get. 
15 years: I should be good because we are here to make 
the very best of our life. Besides, it is selfish to be other- 
wise, as we are hurting others. 
142 years: I should be good because it is everybody's 
first and foremost aim in life and also every one's duty. 
132 years: Because it might make other people bad if 
we didn't try to be good too. 
13 years: When you are bad your conscience troubles you. 
13 years: When I am good luck comes my way. 
122 years: I should be good because I was made to be good. 
12 years: When I am bad I feel worried and afraid. 
122 years: If I am good my mother thinks more of me. 
388. 
American Boys. 
132 years: I should be good because God, my .mother, and 
father, and every one else would respect me more. 
132 years: Because there are those who trust me. 
13 years: It is not friends who decide your after life, 
but it is GOD. 
14 years: When I am good, I seem to get along better 
with everybody. 
15 years: It pleases God when you are good, for He put 
you here to be good and wants you to be that way. 
152 years: Because it does please God and everybody else. 
16 years: There is one yet better than number 4 - that 
is, I am good because of ammother's trust and love. 
162 years: If I want to get along, I must obey my 
mother and father and respect old folks at all times. (Col- 
oured boy) . 
American Girls. 
152 years: Because when I am good, the world is full of 
sunshine. 
152 years: The Lord wishes for all to love one another 
so when we die he will take us to Heaven on high. (coloured). 
15 years: So that I may have other friends. 
15 years: If you are good and it pleases God, every one 
else will think well of you. 
142 years: When I am good, it pleases God, and he will 
do things to please me. And I will be more happy. 
14 years: Because it not only pleases the Heavenly Father, 
389. 
but it pleases all and the ones that RESPECT you. 
14 years: When I am good my mother respects me more. 
132 years: Because people will like you better and think 
more of you. And God shall think more of you. 
13 years: I think you get to go more places. (Coloured 
girl ) . 
Question IV. 
The replies to the question "What do you think it means 
to be good ?" fell into ten groups: 
1.0bedience to superiors, parents, teachers, etc. 
2.The religious meaning, such as obedience to God, follow 
Christ, etc. 
3.Concrete specifications, mostly prohibitions, such as "do 
not lie ", "do not steal ", etc. 
4.Abstractions, such as "do what is right ", "don't sin ", etc. 
5.Platitudes, such as "be pure in thought, word, and act ", etc. 
6.An altruistic meaning, such as "help others ". 
7.Enlargements and prolonged explanations. 
8.Public approval, such as "to have a good reputation ". 
9.Self- respect, such as "you are not ashamed to look people 
in the face ". 
10.Approval of conscience, expressed in such ways as "to be 
good is to have a clear conscience ", "to do what you 
think is right ", etc. 
A section of the percentage- results from the scroll 
record of Question IV follows on page 390. 
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391. 
Thus, for example, at the age 13: 38% of the Scottish 
boys, 20% of the American boys, 42% of the Scottish girls, 
and 8% of the American girls, gave submission to their elders 
as the meaning which "being good" had for them, their content 
of morality. At the same age, 26% of the Scottish boys, none 
of the American boys, 21% of the Scottish girls, and 16% of 
the American girls gave as their meaning of "being good ", to 
"obey God ", or some other similar religious criterion. 
These results of Question ITT were graphed. See Graphs 
80 and 81. 
There follow some typical answers to this question. 
Scottish Boys. 
152 years: To be good in the sight of God. To do what 
you think is right. 
15 years: To do what one thinks he will not regret 
afterwards. To do what one thinks one's conscience will not 
prick him for doing it. To be obedient to your father and mother. 
142 years: If we are not good we will feel very unhappy. 
14. years: To be good is to have a clear conscience. 
132 years: To keep doing what you think God likes and 
not to do what you think is good because other people think so. 
132 years: To be good is to behave yourself and respect 
other people and do what you think is correct. 
132 years: To be obedient when it is right. 
13 years: To be good is to please God and to serve our 
fellows. 
122 years: To be good means to do everything pleasing 
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in the sight of God and do nothing you will be ashamed of. 
122 years: To be pure in thought, word, and act, and to 
.love and obey God and parents. To be unselfish and goodnatured. 
12 years: To be happy and helpful and honest. 
11 years: To be good is to be unselfish, generous, for- 
giving, sympathetic and obedient. 
Scottish Girls. 
17 years: To do what one's conscience tells one. 
162 years: When you are good you know you are good, and 
will be much respected. 
16 years: To try to do everything in a straightforward 
way and not say or do anything which you would be ashamed 
of or which would be unpleasant to anyone. 
16 years: To have nothing on your conscience to fear. 
16 years: To be honourable and honoured by other people. 
You have no bad points against your. name. 
152 years: To do what your instinct tells you is the 
right thing. 
152 years: Never to mind what other people think about 
you, but to do just what you yourself think is right. 
14 years: To do what one thinks is right and what would 
please God. Not to tell lies, and help others to be good. 
13 years: To be obedient and do things which you think 
will please God and your parents. Not to think wrong of anyone 
and to try and keep a clear conscience. 
122 years: To be good is to be kind to other people, to 
help those who are worse off than yourself, to obey your 
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elders, and have a clear conscience. 
11 years: To obey and do what you are told. 
American Boys. 
132 years: It means you feel better and your friends 
respect you more. 
14 years: It means a place in the world among men. 
14 years: Do the best you can at all times. 
14 years: By being good it means to have a good clean 
spirit. Get everything out of life there is to be gotten, 
and don't forget your friends. 
15 years: You have an easy feeling. 
152 years: If you are good you please everyone, make life 
more comfortable, and you get along better in the world. 
142 years: When you are good you are kind to everyone 
you meet, even you enemies. To obey your parents and God. 
142 years: Follow the Golden Rule. 
American Girls. 
162 years: It means to be friendly to everybody and not 
to do the things that are wrong. When you get so old you 
ought to know right from wrong. 
16 years: Good means to have respect for yourself and 
if you aren't good it all goes upon your reputation. 
15 years: It means you have some self- respect for your- 
self and others. And any one can trust you. 
15 years: To obey and do things you would do in front 
of anybody. 
142 years: You should respect your name. 
394. 
14 years: Being good is to do the things which you know 
are right. And doing unto others as you would have them do 
unto you. 
13i years: To be good it means to obey all of your teach- 
ers, to be respectful, kind. When you are good, and can say 
you are, you have accomplished something. 
13 years: To be good means to do what is right because 
you want to and not because you fear punishment. 
13 years: It means you have some respect for yourself 
and for others. 
Conclusions. 
Question 1,1. 
Girls, both Scottish and American, customarily choose 
men as their ideals more than the boys choose women. Scot- 
tish girls show this tendency more than do the American girls.- 
See 'Graphs 1 and 2. 
As experiences multiply, the children's interest spread 
increases, and the field from which ideals are chosen shows 
a corresponding broadening; ideals are the synthesizations 
of experienced goods. See pages 359 to 362. 
Desirable traits are ascribed by the children to their 
hero -ideals whether these latter possess those traits or not. 
As the children advance in years and experience, the degree 
of this naive idealization decreases, and they, with more 
exactness and care ascribe to their ideals fewer and more 
carefully selected traits. See pages 359 to 362. 
Question 1,2. 
Graphs 11, 12, 13, and 14 show the ages at which the 
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various traits manifest their highest percentages of choice 
by the children. These graphs show a pubertal disturbance in 
the development of moral ideas: in the case of the Scottish 
boys, no year between 13 and 142 inclusive shows any self - 
regarding trait as having received the highest average of 
choice; in the case of the Scottish girls, the years 13 to 
15 show the same phenomenon; that is, for the Scottish child- 
ren, a pubertal disturbance seems to extend from about 13 to 
15 years. In the case of the socialization traits, this spread 
for boys is 122 years to 142 years, and for. girls, 13 to 15 
years. In the case of the American children: for the boys, 
the self -regarding traits show the pubertal disturbance from 
14 to 15 years, with a strange exception at 142 years, which 
maintains throughout the test; for the socialization traits, 
the boys manifest the pubertal disturbance from 14 to 16 
years, with the same exception at 142 years; in the case of 
the American girls, the socialization traits show the dis- 
turbance at 14 to 15 years, with a very few scattering excep- 
tions. It appears that between the years 13 and 15, both 
Scottish and American children show a pubertal disturbance 
in the development in moral ideas. 
At the earlier ages of 11 and 12 years, the children 
light upon traits which are customary, trite, socially approved, 
"orthodox", such as "good ", "helpful ", "kind ", and "loving ". 
It is only at later ages that they become sensitive to such 
traits as "morally brave ", "persevering ", "self- sacrificing" - 
traits which are experienced later, noticed later in other 
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people, traits to choose which presupposes a wider experience 
and more thoughtfulness than the former ones. 
Question I,2. 
In the case of Scottish boys, the percentages of choice 
show an increase, between the years 132 and 14, in 17 traits, 
namely, beautiful, famous, firm, influential, brave, perse- 
vering, good, humble, unselfish, gentle, humane, self -sac- 
rificing, honest, honoured, patriotic, sociable, and solitary. 
Between the same years, there is a decrease in the percent- 
ages of lßß traits, namely,athletic, brave, strong, wealthy, 
cautious, modest, obedient, steadfast, aid, charitable, kind, 
cheerful, courteous, and obliging. During the year 14 to 
142, there was in increase in the percentages of 12 traits, 
namely, athletic, brave, cautious, good, humble, peaceful, 
temperate, aid, forgiving, helpful, friendly, and honest: and 
there was a decrease in the percentages of 26 traits. During 
the period 142 to 15 years, there was an increase in the 
percentages of 27 traits, and a decrease in those of 14 
traits. See Graphs 3 to 6, supplemented by 15, 17, 19, and 21. 
In the case of Scottish girls, from the same graphs, it 
appears that there is an increase in the percentages of 6 
traits between 13 and 132 years, 9 traits between 132 and 14, 
11 traits between 14 and 141, and 31 traits between 142 and 
15: there is a decrease in 34 traits between 13 and 132, 
34 traits between 132 and 14, 34 traits between 14 and 142, 
and 6 traits between 141 and 15. 
The table of the increases and decreases in these per- 
centages for the Scottish children follows on page 397. 
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398. 
From the table on page 397, it is seen that, in the case 
of the Scottish boys, the ratio between the number of in- 
creased percentages and the number of decreased percentages 
is smallest at the age 14 to 142 years, that is, 12 to 26. 
The conclusion is, that for the Scottish boys, the pubertal 
disturbance in the case of the development of moral ideas, 
is at its height at the age 14 to 142 years. 
The corresponding ratio for the Scottish girls is 
6 to 34, at the age 13 to 132 years. The pubertal disturbance 
in the case of the Scottish girls is at its height at the 
age 13 to 132 years, a year precedent to the boys. 
In the case of the American children, the table showing 
the same phenomenon follows on page 399. 
In the case of the American boys, the ratio between the 
number of traits with an increased percentage and the number 
with a decreased percentage is smallest at the age l42 to 
15 years. The conclusion is, that the pubertal disturbance 
in the development of moral ideas is, in the case of the 
American boys, at its height at 142 to 15 years. 
In the case of the American girls, this ratio is small- 
est, that is, 4 to 9, at thé age 13 to 132 years. Our con- 
clusion is, that, for the American girls, the pubertal dis- 
turbance in the development of moral ideas is at its height 
at the age 13 to 132 years, a good year precedent to the 
American boys. 
For. the American results, see Graphs 7 to 10, supple- 
mented by 16, 18, 20, and 22. 
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Is this pubertal disturbance which is manifest in the 
choice of characteristics the children like, also shown in 
their choice of preferred traits? That is, does Question 
I,3, as well as Question 1,2, show this disturbance? 
Graphs 31, 32, 33, and 34 show the ages at which the 
greatest percentages of children, chose the various traits. 
There is here manifested again a paucity of high percentages 
at or near puberty. In the case of the Scottish boys, the 
self- regarding traits show the disturbance at 12 to 142 years - 
that is, there is at those years a lack of sensitivity to 
those traits. There is an exception to be noted here, namely, 
at 14 years. In the case of the socialization traits, the 
lack of sensitivity or the pubertal disturbance is shown at 
12 to 14 years. 
For the Scottish girls, the self -regarding traits show 
the disturbance at 122 years to 132 years; and the social- 
ization traits show it at 13 to 14 years. 
For the American boys, the pubertal lack of sensitivity 
is shown to the self- regarding traits at 14 to 142 years, 
and to the socialization traits at 14 to 14- years. 
For the American girls, the disturbance is shown by the 
self- regarding traits at 14 to 15 years ( where again the 
exception of the age 142 is noticeable ), and by the social- 
ization traits at 14- to 15 years. 
Our conclusion is, that in their choice of "preferred 
traits" as well as in their choice of "liked traits ", the 
401. 
children show a disturbance, at or near puberty, in the de- 
velopment of moral ideas. 
Graphs 3 to 10 show that the curves of the girls' re- 
sults are more regular than those of the boys': the boys 
show a greater individual variation , their development seems 
to be more irregular than that of the girls; the girls seem 
to develop more smoothly than the boys. 
From Graph 48 it is to be drawn that the pubertal dis- 
turbance, in the case of traits regarded as "wrong ", is 
manifest, but no so clearly and consistently as in the case 
of traits which the children voted as "liking" and "preferring ". 
Scottish boys, in the self- regarding wrongs, tend to show 
the disturbance at the age 122 to 14 years; in the socializa- 
tion wrongs, at 12 to 14 years. The Scottish girls, in self - 
regarding wrongs, show the disturbance at 13 to 142 years; 
in the socialization wrongs, at 122 to 14 years. The Ameri- 
can boys, in the self- regarding wrongs, show the disturbance 
at 142 to 15 years; and in the socialization wrongs, at 142 
to 15 years. The American girls, in wrongs related to self - 
regard, show the disturbance at 15 years; in wrongs related 
to socialization, at 142 to 15 years. 
Our conclusion is, that the pubertal disturbance is man- 
ifest in the results of Question II,1, but not so clearly 
and consistently as in those of Question I,2. The sensitivity 
to wrongs shows less clearly and with less, chronological ex- 
actness and consistency, the pubertal disturbance, than did 
the record of the development of the sensitivity to desirable 
traits. 
402. 
Which, if either, develops first - sensitivity to traits 
having to do with self -regard, or those bearing upon social- 
ization? From Graphs 15 and 17, it is seen that from 12 to 
122 years, in the case of Scottish boys, 2 traits of self - 
regard show an increase in sensitivity, and no traits of 
socialization; at 122 years to 13 years, 1 trait of self -re- 
gard and none of socialization, and so forth. The record of 
the traits which show the increases in sensitivity, follows 
on page 403, for the Scottish children, and 404 for the Ameri- 
can. The graphs for the American results are 16 and 18. 
From the tables on pages 403 and 404, we draw the follow - 
conclusions. 
Scottish boys show sensitivity to self- regarding traits 
earlier than to those of socialization. Sensitivity to the 
latter begins immediately after the height of pubertal dis- 
turbance has been reached and passed, that is, at the age 
142 to 15 years. However, the development of the two overlap, 
and the greatest step in the development of sensitivity to 
self -regarding traits synchronizes with the greatest step in 
the development of sensitivity to socialization traits. 
Scottish girls show gradual development of sensitivity to 
both self- regarding and socialization traits until the age 
142 years, when sensitivity to socialization traits takes its 
first big step in development. 
The age 142 years seems to be a crucial year. 
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405. 
From the tables on pages 403 and 404, the following 
conclusions are to be drawn with respect to the American 
children. 
American boys show an increase in sensitivity to self - 
regarding traits from 132 years onward; the increase in sen- 
sitivity to socialization traits begins at 14 years. Both 
increases show the pubertal disturbance at 14-2 years. From 
14- years upward, sensitivity to socialization traits de- 
velops gradually, also more steadily that sensitivity to the 
self- regarding traits. 
American girls show the pubertal disturbance at 142 
years in both sensitivity to self -regarding traits and also 
sensitivity to socialization traits. Sensitivity to self - 
regarding traits develops a bit earlier than that to social- 
ization traits. The latter develops suddenly after 142 years - 
that is, after pubertal disturbance. 
All children, Scottish and American, showed a develop- 
ment to traits of socialization following immediately upon 
the period of pubertal disturbance. Sensitivity to self -re- 
garding traits develops earlier than sensitivity to social- 
ization traits. During the period of pubertal disturbance, 
such traits as symbolize active beneficence to the degree, 
for example, of self- sacrifice, are less numerous than self - 
regarding traits such as beautiful, dashing, wealthy, and 
such simpler socialized traits as honesty, generous, helpful, 
and merciful. 
406. 
Question II, 1. 
Which, if either, develops first - sensitivity to self - 
regarding wrongs or sensitivity to socialization wrongs? That 
is, do the findings based upon Question II,1, agree with 
those based upon Question I,2 ? 
Graphs 49, 50, 53, and 54 are the basis for our conclu- 
sions here regarding the Scottish children, and Graphs 57, 
58, 61, and 62 for the conclusions regarding the American. 
On pages 407 and 408 are the records of the wrongs, sensitiv- 
ity to which shows an increase at the various ages. From 
these tables, we draw the following conclusions. 
Scottish boys increase in sensitivity to both self -re- 
garding wrongs and socialization wrongs up to the age of 
142 years, and then show a decrease. Scottish girls show a 
corresponding disturbance at 14 years. Here again there is 
manifested the pubertal disturbance. 
Scottish boys, at 132 years, show a sharp increase in 
sensitivity to wrongs, but the girls seem to be already sen- 
sitized at 13 years. Here there may be a basis for suspecting 
the manifestation of conscience. 
The conclusions from Question II, 1, neither support 
nor refute the conclusion that sensitivity to self- regarding 
traits develops before that to socialization traits. 
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Prom the table on page 408, the following conclusion 
regarding the American children can be drawn. 
American boys, and to a slight degree American girls, 
show an earlier development in sensitivity to self -regarding 
wrongs than in sensitivity to socialization wrongs. 
Our next problem is, "Which, if either, boys or girls, 
develop sensitivity to wrongs first, considering again both 
wrongs relating to self - regard and those relating to social- 
ization?". 
Graphs 49 and 50 for the Scottish children, and 57 and 
58 for. the American, furnish the basis for the following 
conclusions, regarding the self- regarding wrongs. 
Scottish boys precede the Scottish girls in the develop- 
ment of sensitivity in 8 traits; Scottish girls precede the 
boys in the development of sensitivity in 10 traits. Ameri- 
can boys precede American girls in developing sensitivity to 
self- regarding wrongs in 6 cases; American girls precede 
American boys in 21 traits. 
It seems that in the development of a sensitivity to 
self- regarding wrongs, girls precede the boys. 
Graphs 53 and 54 for the Scottish children, and 61 and 
62 for the American, are the basis for the following con- 
clusions regarding the development of sensitivity to social- 
ization wrongs. 
Scottish boys precede the Scottish girls in developing 
sensitivity to socialization wrongs in 10 cases. Scottish 
girls precede the boys in 6 cases. Here is a lone case of 
410. 
reversal of precedence. 
American boys precede American girls in developing sen- 
sitivity to 5 wrongs. American girls precede American boys 
in developing sensitivity to 21 wrongs. 
The conclusion is, that in the American results, the 
girls ran true to form in preceding the boys in the develop- 
ment - in this case, the development of sensitivity to social- 
ization wrongs. In the Scottish results, there is a reversal 
of the customary precedence - the boys preceding the girls 
in developing a sensitivity to a larger number of wrongs. 
Our next problem is, "Which, if either, boys or girls, 
precede in the loss of sensitivity to wrongs, considering 
both self -regarding and socialization wrongs ? ". 
Graphs 51 and 52 for the Scottish children, and 59 and 
60 for the American, are the basis for our conclusions re- 
garding the loss of sensitivity to self- regarding wrongs. 
Scottish boys precede the Scottish girls in decrease 
of sensitivity to 7 wrongs. Scottish girls precede Scottish 
boys in decrease of sensitivity in the case of 16 wrongs. 
American boys precede American girls in decreased sen- 
sitivity to 19 wrongs, and American girls preceded American 
boys in 4 cases. 
That is, in the loss of sensitivity to self -regarding 
wrongs, Scottish girls precede Scottish boys, but American 
boys precede American girls. American girls attain this sen- 
sitivity earlier, and retain it longer than, American boys. 
411. 
Graphs 5 and 56 for the Scottish children, and 63 and 
64 for the American, are the basis for our conclusions re- 
garding the precedence in the loss of sensitivity to social- 
ization wrongs. 
Scottish boys precede Scottish girls in a decrease in 
sensitivity to socialization wrongs in 8 cases. Scottish girls 
precede the boys in loss of sensitivity to 14 wrongs. 
American boys precede American girls in a decreased 
sensitivity to 23 wrongs relating to socialization. American 
girls lose this sensitivity first in 2 cases. 
The conclusion is that Scottish girls precede Scottish 
boys, but American boys precede American girls in a decrease 
in sensitivity to socialization wrongs. 
Collecting the data regarding the priority of development 
in the case of boys and girls, it is to be said that girls 
precede the boys as follows: 
1. In development of interest spread, as shown in their choices 
of heroes. 
2. In the appearance of the pubertal disturbance. 
3. In increase in sensitivity to self -regarding traits. 
4. In increase in sensitivity to socialization traits. 
5. in increase in sensitivity to self- regarding wrongs. 
Boys precede the girls in one instance, namely, American 
boys precede American girls in loss of sensitivity to self - 
regarding wrongs and socialization wrongs. 
The general conclusion is that girls precede boys in 
412. 
development, except that American boys lose sensitivity to 
wrongs before American girls. 
Question I,4. 
Based upon the Scottish results, Graph 35, we draw the 
following conclusions. 
Of the boys of 142 years, the age of greatest pubertal 
disturbance, a decreased number report that they would choose 
Jesus as their ideal if they did it over; and increased num- 
ber recoil from His sufferings, popular hatred, and shortened 
life. A decreased number report themselves ashamed to name 
Jesus as their ideal. A decreased number say they admire 
another more, or that He was too mild, or not manly enough. 
At 15 years, there is a decided upward curve in the num- 
ber who report Him as an acceptable ideal if He is brought 
to their attention. 
In the case of the girls, at 132 years, the age of the 
greatest pubertal disturbance, a slightly decreased number 
say they would choose Jesus if they did it over. 
Question 1I,2. 
Our next problem is, "Which develops first, sensitivity 
to self- regarding wrongs voted the "worst", or sensitivity 
to socialization wrongs voted the "worst" ?. Based upon 
Graphs 65 to 76, is the following table of "worsts ", sen- 
sitivity to which shows an increase at the various ages. See 
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From these tables are drawn the following conclusions. 
Scottish boys and girls both develop sensitivity to self - 
regarding "worsts" earlier than to socialization "worsts ". 
In the development of this sensitivity, the Scottish girls 
precede the Scottish boys. 
The same conclusion follows in the case of the American 
children. 
In the case of both the Scottish and American children, 
there is manifest a tendency toward lack of sensitivity 
at or near puberty. The pubertal disturbance is not clearly 
defined, but it is faintly discernible. 
Question 11,3. 
Graph 77 shows the developing sensitivity toward the 
"wrongs" which are voted to be the "least bad ". 
The conclusion arrived at from the graphs is, that at 
the age when the tests stop, Scottish children have not yet 
developed to the point of view of active positive self -sac- 
rificing beneficence, which would include such traits as 
generosity, friendly, tender, affectionate, devoted. The 
traits voted the "least bad ", that is, those voted the "best ", 
are all self- regarding traits. 
Question III. 
Graph 78 for the Scottish children, and 79 for the 
American, are the basis for our conclusions as to the ethical 
motive active in the children's minds. 
The conclusions for the Scottish children are the follow- 
ing, 
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In the case of the boys, it is at 14 years that con- 
science is given most frequently as a motive for morality. 
Girls begin to name conscience as a motive at 13i years, 
after which it increases in frequency as a motive. That is, 
it becomes frequent at the time of the pubertal disturbance. 
Boys give worldly success as a motive to a larger ex- 
tent than do the girls. This motive is high at the age of the 
greatest pubertal disturbance, both in the ease of the boys 
and in that of the girls. 
Girls are higher in the religious motive than are the boys. 
The religious motive shows a tendency to decrease as 
age increases. 
In the case of the girls, conscience and social approval 
increase as motives with the increase in age. 
In the case of boys, all motives tend to fall up to 
16 years. Basing our conjecture upon the cases we have, we 
may say that after 16 years, boys again tend to develop the 
motives of conscience and religion. 
In the case of girls, conscience and social approval 
are the motives which rise after all have fallen. 
During the period of the pubertal disturbance, the mo- 
tives which are active are: for the girls, punishment, and 
success, with religion secondary; for the boys, success, with 
religion and conscience secondary. 
Toe conclusions for the American children are the follow- 
ing. 
Boys give conscience as a motive after the period of 
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pubertal disturbance, that is, after 142 to 15 years. It is 
then a secondary motive only. 
During pubertal disturbance, worldly success is the boys' 
greatest motive. Religion and social approval as motives are 
both low. 
The Religious motive is higher in the case of the girls 
than with the boys. 
Girls give conscience as a motive after 13i years, that 
is, after the pubertal disturbance. A second rise comes at a- 
bout 152 years. 
Boys give success as a motive more than do the girls. 
Boys give social approval as a motive to a decreasing 
degree up to and through the period of pubertal disturbance. 
Girls give as motives during the pubertal disturbance, 
success, religion, and social approval. 
Question IV. 
The results of this question are graphed - 80 for the 
Scottish children, and 81 for the American. The conclusions 
to be drawn are the following. 
In the case of the Scottish boys. 
As a content of the good, external authority falls off all 
along the way, showing a sudden drop after pubertal disturbance. 
The religious content is low during pubertal disturbance, 
after which it shows a sudden rise. 
Altruism as a content falls off during pubertal disturbance. 
Self- respect develops as a content very slowly all the way. 
Conscience as a content of morality develops after a decrease 
at the pubertal disturbance. 
418. 
In the case of the Scottish girls. 
Obedience as a content of being good begins to fall at 13 
to 132 years, that is, at about the time of the pubertal dis- 
turbance. 
The religious content shows a sudden rise after the pubertal 
disturbance. 
Public approval is higher than in the case of the boys. 
Self- respect as a content is low -at the pubertal disturbance. 
After that it develops. 
Conscience as a content is higher than in the case of the boys. 
It rises somewhat sharply after the pubertal disturbance. 
In the case of both boys and girls, external authority 
as a content of the moral life drops after the pubertal dis- 
turbance; and the religious content and conscience both rise 
after the pubertal disturbance. 
The conclusions for the American boys are the following. 
External authority gradually vanishes as a content of the 
moral life. 
The religious content is high at 142 years, but then, that is, 
after the pubertal disturbance, it drops away. 
Altruism rises after the pubertal disturbance. 
Self -respect begins to drop away as a content at the time of 
the pubertal disturbance. 
Conscience as a content is absent during the pubertal dis- 
turbance, after which it rises. 
The conclusions for the American girls are the following. 
Obedience to external authority as the content of being good 
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falls after the pubertal disturbance. 
The religious content is high at the pubertal disturbance. Then 
it falls. 
Altruism rises after the pubertal disturbance. 
Self- respect falls after the pubertal disturbance. 
Conscience rises up to 14- years - through the pubertal dis- 
turbance. 
In the case of both American boys and American girls, 
submission to external authority as a content of good living 
falls away, especially after the pubertal disturbance. 
Religion in the case of both boys and girls falls as a content 
after the pubertal disturbance, when it was high. 
For both boys and girls, altruism as a content of the good 
life rises after the pubertal disturbance. 
For both American boys and American girls, self- respect as 
the content of the good life falls after the pubertal dis- 
turbance. 
Comparison of Conclusions. 
Comparison of Scottish and American Boys. 
Question 1,2. The pubertal disturbance is practically 
synchronous, at 142 years. 
Comparison of Scottish and American Girls. 
Question 1,2. The pubertal disturbance is synchronous - 
at 13 to 132 years. 
Question III. Both groups of girls give conscience as 
the motive for morality after the pubertal disturbance - 
from 132 years upward. 
420. 
Comparison of Scottish and American Children. 
Question 1,2. American children precede Scottish in the 
appreciation of socialization traits. The gang spirit is 
especially manifest in the comparison of the Scottish with 
the American votes on the word "tattling ". See Graphs 17, 18, 
37, and 43. 
Question I,2. Scottish children lose the sensitivity 
to self- regarding traits earlier than do the American. See 
Graphs 19, 20. 
Comparison between the Developments shown with regard 
to Self- regarding traits and Socialization traits; Self -re- 
garding Preferences and Socialization Preferences; Self -re- 
garding and Socialization Wrongs; and Self- regarding and 
Socialization Worsts. 
Scottish Boys. 
Question 1,2. No self -regarding trait showed its highest 
average during the years 13 to 14. No socialization trait 
during the years 122 to 142. 
Question I,3. Self- regarding traits show pubertal dis- 
turbance at 122 to 142 years; socialization traits at 12 to 
14. 
Question 1,2. Sensitivity to self -regarding traits pre- 
cedes that of socialization traits. 
Question II,2.Sensitivity to self- regarding wrongs 
precedes that to socialization wrongs. After 142 years, both 
decrease. 
Question I1,1. Sharp increase in sensitivity to all 
421. 
wrongs is apparent at 132 years. 
Scottish Girls. 
Question 1,2. No self- regarding or socialization trait 
showed a highest average between the ages 13 and 15 years. 
Question I,2. Development in sensitivity to self- regard- 
ing traits precedes that to socialization traits. 
Question 1,3. Self- regarding traits show disturbance at 
122 to 132 years; socialization traits at 13 to 14 years. 
Question I1,1. Girls already sensitized to wrongs at 
13 years. 
Question 11,2. Sensitivity to self- regarding traits de- 
velops before that to socialization traits. Sensitivity to 
both develops up to 14 years, at which a dullness to both 
categories sets in. 
American Boys. 
Question I,2. Self- regarding traits show disturbance 
at 14 to 15 years; socialization traits at 14 to 16 years. 
Question 1,2. Self- regarding sensitivity precedes 
socialization sensitivity. 
Question 1,3. Self- regarding traits and socialization 
traits show disturbance at 14 to 142 years. 
Question II,1. Development in sensitivity to self-re- 
garding wrongs precedes that to socialization wrongs. 
Question 11,2. Development in self- regarding worsts 
precedes that to socialization worsts. 
American Girls. 
Question 1,2. Self- regarding traits show disturbance at 
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14 to 15 years; so too do socialization traits. 
Question I,2. Self- regarding traits precede socializa- 
tion traits in development. 
Question I,3. Self- regarding traits show disturbance at 
14 to 142 years; socialization traits at 14- to 15 years. 
Question II,1.Sensitivity to self -regarding wrongs pre- 
cedes slightly that to socialization wrongs. 
Question 11,2. Self- regarding worsts and socialization 
worsts show almost a simultaneous development in the sensitivi- 
ty toward them; if either precedes, it is self- regarding ones. 
All children showed a development of sensitivity to 
socialization traits immediately following the pubertal dis- 
turbance. Sensitivity to self- regarding traits develops 
earlier. 
During the pubertal disturbance, active self -sacrificing 
traits are not yet chosen; instead, the traits chosen as 
ideal are the self -regarding ones. 
423. 
Summary of Conclusions. 
1. Children imagine their ideals to embody all desirable 
traits, until they learn that they do not; then the children 
transfer these traits to imagined heroes. 
2. Before the age of 12 years, approximately, children 
accept orthodox, customary standards of action; after 12 
they tend to develop individual standards of their own. 
3. Girls as a rule precede boys in the steps of their 
moral development. 
4. There is manifest in all children a disturbance in 
their development along the line of moral ideas at or near 
the period of puberty. This pubertal disturbance appears in 
the case of Scottish boys at 142 years at its height; in the 
case of Scottish girls, its height appears at 13 to 132 
years; in the case of the American boys, at 142 to 15 years; 
and in the case of the American girls at 13 to 132 years. 
5. During the pubertal disturbance, the traits of char- 
acter which appeal to the children are generally those of 
the self- regarding category, rather than of the socialization 
category. 
6. At the height of the pubertal disturbance, a de- 
creased percentage of the children would choose Jesus as 
their ideal. 
7.During the period of pubertal disturbance, the Scot- 
tish girls hold, as motives for being moral, punishment and 
success with religion secondary as a motive; the Scottish 
boys hold desire of success, with religion and respect 
424. 
for conscience secondary; the American boys hold desire of 
success as their chief motive; the American girls, hope of 
success, religion, and love of social approval. 
8. As a rule, categories pertaining to self- regard 
precede in development those pertaining to socialization. 
9. Boys show greater individual variations: the girls 
tend toward the orthodox and customary. 
10. There is some basis in our results for suspecting 
the noticeable appearance of the operation of conscience at 
132 years in Scottish boys, and before that in the Scottish 
girls. The same suspicion has some basis in the case of the 
American children. 
11. Conscience as a motive for morality rises after the 
pubertal disturbance. 
12. Obedience to conscience as the content of moral 
living rises as some other contents fall. 
13. Boys give success as a motive for good living 
more generally than do the girls. Girls give the religious 
motive more generally than do the boys. 
14. As the content of the good life, submission to an 
external authority decreases from the time of the pubertal 
disturbance. 
15. As the content of the good life, religion rises in 
the case of the Scottish children after the pubertal dis- 
turbance. In the case of the American children, it is al- 
truism which thus rises. 
16. American children precede the Scottish in the appre- 
425. 
elation of socialization traits. Scottish children precede 
the American in the loss of sensitivity to self -regarding 
traits. It seems that in the case of the American children, 
gregariousness becomes manifest more pronouncedly and earlier 
than in the ease of the Scottish children. 
17. At the age when the tests stop, the children have 
not yet come to the point of saying that they think that 
traits of active, self -sacrificing beneficence are the best. 
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